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This thesis is a labour history of Trinidad and Tobago, 
concentrating on the period from 1937 to 1990. The study 
attempts to show that there is not a unified or homogenous 
working class, and for this reason both traditional Marxist 
and industrial relations theories are rejected. Instead, the 
history of labour focuses on how the working classes have 
been divided by factors such as race, gender, class 
structure and politics. These divisions are used as an 
explanation for the absence of a popular socialist party in 
the country. It concludes that the economic recession of the 
1980s has led to the worst crisis in the history of the 
labour movement, but at the same time, this has laid the 
framework for a new strategy of social movement unionism, 
which attempts to constructively engage with, rather than 
ignore, divisions within the working classes. 
The main sources of data were documentary and archival 
material, and in particular, reports made by the British TUC 
and Colonial Office, industrial relations legislation, and 
trade union and political party documents and manifestoes. 
For the contemporary period, these sources of data were 
supplemented by fifteen interviews with leading figures in 
trade union and labour politics. 
The work is based on a macro approach to the study of 
labour, and as such constitutes a new and original approach 
to the study of labour in Trinidad and Tobago. In addition, 
more contemporary trade union documents and interviews 
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GLOSSARY 
Below are some of the major trade unions and political 
parties, past and present, in Trinidad and Tobago's history. 
These, and other, less significant organisations are 
discussed in the main text. 
ATSEFWTU - All Trinidad Sugar Estates and Factory Workers 
Trade Union. Formed in 1937, now known as the All Trinidad 
Sugar and General Workers Trade Union. 
BEU - Bank Employees Union. Small trade union formed in the 
1980s, representing bank employees at Republic Bank. 
BEWCHRP - British Empire citizens' Workers' and Home Rule 
Party. Formed by Uriah Butler in 1935-7, it declined after 
the 1956 election. 
CPTU - Council of Progressive Trade Unions. One of the two 
trade union federations still in existence, founded in 1971, 
and affiliated to the World Federation of Trade Unions. 
DLP - Democratic Labour Party. The main party of Oppostion 
from 1961-71. 
FWTU - Federated Workers Trade Union. Formed in 1937, no 
longer exists (see NUGFW). 
JTUM - An informal alliance of trade unions from both 
federations, it was formed in 1989 in an attempt to 
facilitate long term trade union unity. 
NAR - National Alliance for Reconstruction. An electoral 
alliance of four parties (the Democratic Action Congress, 
united Labour Front, Organisation for National 
Reconstruction and Tapia House Movement), it formed the 
government in December 1986. 
viii 
NJAC - The National Joint Action committee. Founded in 1969, 
it was the leading organisation in the 1970 Black Power 
rebellion. 
NUGFW - The National Union of Government and Federated 
Workers. The largest union in the country, it was formed in 
the late 1960s out of a merger between the National Union of 
Government Employees and the Federated Workers' Trade Union. 
NWA - Negro Welfare, Cultural and Social Association. Formed 
in 1935, this proto-Marxist and feminist organisation 
declined in the war years and its fragments went into 
various post-war labour parties (see chapter three). 
OWTU - Oilfields Workers' Trade Union. Formed in 1937, 
historically it is probably the most influential union in 
the country. Since 1962, it has had a radical leadership, 
but a more conservative membership. 
ix 
PNM - Peoples National Movement. Formed in 1955, it was the 
governing party from 1956-86. 
PSA - The Public Services' Association. Formed in 1938, it 
is the second major union representing public servants. 
SOPO - Summit of Peoples organisations. Formed in 1990 as an 
alliance between organised labour and other social 
movements. 
TIWU - Transport and Industrial Workers' Union. Formed in 
1962, it is traditionally one of the more radical unions in 
the country. 
TTLC - Trinidad and Tobago Labour Congress. The main trade 
union federation, founded in 1966, affiliated to the 
Trinidad and Tobago Labour Congress. 
TTUTA - The Trinidad and Tobago Unified Teachers' 
Association. Formed in the early 1980s, it is one of the two 
principal non-aligned unions in the country. 
TUC - Refers (where specified) to either the British Trade 
Union Congress, the Trinidad Trade Union council, which was 
formed in 1937 but no longer exists, or the Trinidad Trade 
Union Congress, which was formed in 1957, but split in 1965-
6, and eventually became the Trinidad and Tobago Labour 
Congress. 
x 
TWA/TLP - The Trinidad Working Men's Association, formed in 
1897. It became a semi-political party under the name 
Trinidad Labour Party in the 1930s. Eventually it formed 
part of the Democratic Labour Party. 
ULF - United Labour Front. opposition party after the 1976 
elections. It split into two factions in 1977-8. 
UNe - united National Congress. opposition party from 1990, 
it was formed from the split in the National Alliance for 
Reconstruction government in 1988-9. 
WFP - Workers' and Farmers' Party. Formed in 1966, it 
quickly dissolved after a poor showing in the general 
election of that year. 
WIIP - West Indian Independence Party. Short-lived labour 
party that contested the 1956 election. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. Trinidad and Tobago 
Trinidad and Tobago is a twin-island state in the southern 
Caribbean, with a population of approximatelY 1.2 million, 
which lies only a few miles from the South American 
mainland. It is justly famous for its Carnival, cricketers 
and calypso music. Among its most renowned public figures 
are the author Sir v.s. Naipaul, the former cricketer and 
peer Learie Constantine (who died in 1970) and political 
commentator, historian and cricket journalist C.L.R. James 
(who died in 1989). Its diverse culture - there are strong 
African, Creole, Indian, Chinese and European influences -
is a reflection of the fact that it is an immigrant society 
which has evolved since Columbus first sighted Trinidad in 
1498. 
However, the tourist brochure image of sunny weather and 
sandy beaches hides a grimmer reality. Leaving aside the 
fact that it rains a lot, the islands have a history of 
exploitation, colonialism and oppression. Trinidad was a 
Spanish colony until 1797, when it was taken over by the 
British. Tobago frequently changed hands but the British 
finally established control of the island in 1793. The 
islands' original inhabitants, the Arawaks and Caribs, were 
either killed by imported European diseases or murdered. 
Slavery was the first major form of labour control and 
Africa was the principal supplier of labourers. Sugar was 
2 
the main export from both islands. After its abolition in 
1834, indentured labour was established as the most 
prominent form of labour control on the sugar plantations of 
Trinidad, and India became the main source of labour. In 
Tobago, the sugar industry gradually declined and the 
island's economic situation grew increasingly worse, which 
was a major factor in the island's unification with Trinidad 
between 1889-98. 
In the twentieth century oil became established as the main 
export and the economic fortunes of the twin-island state 
remains increasingly dependent on this sector. Colonialism 
established a particular pattern of production based on 
exporting a limited number of primary goods and agricultural 
foodstuffs, and efforts to industrialise and diversify the 
economy since the 1950s have met with limited success. 
Poverty and unemployment, especially among young people, are 
serious problems, and in 1990 an attempt was made to 
overthrow liberal democracy by a small fundamentalist Muslim 
sect. Although liberal democracy (albeit one which is very 
corrupt) remains intact, the economic and social situation 
in the country leads one to question, in the absence of 
radically different development strategies, the continued 
stability of the political system. 
3 
2. The Thesis 
(i) Outline 
In this thesis, I outline a labour history of Trinidad and 
Tobago, concentrating on the period from 1937 (when trade 
unions were first formed) to the present day. In doing so, I 
explore the divisions within the working classes, and focus 
on race and ethnicity, gender, the class structure, and the 
politics of labour. Previous labour histories of Trinidad 
and Tobago have either concentrated on the trade union 
movement (Ramdin 1982), or have crudely used an 
inappropriate Marxist two-class model to explain periods of 
conflict and consensus (Rennie 1974). While my thesis is 
influenced by Marxist theory, I attempt to utilise a 
materialist method in a flexible way, and in doing so, I 
link the concepts of labour and development. For example, by 
focusing on divisions within the working classes - and 
explaining them (at least partly) in terms of uneven 
capitalist development - I reject the idea of an inevitable 
class confrontation between bourgeoisie and proletariat that 
leads to socialist revolution, or explanations which regard 
the absence of such a confrontation as a product of the 
'false consciousness' of the working class. The problems 
that are posed by the thesis have therefore not been 
explicitly asked before, and it is in this respect that the 
work constitutes an original contribution to knowledge. 
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(ii) Theory and Methods 
The relationship between theory and method is a 
controversial one, particularly as many social scientists 
now reject the use of 'meta-theory' and concentrate on 
analysing the social construction of reality. Whilst I agree 
that social science is not value free and every theory is 
"in part a social product of .•. society." (Gouldner 1973: 
465), this does not mean that one arbitrarily chooses 
between competing perspectives, as if they were simply a 
matter of personal taste. Instead, one discusses competing 
perspectives, and clearly shows why some approaches are 
rejected and others accepted. This task is undertaken in 
some detail in chapter one. 
Nevertheless, this still leaves the problem of relating 
theory to empirical data, which in turn leads on to the 
problem of conducting appropriate research methods. Keeping 
in mind my detailed examination of theories in the opening 
chapter, a preliminary, but brief, discussion of the 
relationship between theory and methods is necessary. 
The problem with modernisation theory can be traced back to 
its roots in Parsonian 'Grand Theory.' In this approach, 
theory is an a priori construction - it is constructed prior 
to, and in isolation from, empirical material. Grand 
theorists "never ..• get down from the higher generalities to 
problems in their historical and structural contexts." 
(Mills 1961: 33) Historical sociology is reduced to the 
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gradual transition to 'modern' society. Empirical data is 
simply used to 'fit into the boxes' of grand theory 
(Goldthorpe 1987: 166). The process of research therefore 
becomes a task of finding the 'facts' which fit the theory. 
Of course, this becomes a problem when 'inconvenient' 
factors arise; in my study, one example is the existence of 
'archaic' labour regimes (slavery, indentured labour) during 
the colonial period, from which European capital derived 
some benefit. 
A Marxist approach does not necessarily overcome these 
problems. Hindess and Hirst argued that 'facts' are based on 
theoretical constructions, an argument with which I would 
not disagree. However, they go on to argue that their 
arguments "cannot be refuted by an empiricist recourse to 
supposed 'facts' of history." (Hindess and Hirst 1975: 3) 
Such a view is excessively rationalist and all too easily 
leads to a neglect of empirical data, or even to the view 
that no amount of empirical research can refute one's 
argument. Moreover, they employ a rigid separation of 'fact' 
and 'theory' (ibid.: 179), one that many empiricists would 
agree with. The Marxist method should not ignore the 
'given'; as Asad and Wolpe argue, "Empiricism cannot be 
transcended ... by a refusal to confront 'the so-called 
facts'." (Asad and Wolpe 1976: 476) 
Other versions of Marxism (Warren 1988; Cohen 1984) reduce 
history to a gradual unfolding of the productive forces, in 
which all societies pass through similar stages of 
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development. The problems of modernisation theory are 
therefore replicated in this approach. This has led some 
writers to reject Marxism as 'historicist' because the role 
of human agency is subordinated to an 'inevitable plan' of 
history. Popper, for example, defines historicism as "an 
approach to the social sciences which assumes that 
historical prediction is their principal aim, and which 
assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the 
'rhythms' or the 'patterns', the 'laws' or the 'trends' that 
underlie the evolution of history." (Popper 1986: 3) Newer, 
'post-modern' theories reject Marxism as a totalising, 
'modernist' project for very similar reasons (see among 
others Foucault 1980; for a critical commentary see Kellner 
1988). 
There is no doubt that these critiques are very powerful. 
However, they are only applicable to some crude versions of 
Marxism, particularly influential in the Second 
International and in the pre-Gorbachev soviet union. In this 
thesis I attempt to utilise a materialist method in a way 
that does not make class an 'all-embracing', totalising 
category (see for instance my discussion of social movement 
unionism in chapter six), nor leads to a stagist theory of 
history based on inevitable laws of motion beyond the 
control of human beings. I therefore account for human 
agency and consider empirical material. For example, I look 
at the real processes of class formation, structure and 
resistance in Trinidad and Tobago, rather than neglect the 
'facts' of slavery or indentured labour because they do not 
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'fit the theory' of successive stages of history. Concepts 
such as class formation, imperialism or gender subordination 
are not separate from, and prior to, historical analysis and 
"can only be described, verified and linked to empirically 
observable events through historical analysis." (Lubeck 
1986: 313-4) Processes of class formation are important 
because they set the limits (and generate opportunities) on 
what 'social actors' can or cannot do. They do not however, 
completely determine what people will actually do. 
Clearly then, empirical material is very important. I 
therefore found (a) research methodes) appropriate to my 
subject of study. The project stands in the tradition of 
historical sociology, and covers a wide area of study 
(labour in general, rather than a specific occupation) over 
a long period of time. Surveys or interviews alone were 
therefore deemed inappropriate or limited. Those interviews 
that were carried out were supplementary rather than central 
to my work, and/or they were focused on a particular time 
period, the 1980s, where personal information was an 
important supplement to printed sources. Altogether, 15 
interviews were carried out during my visit to Trinidad, 
which lasted from January to June 1990. They were conducted 
with leading figures in the labour movement, and some were 
especially useful because they 'opened the gates' to other 
sources of information, particularly documentary material. 
The bulk of my research methods relied heavily on 
'unobtrusive' primary and secondary sources such as 
documents, newspapers and books. Research was conducted at 
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the libraries at Warwick University, the Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, London, the University of the West 
Indies, st. Augustine, at the headquarters of the oil fields 
Workers Trade Union, San Fernando, and the Council of 
Progressive Trade Unions, Port of Spain. I initially 
familiarised myself with the secondary material at Warwick, 
and then moved on to examine primary sources such as old TUC 
and Colonial Office reports, which were available at the 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies. During my visit to 
Trinidad, I used the university library at st. Augustine as 
the main source of access to primary material in the post-
independence period. Industrial relations legislation, trade 
union documents, labour party manifestoes and newspapers 
were of particular importance. The librarian at OWTU 
headquarters provided me with a wealth of data on trade 
unions and political parties, most of which was conveniently 
arranged into various appropriate categories. Finally, the 
trade union leaders and secretarial staff at the 
headquarters of the CPTU provided me with a great deal of up 
to date documentary material, much of which was otherwise 
confidential. The leadership of the Labour Congress was less 
forthcoming, but I managed to get access to most of their 
documents through the collection at the CPTU. 
This largely unobtrusive approach had the advantage that it 
gave me a long term historical perspective, and it was a 
time and cost saving device. As Lubeck states, this approach 
uniquely "enables the researcher to interpret empirical 
findings in relation to long term historical processes .. " 
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(ibid.: 314) For instance, an extensive survey of newspapers 
published during the 1970 rebellion enabled me to assess the 
extent of the role played by the organised labour movement 
in these events (see chapter four). Similarly, internal 
documents and newspapers enabled me to explore what the 
united Labour Front stood for, and the reasons for its split 
(chapter five). And interviews and documents gave me access 
to the most up to date information concerning trade union 
unity and social movement unionism (chapter six). 
Finally, my approach also overcame some of the problems of 
surveys and questionnaires, particularly those relating to 
the 'reactivity' of those being questioned. When somebody 
knows that they are being questioned or studied by a social 
scientist, they may change their behaviour accordingly. This 
is not usually the case when the sources have been collected 
for some other purpose. 
(iii) Thesis Structure and Two Disclaimers 
The thesis is divided into six chapters and a conclusion. In 
the opening chapter I look at various theories of 
development and outline the approaches to labour which 
accompany these theories. Chapter two outlines a labour 
history of Trinidad and Tobago from the period of slavery 
until the emergence of trade unions in 1937. This chapter 
explores the origins of gender and ethnic divisions amongst 
the working classes. The third chapter focuses on the 
development of the labour movement from the late 1930s to 
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independence and looks at the political divisions that 
emanated. Chapter four analyses the Black Power revolt of 
1970 and concentrates on the interaction of race and class, 
the fluidity of the class structure, and the political 
potential of the so-called 'informal sector'. In chapter 
five I present a specific case study of the united Labour 
Front, the one labour party in Trinidad's history that 
enjoyed significant electoral support, and assess why it 
failed to come to terms with the long term divisions within 
the working classes. Chapter six looks at the recession of 
the 1980s and how this has exacerbated these divisions, and 
at responses by the labour movement to the unfavourable 
economic climate. I then make some conclusions about labour 
and development, and the links between the two concepts. 
Finally, I wish to point to two unavoidable weaknesses in 
this study. First, although the title of the thesis includes 
the words Trinidad and Tobago, in practice the latter island 
is neglected. No organised labour movement in Tobago exists 
independently of that in Trinidad, and it is on this 
(admittedly weak) basis that Tobago is largely treated as 
just one area within Trinidad, while in reality, it has some 
degree of self-government in its own House of Assembly. 
Second, the term 'Third World' is used throughout the 
thesis. I am aware of the problems associated with this term 
and in particular how it homogenises a very diverse group of 
countries. The term is therefore used as shorthand and 
refers to those countries who, as late developers, have 





Approaches to the study of Labour and Development in the 
Caribbean 
"We are told that free trade would create an international 
division of labour, and thereby give to each country the 
production which is most in harmony with its natural 
advantages. 
'You believe perhaps, gentlemen, that the production of 
coffee and sugar is the natural destiny of the West Indies. 
'Two centuries ago, nature, which does not trouble herself 
about commerce, had planted neither sugar-cane nor coffee 
tree there ... 
'If the free-traders cannot understand how one nation can 
grow rich at the expense of another, we need not wonder, 
since these same gentlemen also refuse to understand how 
within one country one class can enrich itself at the 
expense of another." 
K.Marx: Speech on Free Trade 1848 (in Marx 1984: 269) 
In this opening chapter, I initially examine three competing 
theories of Caribbean society, and relate these to the study 
of labour and development in the region. The three basic 
approaches are: firstly, modernisation and industrial 
relations theory; secondly, dependency theory; thirdly, the 
theory of cultural pluralism. Each of these is examined both 
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generally, and in terms of its applicability to the 
Caribbean region. They are then described and critically 
examined, and I conclude that they are all incapable of 
fully illuminating the subject of my study. I then present 
an alternative theory in my fourth section, based on the 
concept of uneven development, which attempts to explicitly 
link labour and development. As a prelude to my case study, 
this section is completed by a brief discussion of the 
politics of labour organisation in Third World societies. 
section One: The Political Economy and sociology of 
Modernisation. 
Introduction 
This opening section examines the political economy and the 
sociological theory of modernisation. In my discussion of 
the former, I concentrate on questions concerning the 
industrialisation of the Third World, and in particular the 
Caribbean, from the 1940s onwards. In discussing the latter, 
I turn to more general questions of historical sociology, 
and focus my discussion on the differences between, and 
transition from, 'traditional' to 'modern' societies. In 
discussing these two schools of thought, I show the 
similarities of their proposals for developing Third World 
societies. My discussion then moves to the question of 
labour and industrial relations' systems in 'underdeveloped' 
societies. Finally, the strengths and weaknesses of this 
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approach are analysed, and I argue that while modernisation 
theory constitutes a partial advance over neo-classical 
economic theory, its proponents still fail to comprehend the 
problems of economic and social development in 
underdeveloped societies, and therefore cannot provide a 
systematic analysis of labour. 
1. Modernisation Theory Outlined. 
(i) Political Economy: Neo-Classical Theory Amended 
By the nineteenth century, an international division of 
labour had developed in which 'advanced' countries produced 
manufactured goods (and some primary goods) while 'backward' 
countries mainly produced and exported primary products. 
Leading economists argued that this division of labour was 
to the mutual benefit of the countries involved; that is, 
each nation obtained more goods through an international 
division of labour in which all nations specialised in, and 
exported, those goods which they produced cheaply. In other 
words, each nation produced the goods in which it had a 
natural or 'comparative advantage' (Ricardo 1981: 133-41). 
(See section four below for a more detailed discussion of 
neo-classical economics.) 
Even in the twentieth century, the colonial powers continued 
to argue that the colonies were incapable of undergoing a 
thorough process of industrialisation. For example the Moyne 
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commission of Inquiry (on the Caribbean labour riots of the 
1930s) argued that various factors militated against 
industrial development. These included the temperament of 
the west Indian worker, overpopulation and the size of the 
territories. The Commission reported that the region should 
continue to specialise in producing those goods in which it 
had a natural advantage, which were minerals and 
agricultural goods (West India Royal Commission Report 1945: 
426, 443; Thomas 1988: 61). 
However, a number of economists began to challenge the view 
that unhindered 'market forces' equally benefited each 
country in the world order. The Latin American economist 
Raul Prebisch (prebisch 1959) argued that the Third World 
did not benefit from the international system of trade 
because of the unequal market powers involved in 
international transactions. Focusing his study on Latin 
America (where independence had been won in the nineteenth 
century but the region was still largely a primary good 
exporter), Prebisch argued that the 'terms of trade' that 
existed between primary producers and manufactured goods' 
producers were weighted in the latter's favour (ibid.: 261-
4). Exporters of manufactured goods had a monopoly on the 
supply of such goods and so they could control prices. This 
was reinforced by the power of trade unions in 
industrialised countries, whose members won wage increases 
which in turn guaranteed that prices would remain high. On 
the other hand, there were many exporters of primary 
products and the resultant competition drove prices down. 
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The international division of labour therefore worked to the 
advantage of the industrialised countries (ibid.: 251-4). 
The proposed solution for the peripheral countries was 
industrialisation, which would reduce the reliance on 
imports, and so reduce the need to export. In so doing, 
domestic employment would increase and the home market would 
expand. Prebisch therefore proposed a strategy of 'import 
sUbstitution industrialisation' for Latin America, under 
which manufactured imports would be controlled by protective 
tariffs in the periphery (ibid.: 254-61). 
This challenge to neo-classical economics was not as 
innovatory as it may initially appear. For example, the 
'free-trade utopia' espoused by neo-classicists hardly 
corresponded to the real mechanisms of the international 
economy in the nineteenth century, as nascent industrial 
powers protected their domestic industry from foreign 
competition through high protective tariffs (Hobsbawm 1968 
and 1988c: 140 and 39; Gamble 1985: 237). Moreover, in Latin 
America itself nations such as Brazil had begun to 
industrialise in the 1930s (in Argentina the process started 
at an even earlier date) precisely through the lSI strategy 
advocated (after the event) by Prebisch. 
The work of W. Arthur Lewis on the Caribbean mirrors that of 
Prebisch's on Latin America. Lewis challenged the 
assumptions of the British Colonial Office and the Moyne 
commission and argued that it was possible, indeed 
17 
necessary, for the West Indies to begin to industrialise. He 
regarded it as necessary because primary good production 
could not provide adequate employment. Indeed, Lewis argued 
that the constant factor of unemployment provided the region 
with a comparative advantage in cheap, 'unlimited supplies 
of labour' (Lewis 1954: 141). This was because unemployment 
functioned to keep wage costs down as the supply of labour 
outstripped the demand. Lewis argued that this advantage 
would encourage investment as profits would be high. It was 
however, recognised by Lewis that domestic entrepreneurs 
lacked the capital to lead the investment process, so, 
initially at least, foreign capital would play the leading 
role (Lewis 1950: 38). 
Like Prebisch, Lewis was theorising a process that had 
already begun in the region. Indeed, labourers were using 
advanced technology in the Caribbean region at a 
comparatively early period - sugar production by slave 
labour in Cuba used such advanced methods as the steam mill. 
In terms of capitalist industrialisation, two points are 
relevant. Firstly, there had been some diversification into 
light industries in the period of the Second World War. 
Secondly, and more importantly, Puerto Rico had undergone a 
process of industrialisation from 1944. The 'Puerto Rican 
Model' was based on attracting foreign (primarily US) 
capital through tax incentives (such as The Industrial 
Incentives Law 1947), cheap labour and weak trade unions. US 
investment increased, particularly in labour intensive 
industries such as textiles, food processing and leather 
goods (Thomas 1988: 78). 
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So, a good part of Lewis' recommendations were already in 
operation in Puerto Rico. Nonetheless, these proposals would 
influence the development strategies undertaken in the 
British West Indies in the 1950s , including those in 
Trinidad and Tobago. 
(ii.) Sociology: Functionalist Theory Up-Dated. 
My analysis has so far concentrated on the works of 
development economists at a very specific time period, when 
Latin America and the Caribbean were beginning to 
industrialise. The purpose of this study is to explain the 
factors that determine class formation, labour control and 
the politics of labour, both prior to, and after industrial 
development. Of particular concern here is the 
'theorisation' of the process of transition from a 
traditional, pre-industrial society to a modern, industrial 
society. In order to carry out this task, I now examine 
approaches to labour and development in the tradition of 
'historical sociology', and in particular the 
'modernisation' school. 
The origins of this school of thought are rooted in the 
works of the classical sociologist, Emile Durkheim. In his 
work The Division of Labour in Society, Durkheim contrasted 
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traditional and modern societies in order to explain the 
changing nature of order (or 'social solidarity') in 
society. In traditional societies, solidarity is 
'mechanical', whereby society is based on shared beliefs 
(such as religion) and community values. In modern 
societies, on the other hand, solidarity is based on 
'organic' values: in other words, society is no longer based 
on shared beliefs (for instance the modern phenomenon of 
secularisation) but is instead 'unified' by shared material 
interests and contractual relations, and an interdependent 
division of labour (Durkheim 1964: 70-110, 111 ff.). 
Talcott Parsons was influenced by this contrast between 
traditional and modern societies when he attempted to 
explain how societies achieve social order. In a rather 
ambitious theory, Parsons argued that the basis for all 
societies lies in "an integrated system of generalized 
patterns of value orientation." (Parsons 1962: 203) He 
argued that society is 'achieved' through an agreement on 
beliefs and values, and that the nature of these beliefs 
varies from society to society. In traditional society 
common beliefs include an ascribed or pre-determined social 
status, particularist or personalised social relations and 
collectivist values. Modern societies, by contrast, are 
based on achieved status (i.e. open social mobility and 
equality of opportunity), universalism (i.e. standards 
equally applicable to all, such as the rule of law), and 
individualist values (Parsons 1962: 76-88). 
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Influenced by these ideas (albeit based as they are on a 
one-sided reading of Durkheim), sociologists began to 
theorise the process of development in terms of the 
transition from traditional to modern societies. The 
problem, then, for sociologists in the 1950s was to explain 
the causes of 'backwardness' and propose appropriate 
solutions. Some writers argued that traditional values were 
the cause of 'backwardness' and that the solution to this 
problem was to educate the traditionalists on the virtues of 
modern (i.e. western) ideas (McClelland 1961: 430). Others 
argued that these values may impede modernisation, but they 
were largely a reflection (rather than a cause) of 
traditionalism. For instance, Walt Rostow argued that there 
were five stages of development through which all societies 
must pass: traditional, pre-conditions for take-off, take-
off, drive to maturity, and high mass consumption (Rostow 
1960: 4-16). Third World societies were situated at the 
traditional stage, which was characterised as having a 
basically agrarian economy, using backward technological and 
scientific techniques, and based on a closed system of 
social stratification where roles were ascribed rather than 
achieved. To overcome the problems of backwardness, Third 
World societies must pass from the traditional stage to the 
second stage, where the pre-conditions for the take-off to a 
modern, industrial society are present. These pre-conditions 
include the development of trade, the beginnings of 
rational, scientific ideas and the emergence of an elite 
group which re-invests, rather than squanders its wealth 
(ibid.: 17-35). 
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so, the solution to the problem of backwardness was 
industrialisation. sociologists therefore arrived at similar 
conclusions to development economists, in that both schools 
of thought advocated industrial development in 'backward' 
countries. There were significant differences as well, 
particularly in the degree of attention paid to the 
international economy: development economists regarded the 
existing terms of trade as inequitable, even exploitative 
(and in this respect Prebisch was a great influence on the 
dependency school, discussed below), while sociologists 
tended to neglect existing international economic relations. 
Nevertheless, both schools agreed that industrialisation of 
the periphery was necessary, and both believed that 
corporations from the advanced countries would (initially, 
at least) lead this process. 
Both Latin America and the Caribbean began this process in 
the 1930s and 1940s (or earlier). In the 1950s, the British 
west Indies followed suit and impressive rates of growth 
were recorded. Optimism concerning the transition to 
'modernism' was rife. The Trinidadian sociologist Lloyd 
Braithwaite argued that the modernisation of the Caribbean 
economy would lead to a modernisation of the 'system-goals' 
(social aspirations) of Caribbean society. Trinidad was 
progressing "from the mere maintenance of law and order to 
the introduction of political and social institutions 
appropriate to a society in which universalistic-achievement 
values pre-dominated, and to the acceptance of a system-
goals corresponding to those of the United Kingdom." 
(Braithwaite 1975: 161) 
Summary 
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Development economics and sociology in the 1940s to the 
1960s agreed that Third World societies needed to 'catch up' 
with advanced, Western societies and that this was best 
achieved by the employment of Western development 
strategies. These could take the form of a diffusion of 
Western technology or Western values, or a combination of 
the two. In this way, the social institutions of Third World 
societies would be modernised, and would take on a form 
similar to that in the West. One of these social 
institutions was the arena of labour relations, and it is to 
this field that I now turn. 
(iii.) Modernisation and the Modern 'Industrial Man'. 
Development economics and sociology amended, but did not 
totally reject neo-classical theories of the international 
economy. For instance, the neo-classical argument that the 
Caribbean should continue to produce those goods in which it 
had a comparative or natural advantage was rejected, and the 
need to industrialise was stressed. Prebisch argued that 
this was due to the imperfections of 'pure market forces', 
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and their resultant inequalities. However, the 'break' was 
only partial because the basic laws of market economies were 
accepted and industrialisation was premised on the existence 
of comparative advantages other than natural resources - for 
instance, cheap labour. 
In the field of industrial relations, sociologists in the 
1950s and 1960s similarly questioned some of the premises of 
neo-classical economics. Free market economists saw no need 
for trade unions beyond their functioning as friendly 
societies. This was because the wage labour contract was 
regarded as a contract of equals, freely entered into by the 
concerned parties. (It was similarly argued, as I have 
suggested, that international trade was based on the 
assumption of the existence of two or more equal partners.) 
However, industrial relations theorists recognised that 
market imperfections could arise; for example, through 
employers paying their workers a wage lower than that which 
market conditions alone would dictate. Therefore, trade 
unions could play a proper role in society by ensuring an 
adequate wage for their workers. Hence, just as 
protectionist Third World states modified the workings of 
world market forces, collective bargaining would modify the 
functioning of market forces in the labour market. 
In the Third World, industrial relations theorists believed 
that the effect of industrialisation would be to modernise 
the prevailing system of labour relations. It was argued 
that the radicalism of Third World labourers would gradually 
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diminish: "labour protest", Kerr argued, "is on the decline 
as industrialization around the world proceeds ... The protest 
of today is more in favour of industrialization than against 
it." (Kerr et.al. 1962: 7) This is because industrialisation 
"tends under any political and economic system to raise 
materially the level of wages, to reduce the hours of work, 
and to raise living standards as measured by such 
conventional means as life expectancy, health and 
education." (ibid.: 29) 
west Indian industrial relations theorists such as Zin Henry 
put forward the view that the Caribbean was slowly moving 
forward to an 'industrial relations system' (Dunlop 1975: 1-
32; Craig 1975: 8-20) based on the British model; a model 
described as "a self-administered system built upon 
principles of freedom and voluntarism where labour and 
management are free to regulate their relationship, 
determine terms and conditions of employment, and 
accommodate their problems by mutual consent." (Henry 1972: 
91) 
The adequacy of this theory will be examined below, but one 
weakness is immediately obvious. with the benefit of 
hindsight, it is clear that Kerr and his collaborators were 
optimistic concerning the scope of Third World 
industrialisation. Kerr may be correct in his assertion that 
protest is for rather than against industrialisation, but 
this in itself cannot explain why the process has been 
limited. The industrialisation of Haiti, Bangladesh or 
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Burkina Faso may lead to increased stability, but this does 
not address the problem of how to proceed with a such a 
strategy. Moreover, the limitation of industry to certain 
sectors in most (or even all) Third World countries calls 
into question the applicability of Kerr's thesis to the 
Third World in general, as I discuss below. 
These problems with Kerr's contentions have been implicitly 
recognised by another mainstream IR theorist, Adolf 
Sturmthal. He recognises that a modern IR system is but one 
of a variety of systems of labour relations in the world 
(sturmthal 1973: 8). However, he argues that the modern 
system should be the only system in the world. In other 
words, what is required is a continued diffusion of Western 
ideas and technology into other areas of the world. 
2. Modernisation Theory Assessed 
It is now widely recognised by sociologists that the 
functionalist analysis of society is inadequate. Many 
criticisms have been made: for instance, the model assumes 
rather than explains social equilibrium, it conflates the 
existence of an institution in society with its necessity, 
and it under-estimates the degree of conflict in society 
(Mills 1959: 39: Mann 1987). As a result of these 
weaknesses, functionalists cannot properly explain the 
causes of social change. The weaknesses of functionalist 
sociology are equally applicable in the 'developed' world 
and the 'underdeveloped' world. For my purposes, I will 
concentrate on the functionalist analysis of the latter. 
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Undoubtedly the basic weakness of modernisation theory is 
its 'dualism'. Modernisation theory assumes that there is a 
complete separation of the inter-relationships between 
different parts of interdependent economies. This dualism 
occurs at two levels in modernisation theory: firstly, there 
is a failure to examine properly the relationship between a 
particular Third World society and the wider international 
economy; and secondly, there is a failure to explain the 
relationship between the traditional and the modern sector 
within a Third World economy. As Frank states, "The dualist 
theory and the diffusionist and other theses based on it are 
inadequate because the supposed structural duality is 
contrary to both historical and contemporary reality: the 
entire social fabric of the underdeveloped countries has 
long since been penetrated and transformed by, and 
integrated into, the world embracing system of which it is 
an integral part." (Frank 1969b: 62) 
An analysis which overcomes this dualism at the 
international level shows the inapplicability of Rostow's 
analysis to the Caribbean. The original traditional 
societies of the Arawak and Carib Indians were largely 
destroyed (rather than modernised) by the Europeans. 
Moreover, the societies that succeeded the Indian 
civilisations were the creations of European colonialism, 
but were still 'traditional'. So the development of 'modern' 
society in Europe was accompanied by the reinforcement of 
'traditional' society in the Caribbean. 
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Indeed, the connection may go far deeper than this, for as 
Frank argues, 'modern' society (or to use his phrase, the 
'metropolis') was a product (wholly, according to Frank, but 
partly in other analyses) of the exploitation of 
'traditional' societies (satellites). This exploitation 
takes place through the expropriation by the metropolis of 
the satellites' surplus, which in turn leads to the 
development of the former at the expense of the latter. In 
this way so-called traditional societies are not undeveloped 
so much as underdeveloped, due to the "lack of access to 
their own surplus." (Frank 1969a: 9) The precise mechanisms 
(and the adequacy) of this process will be examined in 
sections two and four, but it should be clear that Rostow's 
ahistorical dichotomy between the traditional and the modern 
is false, and that economies do not develop in isolation 
from each other; indeed, one may even benefit at another's 
expense. It would be compatible with this analysis to argue 
(as some scholars - to be discussed later - have) that New 
World slavery promoted the industrial revolution in Europe. 
west Indian writers such as Lewis and Braithwaite accept 
that these contentions apply to the slave period (and the 
period of indentured labour up to 1917) (Lewis 1950: 34-5; 
Lewis 1954: 149; Braithwaite 1975: 25), but they question 
its appropriateness once a Third World country has achieved 
political independence and/or industrialised. They argue 
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that capitalist industrialisation sweeps away the remnants 
of archaic economic practices and the particularistic values 
of traditional societies, and that a Western style of life 
will eventually emerge (Braithwaite 1975: 168). 
However, industrialising Third World societies had to (and 
still have to) compete with countries that had a large 
'head-start' in industrial development. This advantage 
allowed the advanced countries to develop further, once 
again at the expense of the underdeveloped societies. Some 
writers argued that foreign dependence actually increased 
through industrialisation, as Third World societies relied 
increasingly on transnational corporations, and that while 
some development had taken place in the periphery, it was 
still largely dominated by, and for the benefit of, the 
'advanced' countries, or a small minority in the Third World 
(see section two for further details). For instance, in 
Trinidad and Tobago from 1957-65, foreign investment 
averaged $86 million a year, but over the same period 
average annual outflows were $111 million (McIntyre and 
Watson 1970: 19; Oxaal 1975: 39-40). 
The dualist analysis is also inadequate in its assessment of 
the internal structure of Third World societies. Kerr's 
argument that labour protest declines as modern industry 
delivers a higher standard of living relies on a purely 
'technicist' account of industrialisation, which does not 
account for the real contradictions of the process nor its 
effects on people's lives. Indeed, Rostow carried out such 
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an analysis of the British case, arguing that the transition 
to an industrial society led to a uniform increase in living 
standards (Rostow 1948: 122-5). This view is open to 
question in the British case (Hobsbawm 1968: 154-71), 
although there may have been a slight increase in living 
standards from 1790-1840. However, even this debate, useful 
as it is, can become sterile because it tends to neglect an 
enquiry of the very real social changes that 
industrialisation brings about (Hobsbawm 1968: 79-96). For 
instance, who benefits most (and least) from the process? 
Moreover, the British (and any other) case was a 
'catastrophic experience' under which people were drawn off 
of the land and were forced (by economic necessity) to seek 
employment elsewhere (Thompson 1988: 231). 
In the Third World, this process has been even more uneven 
and 'catastrophic'. Rostow's analysis does not take into 
account the links between the 'backward' and the 
'traditional' sectors, but instead treats them as two 
separate entities (thus repeating his dualist analysis, this 
time within the 'internal' economy). The task of development 
theory is not to state that the former must simply 'catch 
up' with the latter; instead, it should examine how the 
development of one sector affects the development of the 
other (just as it should question how the development of one 
country affects the development of another). Indeed, the 
presence of the supposedly modernising influence of foreign 
capital has underlined the need for such an analysis. 
capital investment in the Third World has often reinforced 
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'archaic' labour relations (or alternatively invested in 
labour intensive industries and paid very low wages, as in 
the Puerto Rico case above). For example, the British 
dominated sugar industry in Trinidad encouraged the 
development of sugar cane farming in the 1880s (see chapter 
two). And in Jamaica, united Fruit similarly discouraged 
wage labour by selling land to potential independent 
producers in the 1930s (Post 1978: 125). Moreover, both 
national and foreign capitalists behave very differently 
from the expectations of modernisation (and neo-classical) 
theory, a point to which I return in section four. 
The more all-encompassing industrialisation process that has 
taken place since the 1940s has been similarly uneven. 
contrary to Lewis' intentions, Caribbean governments have 
zealously encouraged industrial development, but at the 
expense of the rural sector. The result has been "a growing 
impoverishment of rural economies" (Cross 1979: 19), 
unaccompanied by an 'incorporation' of those forced off the 
land into the urban sector. This has meant that unemployment 
remains a constant factor, along with the growth of a large 
'marginal sector', selling anything from coconuts to their 
own bodies in order to survive. These 'marginals' also 
perform certain functions for capital, such as reducing the 
social reproduction requirements of capital and acting as a 
reserve army of labour, which capital can draw on in a boom 
period and can discard in a slump. (The existence of the 
marginal sector cannot, however, be explained solely in 
terms of their 'functions' to capital, and one must instead 
explain their origins in terms of uneven capitalist 
accumulation - see section four.) 
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This last point is particularly important in any assessment 
of the role of organised labour in the Caribbean. Henry 
argues that 'political unionism' will disappear as 
industrialisation develops, and will be replaced by a modern 
IR system (Henry 1972: 83). I discuss below how this 
argument neglects the unevenness of industrialisation in the 
Third World, but for the moment a brief examination of 
political unionism more generally is necessary. 
Firstly, political unionism still exists, in the narrow 
sense of union-party relations, in the 'advanced' countries; 
for instance, there is an 'organic link' (based on finance 
and voting rights) between the Labour Party and the trade 
union movement in Britain. 
Secondly, mainstream industrial relations theorists regard 
political unionism as a sign of the 'political immaturity' 
of a particular labour movement, but this is because they do 
not concern themselves with power relations (in other words, 
politics) at the workplace and in the wider society. Kerr, 
Dunlop et. ale focus their attention on how conflict is 
contained and controlled; in other words, they regard 
conflict as an anomaly and consensus as the norm. The 
problem with this analysis is that consensus is simply 
assumed and there is no attempt to explain what gives rise 
to conflict in the first place. The question of ownership 
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and control is 'left out' of the analysis and is assumed to 
be a natural rather than a social phenomenon. By moving 
beyond this assumption, and recognising the social character 
of ownership, the underlying mechanisms of the workplace are 
more accurately understood. As Hyman states, "industrial 
relations is the study of processes of control over work 
relations; and among these processes, those involving 
collective worker organisation and action are of particular 
concern." (Hyman 1975: 12; also Allen 1975: 35) Relations 
between capital and labour are therefore political by their 
very nature. Right wing politicians and academics denounce 
'political' strikes in liberal democracies on the grounds 
that they undermine the sovereignty of democratically 
elected governments. This analysis is similarly one-sided 
because it again 'leaves out' the question of ownership and 
control and, therefore, the political power of capital; as 
Hyman states, "the power of capital is a permanent 
constraint on the economic and social objectives which can 
'realistically' be pursued." (Hyman 1989: 44) 
Moreover, there are good reasons why political unionism is 
even more overt in underdeveloped societies than in advanced 
capitalist countries, and these relate to the unevenness of 
industrialisation in the periphery, as I have already 
suggested. The collective bargaining relationship is heavily 
weighted in favour of the employer in the Third World who 
can draw on the large pool of available surplus labour; that 
is, the reserve army of labour. So as Cohen states, "To rely 
solely on collective bargaining in these circumstances is 
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simply unproductive - not unnaturally the unions cast about 
for additional or alternative systems of bargaining in order 
to redress the imbalance between themselves and the 
management." (Cohen 1974: 148) Kerr and Henry are therefore 
incapable of developing such an analysis of political 
unionism in the Third World because they repeat the errors 
of Rostow's dualist analysis and fail to see how one sector 
affects, and is affected by, another. 
sturmthal's analysis is similarly one-sided. He implies that 
while collective bargaining is not the norm, it should at 
least be so. The problem with this analysis is that it is 
not actually attempting to understand social reality; 
rather, it hopes that the prescription will one day become 
reality. A real analysis of Third World labour is therefore 
precluded by a tendency to see things through western tinted 
spectacles. As Cohen argues, "(d)iscussions of the relation 
between reproduction and production, or of the way in which 
the world of industry is parasitical upon or interdependent 
with the world of domestic and peasant labour, do not appear 
in traditional IR research." (Cohen 1983: 4) 
In short, modernisation theory is too Eurocentric and 
weighted in favour of the capitalists' view of the world. 
One researcher on working class values in Trinidad and 
Tobago, sympathetic to this school of thought, has admitted 
that "(i)t seems impossible to deny that the sociological 
use of the word 'modern' has been and still remains 
ethnocentric." However, she then states that "(t)he value 
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judgement that equates 'modern' with 'Western' is 
regrettable, but nevertheless it operates." (Lengerman 1971: 
152) Such a blatantly biased approach to social science 
leads one to concur with Cohen when he states that "(i)n so 
far ••. as their ideas have provided ready ammunition for cold 
war warriors and the agencies of foreign policy in a handful 
(but a powerful handful) of western nations, the extent to 
which comparative IR research can be seen as anything more 
than an ideologically limited and culturally and 
historically specific form of discourse must be raised." 
(Cohen 1987: 8) 
Although the value and scientificity of theories have to be 
assessed in their own terms, the close association between 
particular political practices and advocates of 
modernisation suggests that one cannot accept their claims 
to value neutrality. For example, Rostow was himself an 
adviser to President Johnson during the vietnam war, and 
there has been a remarkably high degree of US intervention 
in the Caribbean Basin region this century. US intervention 
has taken many forms, from frequent invasions of 'sovereign' 
territories, to covert operations (such as the promotion of 
surrogate armies and dictators, and the illegal mining of 
ports) and the perhaps lesser known 'trade union 
intervention', which includes checking the political 
affiliations of trade unions and specific individuals (for 
instance in Trinidad and Tobago in 1972), as well as 
encouraging economic and poltical sabotage against 
nationalist and 'socialist' regimes (for example in the 
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Dominican Republic 1963-65 and in Grenada 1979-83) (Spalding 
1988: 279; Pearce 1982; Blum 1986; Als 1977: 1-7). The 
justification for such support has often been couched in the 
language of modernisation theory (for instance based on 
support for 'modern' systems of collective bargaining) , 
although the 'Reagan doctrine' openly espoused a willingness 
to support 'authoritarian' (i.e. right wing) regimes 
(Brenner 1984). Needless to say, the reality has been that 
these same right-wing governments have not been sympathetic 
to organised labour or the peasantry, but have collaborated 
with US interests (the most notorious example being United 
Fruit in Guatemala in 1954 and The Dominican Republic in 
1965). In this way, modernisation theory is useful more as a 
justification for Western interests, and less as a theory 
that corresponds to Third World reality. 
section Two: Dependency and the Theory of the Plantantion 
Economy 
Introduction 
This section draws on, and extends, the critique of 
modernisation theory outlined in section one. I examine 
dependency theory in both Latin America and the Caribbean, 
and show the importance of the international economy in 
shaping these societies. This school of thought is 
criticised however, because it lacks a sufficient analysis 
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of internal factors in underdeveloped societies, including 
labour. 
1. Outline 
It should now be clear that the development process in the 
Caribbean was very different to that of nineteenth century 
Britain. Industrialisation led to an increased reliance on 
the import of capital goods, a high capital intensity and a 
consequent maintenance of high unemployment. From 1951-65, 
Jamaica's industrialisation had created only 9 000 jobs, 
while the labour force had increased by 20 000 a year: in 
Trinidad and Tobago from 1950-63, less than 5 000 jobs had 
been created by industrialisation, whereas the total labour 
force had increased by 100 000 over the same period (Thomas 
1988: 90). 
In both the Caribbean and Latin America, a new theory 
emerged in the 1960s as a response "to the need to 
understand the failure of post-war economic policies to 
internalize the growth process, and the persistent external 
dependence of the economies." (Girvan 1973: 15) The united 
Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America (set up in 
1948 and led by Prebisch) began to radicalise and question 
some of Prebisch's proposals for overcoming dependence, 
while in the West Indies, an intellectual current with very 
similar outlooks - the New World Group - was set up in 1962. 
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The basic hypothesis of both groups was that their 
respective regions were unfavourably incorporated into the 
international economy, as Prebisch and Lewis had contested, 
but they went on to argue that industrialisation had not 
overcome this problem. The Latin American economist 
Theotonio dos Santos summarised the basic hypothesis: 
"Dependence is a conditioning situation in which the 
economies of one group of countries are conditioned by the 
development and expansion of others." The 'advanced' country 
may advance through self-impulsion, but the dependent 
economy can "only expand as a reflection of the expansion of 
the dominant countries, which may have positive or negative 
effects on their immediate development." (Cited in o'Brien 
1975: 12) 
As I showed in the previous section, one weakness of 
modernisation theory was that it neglected an analysis of 
the international economy. Dependency theory stressed this 
'international' factor, and how one nation could develop at 
another's expense. Thus in Frank's theory the Caribbean had 
played an historical role as a 'satellite' in the world 
capitalist economy. 
One of the leading theorists of the New World Group in the 
1960s was the Trinidadian, Lloyd Best. He characterised West 
Indian economies as plantation economies, which are 
basically " •• externally propelled .• ", and "structurally part 
of an overseas economy." (Best 1968: 283 and 302) Best, in 
partnership with Kari Levitt, argued that there were three 
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stages of the plantation economy (Best and Levitt 1969; 
Levitt and Best 1975: 34-60). Firstly, there was the stage 
of the 'pure plantation economy', which was the slave period 
(including apprenticeship, up to 1838 in the British 
Caribbean). The economies in this period were basically 
plantations, whereby Europe provided the organisation, 
decision making, capital, transport, supplies and markets; 
Africa provided the labour and the Caribbean provided the 
land. Production (mainly sugar cane) was for export to the 
European market. The second period (plantation economy 
modified 1838-1938) starts with the abolition of slavery and 
apprenticeship and ends with the aforementioned Commission 
of Inquiry into the causes of labour unrest in the 1930s. 
This is a period of free trade in which British capital 
benefits from higher productivity and is therefore able to 
capture wider markets. Some changes take place in the 
Caribbean, such as the emergence of an independent peasantry 
and a system of indentured labour. However, there is no 
genuine transformation of society because of the legacy of 
pure plantation economy. Government is still run by, or on 
behalf of, planters, and the peasantry 'carry a legacy' of 
tastes which require continued exports. And ultimately, the 
plantation sector retains the best land. 
So far there is much in this analysis that was compatible 
with Lewis and Prebisch's arguments. However, Best and 
Levitt's characterisation of the third period is critical of 
the actual process of industrialisation in the British West 
Indies. This is the period of 'plantation economy further 
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modified', which dates from the late 1930s to the present. 
Modifications include new, high value goods and services 
(bauxite, petroleum, tourism and some manufacturing), and an 
active public sector. However, many of the features of the 
plantation economy still exist, primarily because of the 
dominance of foreign, transnational companies (TNCs), which 
play a similar role to that of the joint-stock trading 
company of the pure plantation economy i.e. the TNC combines 
organisation, capital, technology and entrepreneurship. 
Moreover, in the 1970s, licensing agreements to nationalised 
industries (including oil and bauxite) were often used to 
maintain foreign control, as the licensing of technology, 
management and the marketing of products are often in 
foreign hands (Jenkins 1987: 178; Thomas 1988: 207). 
(However, these localising factors in a sense undermine 
Best's analysis, as I point out in my critique below.) 
The Jamaican economist, George Beckford, similarly argued 
that the Caribbean is made up of a number of 'plantation 
societies'. He defines the plantation system as lithe 
totality of institutional arrangements surrounding the 
production and marketing of crops." (Beckford 1972b: 8) 
Beckford argues that all development paths are largely 
determined by agricultural organisation, and plantation 
agriculture leads to distortions in the economy: persistent 
unemployment, low levels of national income (and its unequal 
distribution), and under-utilisation of land and 
underconsumption (ibid.: 154-82). This in turn means that 
plantation societies are underdeveloped as expansion of food 
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supplies are inhibited, the terms of trade are unfavourable 
and there are few internal linkages in the economy (ibid.: 
183-214) . 
The work of the plantation economy school is remarkably 
similar to that of Celso Furtado's on Latin America (Furtado 
1970). Like Best he divides the history of the region into 
three distinct stages: the colonial period (1600-1850), 
where production (of precious metals and agricultural goods) 
is for export; a period of externally oriented development 
(1850-1930), based on low wage capitalist agriculture (due 
to unlimited supplies of labour), and the period after 1930, 
based on import substitution industrialisation. Furtado 
argues that industrialisation fails to alleviate dependency 
because of the high import content of new investment (which 
leads to balance of payments problems), the capital 
intensity of production (which means that high unemployment 
persists) and the limited market for goods. Development is 
therefore highly uneven, and subject to stagnation. 
Dependency theorists disagree on what strategies are 
required for Third World countries to overcome their 
disadvantageous situation. Frank and Wallerstein (see below) 
believe that only a revolutionary strategy can overcome 
underdevelopment and dependency, but most theorists argue 
that a reformist strategy is sufficient. For example, Best 
is not critical of Lewis' conception of capitalism; the 
latter's mistake was to apply a Ricardian model (albeit 
amended) to a 'national economy', in a case where a 
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'national economy' did not exist. Best's strategy entailed 
creating the conditions for the existence of a 'national 
economy'. In this respect, his outlook "did not imply a 
radical break from capitalism, but rather its reverse: 
localisation would create the prerequisites for this vital 
engine of the capitalist dynamic to operate within Trinidad 
for the first time in its history." (Oxaal 1975: 43) Indeed, 
members of the New World Group have actively tried to 
promote indigenous capitalist development in the region. 
Norman Girvan was head of the National Planning Agency of 
Jamaica in the 1970s; Owen Jefferson has been Director of 
the Central Bank of Jamaica; and Alister McIntyre and 
Havelock Brewster have been senior officials at the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (Payne 
1984: 8). 
Best also argues that 'localised development' can be 
achieved by a popular alliance which does not take into 
account class boundaries. Indeed, he contends that Caribbean 
societies cannot be analysed in class terms (hence the 
rather sketchy detailing of different forms of labour 
control beyond the blanket term plantation economy) for a 
number of reasons. Post-slave societies are said to be too 
flexible to have social classes; the social boundaries that 
exist between individuals are limited as wealthy 
professionals achieve their position through sacrifice and 
have no tradition of values separate from the rest of the 
population; and class solidarity is not the crucial factor 
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in Caribbean societies (as exemplified by the phenomenon of 
nationalism) (Best 1971: 7-22). 
2. Further Elaboration and Critique. 
Dependency theory points to some of the weaknesses of 
modernisation theory, and begins to analyse the unequal 
relationship that exists between the 'First' and 'Third' 
Worlds. It also provides a powerful critique of Third World 
industrialisation, and shows how this process has failed to 
overcome Third World subordination to the West. However, the 
model contains a number of serious weaknesses, which relate 
to its failure to analyse labour in any significant detail. 
Probably the most common criticism of dependency theory is 
that it analyses external forces (i.e. the international 
economy), at the expense of internal ones. There is some 
truth to this argument but it is an exaggeration. All 
dependency theorists incorporate internal factors into their 
analysis. For instance the Caribbean dependency economist 
Havelock Brewster defines economic dependence as "a lack of 
capacity to manipUlate the operative elements of an economic 
system. This lack of inter-dependence implies that the 
system has no internal dynamic which would enable it to 
function as an independent, autonomous entity." (Cited in 
Girvan 1973: 11) Beckford and Best similarly analysed 
internal factors (Beckford 1972: xvi; Best 1975), and it was 
Best's claim that the Caribbean was a 'classless society' 
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(see above) that led him to advocate a reformist strategy of 
change in Trinidad and elsewhere. (Beckford later changed 
his position, accepting the need for an analysis of 
dependency based more specifically on class relations - see 
Beckford and witter 1982.) 
Frank also examines internal factors, and by implication, 
tries to link labour and development. He analyses classes in 
terms of groups of people located in spatial categories, in 
which some people benefit at the expense of others (through 
surplus appropriation) in the network of 
metropolis/satellite relations (Frank 1969b: 340-9). 
The most systematic attempt to unite labour and development 
however, has come from the advocates of world systems 
theory. Wallerstein has argued that with the development of 
capitalist production "there has been the development of an 
ever more delineated interstate system that has enabled 
states within which core activities were located to develop 
strong state structures (in relation to those in peripheral 
areas), such that they could shape and reshape the world 
market in commodities, labor-force, and capital in ways that 
would maintain, in favor of large entrepreneurs located in 
core zones, both the capital-labor relationship as a social 
form and unequal exchange between core and periphery." 
(Wallerstein 1983: 18) The argument that countries with 
strong states formed the core while those with weak states 
became the periphery has been convincingly challenged 
(Skocpol 1977), but of more relevance here is Wallerstein's 
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approach to the study of labour. In an earlier work he 
argued that "the relations of production that define a 
system are the 'relations of production' of the whole system 
and the system at this point in time is the European world 
economy. Free labour is indeed a defining feature of 
capitalism, but not free labour throughout the productive 
enterprises ... (F)ree labour is the form of labour control 
used for skilled work in core countries whereas coerced 
labour is used for less skilled work in peripheral areas. 
The combination thereof is the essence of capitalism. When 
labour is everywhere free, we shall have socialism." 
(Wallerstein 1974: 127) While his focus on combinations of 
'free' and 'unfree' labour may be useful, the particular 
manner in which Wallerstein attempts to unite labour and 
development is questionable. His basic contention is that 
different modes of labour control are simply the 
(functional) results of the requirements of the world 
system. However, modes of labour control are the results of 
human struggle and it should not be assumed a priori that 
these will always 'fit the logic'of the world capitalist 
system. As Connell points out "(w)orld-systems approaches to 
theorising the international dimension of class confront us 
with charateristic problems: a tendency to treat classes as 
categories of economic actors; an a priori cast-list of 
classes; the appeal to a logic-of-the-system that carries a 
presupposition that there is a well-formed, coherent system; 
and difficulty in grasping class formation other than 
through functionalism or through the distinction of class-
in-itself from class-for-itself." (Connell 1984: 182) 
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Wallerstein's insistence on the all-embracing nature of the 
world system also leads to problems of political strategy, 
as I discuss below. 
These problems can be extended to dependency and 
underdevelopment theorists more generally. While it is true 
that dependency and underdevelopment theory does employ an 
analysis of internal factors, the adequacy of this analysis 
is questionable. Dependency theorists argue that satellite 
or plantation status was a product of integration into the 
expanding world market, and that the internal mechanisms of 
dependency are ultimately produced by this integration. For 
example, the 'absence of interdependence' that Brewster 
refers to (above) is caused by the presence of transnational 
corporations in the economically advanced Western countries, 
and these in turn emerged because of the favourable 
conditions enjoyed by Western nations in the world market. 
The problem with this approach is that the division of the 
world into 'metropolis' and 'satellite' is never adequately 
explained. Britain and the Caribbean were both incorporated 
into the world market but only one 'developed' while the 
other remained (comparatively) 'underdeveloped.' The 
transfer of surplus from the Caribbean to Britain and Europe 
on its own can only be a partial explanation for this 
process, because, it does not explain how one region 
'became' the metropolis and the other, the satellite; in 
other words, "it obviously is not trade per se which 
accounts for whether a country or area stagnates or 
expands." (Mandle 1972: 53) In order to understand the 
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effects of trading relationships on particular regions of 
the world, the specific market powers of the regions 
involved must be explained. Internal structures (including 
labour) must therefore be examined prior to, rather than 
after, an examination of trading relationships. This task is 
undertaken in section four. 
A second, related problem is the ahistorical nature of 
dependency theory. Best's analysis of the three periods of 
plantation economy "portrays self enclosed movements in time 
and static relations which are mechanically transposed from 
one period to another. And underlying all this is the 
unrealistic assumption that in the long interval between the 
establishment of plantations and the society of today no 
significant developments have taken place." (Sudama 1979: 
75) Indeed the continuing utilisation of the term 
'plantation economy or society' is inaccurate and largely 
metaphorical (Craig 1982b: 149). 
The consequence of such a static model is that while it may 
point to an important part of social reality in the 
Caribbean (its satellite status), it fails to specify the 
precise mechanisms, and the changes in them, which cause the 
problem. As O'Brien has written of Latin American dependency 
theory, "The actual mechanisms of dependency are seldom 
spelt out in detail ... One looks in vain through the theories 
of dependency for the essential characteristics of 
dependency. Instead, one is given a circular argument: 
dependent countries are those which lack the capacity for 
autonomous growth and they lack this because their 
structures are dependent ones." (O'Brien 1975: 23-4) 
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This lack of dynamism in the dependency approach is caused 
by its failure to properly analyse the processes of class 
formation and class conflict. In Best's analysis "(t)he 
relationship between the international bourgeoisie through 
its local representatives (the managers of foreign 
controlled firms and the agents of international 
organisations) and the local bourgeoisie and petty 
bourgeoisie is not explored." (Sudama 1979: 79) He argues 
that the professional 'class' is not a capitalist class 
distinct from the rest of the population, but never tells us 
"what they do constitute, and what their relationship to 
local and foreign capital may be .. " (Craig 1982b: 167) 
In the cases of Frank and Wallerstein, a local/foreign 
capital alliance is said to exist, but their static approach 
militates against an analysis of the changes and 
contradictions in this alliance. For instance, the 
national/international alliance in Jamaica underwent 
substantial change after Abolition, and this process cannot 
be explained solely by the needs of the world system, as 
members of the old planter class declined at the expense of 
a wealthy and increasingly capitalist orientated peasantry 
(Post 1978: 36). 
The faulty sociological analyses of the dependency and world 
system schools also leads to weak political programmes. 
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Wallerstein's focus on an all-embracing world system leads 
one to question how this system can ever be replaced, beyond 
a rather impractical support for autarchy, or simultaneous 
world-wide revolution (Brenner 1977: 91; Worsley 1980: 324-
5). Best's more reformist strategy is similarly problematic. 
His argument that factors other than social class are 
considered to be important by social actors does not negate 
an analysis rooted in the social relations of production. 
Indeed, the strength of such an analysis is that it can 
begin to explain the 'missing link' in dependency theory 
(its mechanisms). The argument that post-slave societies are 
too flexible to be considered class societies is a 
caricature of a class analysis, which does not deny the 
existence of social mobility. Indeed, one of the sources of 
conflict in capitalist society (both its 'advanced' and 
'underdeveloped' varieties) is that there are limits to the 
number of 'higher' places in society. In other words, the 
'exceptional' Caribbean is nothing of the sort because 
social mobility operates in all societies, but always within 
certain limits. Best's argument that foreign capital is the 
problem, rather than capital itself, is also very weak. For 
example, there is no valid reason for suggesting that local 
capital would act (or actually has acted) any differently 
from foreign capital in terms of the high import content of 
capital goods or the export of local capital. Indeed, this 
vague strategy of 'localising production' through a non-
class based popular alliance has in many ways already been 
carried out. In Trinidad and Tobago since 1956, various 
attempts have been made to localise production and decision 
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making (for example, through the nationalisations of oil and 
sugar companies, and the development of an indigenous 
natural gas and fertiliser industry), but "there is no 
evidence of a commensurate degree of structural 
transformation." (Sudama 1979: 81) 
Summary 
Dependency theory constitutes a significant advance over 
modernisation theory, because it focuses on the 
international economy. However, the centre of its analysis 
neglects the internal processes of 'underdeveloped' 
societies, and the mechanisms that lead to peripheral status 
in the world system. systems of labour control are one-
sidedly seen as the outcome of the functioning of the world 
market. 
section Three: The Theory of cultural Pluralism. 
1. The Theory Outlined. 
While the theory of cultural pluralism is not explicitly 
concerned with either labour or development, its major focus 
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has important implications for both of these factors. In the 
Caribbean the main exponent of this theory is M.G. smith. 
The basic contention of this approach is that West Indian 
societies are based on conflict and not consensus, and that 
the root of this conflict lies in different institutional 
systems, which in turn are based on conflicting cultures. 
According to Smith, "(e)ach institution involves some forms 
of activity, grouping, rules, ideas and values." (1978: 767) 
These include "marriage, the family, property and the like 
and are common to the total population." (Smith 1965: 14) A 
population that shares a single set of institutions is 
deemed to be culturally and socially homogeneous, while one 
that shares a system of basic or compulsory institutions but 
practices different 'alternative' institutions is 
heterogeneous. Finally, a population that shares neither 
basic or secondary institutions is said to have a plural 
society. For Smith, "(c)ultural pluralism is a special form 
of differentiation based on institutional divergences." 
(ibid.: 770). 
smith claims that Caribbean societies are plural societies 
because different sections of the population practice 
different forms of common institutions. The two factors that 
unify these societies are government and the economic 
system. For smith, "(g)overnment acts to limit the chances 
of conflict, and to limit, maintain, or increase the 
opportunities for acculturation; the economic system 
embraces the entire population, although in different 
degrees and different ways." (Smith 1965: 16) 
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The implications of this theory for a study of labour should 
be clear. Cultural pluralism maintains that the basic 
conflict in Caribbean society is between different cultural 
groups. Labour studies should therefore recognise the 
existence of this primary contradiction, rather than other 
alleged sources of conflict such as class or gender (the 
theory has nothing to say on this latter factor). Smith 
argues that cultural pluralism is "quite distinct from other 
forms of social heterogeneity such as class stratification 
in that it consists in the coexistence of incompatible 
institutional systems." (Smith 1978: 774) There is 
undoubtedly a need to take account of culture and ethnicity 
in examining Caribbean (or any) societies, and my analysis 
in chapters two to six emphasises how these factors have 
divided the labour force in Trinidad and Tobago. However, in 
my critique below I show why I think that the claims of this 
particular theory cannot be sUbstantiated and instead 
propose an alternative framework which incorporates class, 
ethnicity and gender, and relates these to the concept of 
development. 
2. A critique and Alternative Framework for Analysing Labour 
and Development. 
The basic strength of the plural society model is its 
challenge to both crude functionalist and Marxist theories 
of society. The contemporary reality of ethnic conflict 
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undermines theories of society based on value consensus or 
purely class conflict. However, the model itself is 
particularly weak because it is both reductionist and 
lacking in explanatory power. It describes society in terms 
of one basic category -cultural variation - and neglects 
other differences in society based on gender and class. 
Secondly, the model is essentially static; as Cross argues, 
the thesis has a classificatory scheme and labels various 
stages in a social order, but "it does not account for how 
one came to change for the other ... (T)o define a society as 
'plural' and to propound a concept to cope with that society 
is not to understand how that society came to be 'plural' 
and neither is it to show that in reality we are justified 
in applying that particular concept. II (Cross 1971: 484) 
stuart Hall has similarly argued that the theory is 
ahistorical because it fails to explain how the different 
ethnic groups arose. Furthermore, he argues that the origins 
of 'cultural pluralism' cannot be divorced from the class 
relations of society and that II (f)undamentally, it is 
economic production which draws these two social groups into 
a relation of domination/subordination, conquest and the 
institutions of slavery which define the relations, and the 
'extrinsic' composition of the two groups .. 11 (Hall 1977: 
160) • 
These criticisms seriously undermine the plural society 
model. As Mills has argued, "(a)n adequate explanation of 
the dialectics of cultural development must leave the 
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empirical level of simple description and investigate the 
underlying structural forces which break up, as well as 
maintain, a given cultural configuration. Smith's failure to 
do this leaves him seriously vulnerable." (Mills 1987: 83) 
However, it does not follow that a reductionist Marxist 
approach is more useful. As Mills states, factors such as 
ethnicity require investigation and should not be ignored. 
contrary to the claims of Smith, I will attempt to show that 
class is a central category for any analysis of labour and 
development, but it should not be given a primacy that would 
lead to a neglect of ethnicity or gender. 
Advocates of the plural society model share with other 
Caribbean critics of Marxism the belief that the latter 
doctrine must be based on a two class model of inevitable 
polarisation which ignores non-class conflict. One writer 
sympathetic to the plural society thesis has argued that 
n(i)n Trinidad and Tobago, it is not easy to identify a 
working class. This is why here, workers refuse to behave in 
Marxist terms." (La Guerre 1978: 27) This view is (rightly) 
critical of a narrow, positivist Marxism, but it fails to 
examine more flexible approaches which recognise that human 
beings make their own history, and that conflicts other than 
those based on social class exist. 
Carl Stone's more subtle examination of social class in 
Jamaica also criticises a particular kind of Marxist 
analysis. While he accepts that the capital-labour conflict 
exists, stone argues that this is secondary to a wider 
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'rich-poor' conflict. An over-emphasis on the capital-labour 
conflict is misconceived "because of the fragmentation of 
interests based on differential benefits that accrue to 
various categories of wage labour and the owners of 
property." (stone 1973: 20) In other words, the two-class 
model is too rigid because it fails to examine both wider 
conflicts and the uneven development of social classes. 
I would accept much of Stone's analysis but this does not 
mean that a Marxist approach should be rejected wholesale. 
Instead, I will employ a conception of uneven development 
(outlined in section four), together with an analysis of the 
origins of gender and ethnic conflicts (outlined in chapter 
two), to show how the working classes in Trinidad and Tobago 
have remained divided. In other words, I reject the Marxist 
prophecy of proletarian unity but still accept the validity 
of much of the Marxist method. 
Such an approach implies a rejection of positivist 
conceptions of social class (as outlined by La Guerre above) 
and notions of 'true' or 'false' class consciousness. As 
E.P. Thompson states, "(c) lass eventuates as men and women 
live their productive relations, and as they experience 
their determinate situations, within 'the ensemble of the 
social relations' .. (and) (n)o actual class formation is any 
truer or more real than any other, and class defines itself 
as, in fact, it eventuates •• " (Thompson 1978: 149, 150) 
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This 'human action' approach implies that a 'minimalist' 
definition of class 'structure' is required, especially in 
'Third World' societies like Trinidad, where class formation 
tends to be very uneven and fluid. Any approach that uses 
class as a central concept must be one "that recognises the 
incomplete and embryonic character of class formation and 
development on the one hand, but that nonetheless attempts 
to derive a meaningful frame of reference for explaining a 
class-based act, on the other. We may thus recognise the 
relative infrequency and ephemerality of overt class action, 
but also be careful to acknowledge the existence of such 
acts and not underestimate their political significance. II 
(Cohen 1972: 252) 
Class reductionism should therefore be avoided, and one 
should recognise that conflicts other than those based on 
class exist. However, class remains a central concept and, 
as I argue in section four below, Caribbean history cannot 
be properly understood without utilising the category of 
class. 
section Four: Labour and Uneven Development in the Caribbean 
In this section, I attempt to move beyond the modernisation, 
dependency and cultural pluralist approaches by utilising 
(and in some respects, going beyond) the Marxist method and 
more explicitly applying it to Caribbean history. The 
purpose of this section is to show the close linkage between 
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labour (based on a 'minimalist' class definition) and 
development and how one cannot be properly analysed in 
isolation from the other. My argument proceeds by analysing, 
in individual sub-sections, three periods of labour control 
and development - slavery, indentureship and the period of 
'peripheral capitalist development'. This is followed by a 
fourth sub-section which attempts to draw some of the 
implications for my assessment of the politics of labour in 
Trinidad and Tobago. 
Part One: Slave Labour and Development in the west Indies 
(a) Regional Political Economy: The 'Origins' of Slavery in 
the English Caribbean 
From the 1640s, a "regional political economy" (Cohen 1987: 
5-6) emerged based on English merchant capital, African 
labour and Caribbean land. Gunder Frank's characterisation 
of this relationship as capitalist has already been rejected 
(see section two), but his argument that merchant capital 
transforms relations of production has some plausibility. 
The impact of merchant capital on the Caribbean was such 
that it led to the creation of a 'new' system of production 
- slavery - based on labour imported from Africa. The main 
commodity produced was sugar, which was then exported to the 
European market. 
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However, this increase in English trading activity had its 
basis, not in a 'propensity to trade' (Frank's argument), 
but in the development of the productive forces: as more 
goods were produced above immediate sUbsistence requirements 
(i.e. the surplus product), so there was more wealth 
available for trade. Moreover, this increase in the 
productive forces was determined by changes in the relations 
of production in England. Feudal relations were breaking 
down and capitalist relations were developing, a process 
that continued into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
(Hilton 1987a: 116). The increase in merchant capital 
activity that had such an impact on the Caribbean therefore 
had its roots in the relations of production (i.e. social 
classes) that existed in England at the time. 
Labour at the African 'end' of the system was also vital to 
the process, because one must understand how and why the 
slaves from Africa were available as slaves in the first 
place. As Brenner points out, "Before they could be bought, 
the slaves had to be 'produced'; more precisely, they had to 
appear on the market as 'commodities.' But this poses large 
questions, namely of the formation of class systems of 
'production' and appropriation of slaves in Africa (or 
elsewhere)." (Brenner 1977: 88) 
(b). The 'Laws of Motion' of Slavery. 
The production processes that existed in England and Africa 
were therefore vital to the development of slavery in the 
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New World. Once established, the precise mechanisms of 
production were of primary importance because it was these 
that explained the contradictions of slavery, and its 
competitive position in the world market. 
Slavery was organised in such a way that the slave owner, or 
'planter', "gained access to the total product of the 
enslaved person's labour power, in return for which 
sUbsistence (or the means of subsistence) was provided." 
(Miles 1987: 79) Slaves therefore entered the production 
process as constant rather than variable elements (as is the 
case with free wage labour) as they were guaranteed means of 
subsistence. Slaves were both producers and means of 
production which limited the ability of their masters to 
regulate the size of the labour force and burdened them with 
inflexible labour costs, which in turn limited their ability 
to reorganise the labour process on more efficient lines. As 
Post argues, "The masters are forced to organise the 
production process along the lines of closely supervised 
gang labour, making the only possible methods of increasing 
labour productivity the intensification of labour and the 
migration of labour to more fertile soils." (Post 1982: 34; 
also Post 1978: 23) This 'archaic' form of labour control is 
also 'inefficient' compared to wage labour in that there is 
little incentive to accumulate, as I explain below. 
The slave relation of production was not as straight-forward 
as this analysis might suggest, however. In some cases there 
existed a hidden wage, whereby slaves were paid in tradeable 
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commodities, which were sometimes used as currency (e.g. 
tobacco). In order to overcome the constant reproduction 
costs of slave labour, planters often allowed slaves to grow 
food on their own plots of land. According to Mintz, this 
independent sUbsistence production "ran entirely counter to 
the whole conception of how the slave mode of production was 
supposed to operate." (Mintz 1978: 93) This was because 
slaves could work in groups of their own choice, make their 
own calculations, and sell some of their surplus on the 
market place. This last factor enabled a large number of 
slaves to purchase their freedom. 
On the plantation itself, the labour process had 
similarities with that of industrial capitalism. There was a 
large concentration of labour working with relatively 
advanced technology (Moreno Fraginals 1976: 33-40); as Mintz 
states, n(s)laves or no, these labourers were compelled to 
work in some ways that, were or not for slavery, would have 
been just as accurately described as the regimen of factory 
proletarians. n (Mintz 1988: xv) 
However, despite the similarities, slavery cannot be 
accurately described as 'capitalist'. The 'anomalies' that 
Mintz refers to arose out of the contradictions of the slave 
mode of production, and of its incorporation into a world 
economy that was dominated by the nascent capitalist powers 
of Europe, and especially England. Three points illustrate 
this argument: firstly, slave labour remained the dominant 
relation of production. Secondly, the non-slave relations 
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arose out of the contradictions of slave labour (just as 
wage labour in agriculture became increasingly generalised 
in feudal England). Thirdly, the 'laws of motion' of slavery 
were derived from the slave relations of production and it 
was these 'laws' that account for the Caribbean's 
unfavourable incorporation into the world market. For 
instance, slave relations of production arrested 
technological innovation. Even though some degree of 
advanced technology was utilised, especially in Cuba, it was 
insufficient compared to the dynamics of capitalist 
production techniques; as Moreno Fraginals has argued, 
slavery "differed from capitalist production .•• in the 
form ... of the impossibility of constantly revolutionizing 
production methods, an inherent part of capitalism." (Moreno 
Fraginals 1976: 18) The Caribbean was therefore integrated 
into the world economy in such a way that its market power 
was weak compared to parts of Europe, who benefited from 
superior productive techniques. 
(c). English Capitalism and Caribbean Slavery. 
Capitalism emerged in Britain primarily as a result of the 
instability of feudalism and the rise of a class that 
employed wage labour. In other words, a qualitative change 
took place in English society, culminating in the Civil War 
of 1640-49. However, there was a quantitative element to the 
rise of British (and European) capitalism: the plunder (of 
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which slavery was but one form) of the colonial world. This 
plunder benefited European capitalism by extending the 
European market for goods such as sugar and tobacco, 
providing certain raw materials (such as cotton) and 
generally increasing the amount of wealth in the economy. 
This last point is important because the conversion of this 
wealth into productive capital was not automatic (Frank's 
assumption) but instead required the existence of capitalist 
relations of production. Indeed, there was no large scale 
increase in investment in Britain in the late eighteenth 
century (the period when slavery was at its height). The 
profits acquired from slavery "increased British income 
whatever the recipients of the income chose to do with it: 
whether they spent it on land or coaches or wine - or on 
textile machinery." (Solow and Engerrnan 1987: 8) 
The capitalism/slavery relationship demonstrates the 'uneven 
and combined' development of the world economy (Trotsky 
1936: 25-37). England (and later Britain) and other European 
powers 'got ahead' of the rest of the world (just as the 
latter had before) on the basis of 'more advanced' class 
relations, and therefore superior productivity. These powers 
were in a position to influence the development of the rest 
of the world, and did so by inflicting on them 'backward' 
labour regimes. In the Anglo-Caribbean economy, the uneven 
development of the two regions was combined through slavery, 
which enabled the former to move further ahead, and left the 
latter 'underdeveloped'. Frank is therefore correct when he 
says that one country may develop at the expense of another, 
but he never explains the mechanisms that sustain the 
system, which classes, ethnic groups or gender most 
benefited or lost out, or what created the system in the 
first place. 
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A class-based analysis also helps to explain why slavery was 
abolished. As I have shown, slavery was subject to its own 
internal contradictions, which in turn influenced the 
'market power' of its products when they came to be sold on 
the world market. In the climate of European rivalry in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, each power adopted an 
'exclusive' policy for its colonies under which each 
individual colony was protected from competition. However, 
by the late eighteenth century Britain had emerged as the 
major industrial power of the world. The use of more 
efficient labour systems in Britain, employing more 
efficient technology, led to higher labour productivity, 
including in agriculture. The products of slave labour 
became increasingly unprofitable as a result. Both slavery 
and the monopoly system had become unnecessary expenses to 
Britain, because it could under-sell its competitors on the 
world market. The gradual shift to abolition (1834) and free 
trade (1846-52) reflected Britain's (short-term) emergence 
as the dominant industrial power of the world. As Williams 
points out, abolition was more than an attack on slavery. 
"It was an attack on monopoly .•. The reason for the attack 
was not only that the West Indian economic system was 
vicious but that it was so unprofitable that for this reason 
alone its destruction was inevitable." (Williams 1987: 135) 
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Abolitionist sentiments were reinforced by the fact that 
domestic demand expanded more quickly than the foreign 
market in the nineteenth century, especially after the 1812 
War as Britain lost its major market (North America). An end 
to slavery in the 1770s would have led to a loss of demand 
for English manufactures, but this was not the case in the 
1820s onwards, as a far wider internal market existed (Solow 
and Engerman 1987: 14-15). Other factors of importance 
included the Abolition Movement and unrest on the part of 
the slaves themselves, most notably (but far from 
exclusively) in Saint Domingue in 1791 (James 1989). 
Part Two: Indentured Labour and Development in the 
Caribbean. 
After slavery was abolished in the Caribbean (officially in 
1834, but this was followed by four more years of effective 
slavery under 'apprenticeship'), a system of indentured 
labour was introduced. It was most common where the soil was 
most fertile - in particular in Trinidad and British 
Guiana). The system lasted until 1917 and was based on the 
importation of labour from various parts of the world, but 
in particular from India, and to a lesser extent China (for 
details of the Trinidad case see chapter two). Indentured 
labour was based on a system whereby people worked for a 
number of years for a particular employer (they were forced 
into this position through destitution), in return for free 
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passage back to their country of origin or a plot of land in 
the country to which they migrated. Although the system was 
based on wage labour, in practice it was combined with non-
economic coercion where planters utilised a pass system 
which restricted labourers' freedom of movement beyond the 
estate on which they worked. In the absence of adequate 
regulating mechanisms, planters could effectively treat the 
labourers as they wished and so competed with other estate 
owners on the basis of low wages rather than rapid 
technological innovation. 
This system of labour control once again left the Caribbean 
in an unfavourable trading position in the world economy. 
The planters were far from the 'revolutionary bourgeoisie' 
described by Marx in the 'Communist Manifesto'; instead of 
attempting to improve sugar production through constant 
technological development, they decided to try to maintain 
short-term profitability through either cheap, indentured 
labour, or unequal exchange with the peasantry. As Sebastien 
argues, "The fact that they could pay wages to indentured 
laborers way below the value of their labor power, and below 
that of other laborers, impeded the widescale use of 
machinery in the cUltivation process, so that though in the 
short run it may have proved less costly, in the long run it 
was the downfall of many." (Sebastien 1979: 131-2) This was 
reinforced by state encouragement of labour intensive 
methods of production (for instance in sugar and cocoa in 
Trinidad - see chapter two) outside of the indentureship 
system. 
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In Trinidad, permanent labour settlement was actively 
encouraged by the colonial government (see chapter two), and 
this process aided a process of proletarianisation as 
independent production became more difficult. 
Part Three: Labour and Peripheral Capitalist Development. 
(a) Peripheral Capitalism and Uneven Development 
In parts one and two I have placed much emphasis on the 
relationship between different systems of labour control and 
particular patterns of development. In Trinidad from the 
1930s, the capital-free wage labour relation was 
established as the main relation of production. However, 
this relationship was established far more unevenly than in 
advanced capitalist countries, and this again has important 
implications for the wider process of development. This 
point is crucial because it undermines both neo-classical 
and neo-Marxist theories of development, as well as the 
basic assumptions upon which government economic strategy in 
Trinidad has been based since 1956. 
The Lewis model, neo-classical and some neo-Marxist theories 
all share the belief that capitalism has certain 'equalising 
tedencies'. The late Bill Warren for instance utilised a 
Marxist approach to argue that imperialism was a progressive 
force in the 'Third World' because it enabled backward 
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countries to 'catch up' with advanced capitalist countries 
(Warren 1988). As I showed in section one, the Lewis model 
was based on a similar belief that Caribbean countries could 
exercise their comparative advantage in cheap, 'unlimited' 
supplies of labour in order to attract foreign capital and 
thereby reach a level of development similar to that in the 
'First World'. 
These theories have their roots in (a one-sided reading of) 
the work of Ricardo, and were most fully developed in the 
work of Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin (Ohlin 1933). They 
have also enjoyed a revival in development economics in the 
1980s (see especially Bauer 1981; Lal 1983), as well as in 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (see 
chapter six for details of the Trinidad case). I have 
already stated in section one that the basis of the theory 
is that each country or region in the world economy should 
specialise in producing those goods that it can make most 
cheaply - in those goods in which it has a comparative 
advantage. According to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, 
equilibrium in exchange is based on equally available factor 
endowments throughout the world (Ohlin 1933: 34-49). Country 
A may have an initial comparative advantage and therefore 
produce say, corn and cloth, more cheaply than country B. 
However, if country A produces cloth more cheaply than it 
produces corn, it should specialise solely in the former, 
because it could then produce more cloth which it can 
exchange with country B's corn. In this way world production 
of both cloth and corn is stimulated and both countries 
benefit from the trading relationship. 
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In the model, if corn is labour intensive relative to cloth, 
and if labour is relatively abundant in country B, then that 
country will specialise in corn production. As production 
continues, there is a tendency for wage rates (and other 
factor endowments) to be equalised; Heckscher and Ohlin 
argue that this is the case because as country B specialises 
in corn production, its production pattern becomes more 
labour intensive, thus reducing labour abundance and 
increasing marginal labour productivity and wages. 
Meanwhile, in country A, as cloth production increases, 
labour will become less scarce, and marginal labour 
productivity and wages will fall. What this means in 
monetary terms is that country A cannot indefinitely run a 
trade surplus with country B because the inflow of gold (or 
its equivalent) from B to A will lead to an increase in 
prices in A and a decrease in B. Therefore, in the long run, 
equilibrium will be restored (for summaries see Edwards 
1985: 17-43; Shaikh 1979). 
In practice, equalisation of factor endowments across the 
globe (especially wage rates) has not occurred. I will 
attempt to explain why this is so below, but before doing so 
I provide some evidence to show that capital flows to the 
Caribbean have not been (nor are likely to be) sufficiently 
large enough to lead to an equalisation of factor endowments 
between North America and Western Europe, on the one hand, 
and the Caribbean, on the other. 
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successive post-war governments in the Caribbean adopted 
programmes designed to encourage foreign investment, such as 
tax holidays (see section one and chapter four for more 
details). However, these policies did not have the desired 
effect of attracting a sUbstantial inflow of foreign 
capital. For instance, while direct foreign investment in 
Trinidad rose from TT $48 million in 1956 to TT $100 million 
the following year, it had fallen to TT $42 million by 1966 
(McIntyre and Watson 1970: 18). Moreover, in only one year 
between 1957 and 1965 did direct foreign investment exceed 
investment outflows (ibid.: 19). united states' direct 
foreign investment in Latin America and the Caribbean in 
1945 constituted 37 per cent of total us direct foreign 
investment; by 1981, the proportion of us direct foreign 
investment allocated to the region was down to 17 per cent 
(Ramsaran 1985: 85). These figures follow a pattern which is 
typical of the Third World as a whole: in the early 1980s, 
just over one quarter of all direct foreign investment was 
in developing countries, and over half of this was 
concentrated in just eight such countries (Jenkins 1987: 
13) . 
The underlying reason for the failure of all trade 
equilibrium models is that they lack an adequate account of 
the production process. As Brett argues n(t)he fundamental 
weakness of bourgeois theory is not that it ignores dynamic 
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changes in production relations, but that it assumes that 
capitalist development will take a particular form - one 
characterised by even development throughout the system, 
reciprocal benefits to all of those engaged in its exchange 
relationships, and equilibrium solutions to the input-output 
equations generated by the international division of 
labour.1I (Brett 1983: 90) By looking at the production 
process, and how this is integrated with exchange and 
distribution, one can see the (relative) advantages that 
accrue to 'early developers' - generally those countries 
that were not colonised and subject to regimes of forced 
labour, or escaped them early enough to enjoy a competitive 
position in the world market. 
Neo-classical theory's assumption that the world economy is 
made up of equally competitive individual units is a 
fallacy. In practice, some economies are far more powerful 
than others and are therefore in a far greater position to 
attract capital than others. Economies of scale ensure that 
increasing returns prevail when average costs are a 
decreasing function of output. The strongest countries 
secure economies of scale through factors such as the 
exploitation of mass production techniques (for instance -
specialisation of labour, machinery and management, the 
accumulation of knowledge), access to credit and to cheap 
inputs (such as wage goods and capital equipment), which in 
turn improve the prospects of SUbstantial infrastructural 
facilities, and the organisation of Research and Development 
facilities (around 98 per cent of which - in the capitalist 
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world, at least - is concentrated in the advanced capitalist 
countries - see Griffin 1978: 15) (Brett 1983: 90-3). In 
monetary terms, the effects are very different from the 
expectations of the Hecksher-Ohlin model - the outflow of 
gold from country B will not automatically lead to a 
reduction in prices and the restoration of a trade 
equilibrium with country B, but will instead have the effect 
of decreasing the supply of credit, which will in turn 
decrease production and raise interest rates. In country A, 
gold flows will be absorbed by the expanded circulation 
requirements of increased cloth and corn production, 
increased luxury production and expanded bank reserves. This 
final factor will increase the availability of credit at low 
interest rates and therefore promote the continued expansion 
of production. Finance capital may be attracted by the high 
interest rates of country B but this does not lead to a new 
equilibrium because the credit still has to be paid back to 
country A with interest, which eventually leads to an ever 
greater flow of gold from B to A (see Shaikh 1980: 38-9). 
So, capitalism creates hierarchies at both the level of 
production and the level of the world market, the latter of 
which is based on a "tendency towards locational 
agglomeration, a tendency based on the search for the 
economy of time." (Murray 1972: 171) At the level of the 
world market, productive activities tend to be gathered 
together into agglomerations, and most capital is invested 
in these areas. Capital will continue to be invested in 
those areas where 'agglomeration tendencies' are relatively 
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low for a number of reasons - exhausted markets in the 
advanced countries, or vital raw materials, cheap labour or 
protected markets in the Third World - but none of these (on 
their own) are sufficient to overcome the competitive 
advantage (Edwards 1985: 123-65) enjoyed by the advanced 
capitalist countries and so most capital remains there. 
Indeed, even more crucially, there is a net capital flow 
from Third World countries to the 'advanced' world, as Third 
World capitalists seek to maximise their own profitable 
opportunities by investing (often illegally) in the First 
World. In section two I referred to capital outflow in 
Trinidad around the period of independence, but even during 
the boom years from the mid-1970s to early 1980s, there was 
an endemic problem of capital outflow. It has been estimated 
that from 1976-1984, there was a capital outflow of more 
than US $1 billion. At the height of the boom (1976-80) 
capital outflows amounted to 63 per cent of the growth in 
external public debt during the period (Bennett 1988: 64). 
This export of capital, based on a particular conjuncture of 
production, exchange and distribution, has important 
consequences for class formation, as I discuss below. 
Finally, the direct foreign investment which does go to the 
Third World is not as benevolent as is supposed in the neo-
classical and Lewis models. Many labour organisations in 
Trinidad and elsewhere have been critical of foreign 
ownership of important parts of the economy, especially, as 
I show in my case study, the oil industry. They have argued 
that the national interest of small developing societies 
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have been subordinated to the global concerns of large 
transnational corporations. (This is discussed in more 
detail with reference to the Trinidad oil industry in 
chapter six.) Although this argument is often couched in 
overly nationalist terms (which all too often fail to 
condemn local capitalists who are just as prone to export 
capital), its basic premise is useful. Neo-classical theory 
regards international economic relations as market 
transactions between national units. In practice trade is 
increasingly dominated by large firms exchanging with their 
own subsidiaries. The result is that prices are 
'administered' and not 'arm's length' market prices; in 
other words, transnational companies transfer price. 
Transfer pricing refers to "the setting of prices on 
transactions between different parts of the same firm, as 
distinct from the setting of market prices on transactions 
between independent producers." (Murray 1981b: 1) 
Transnational corporations may transfer price in order to 
reduce the tax burden in specific countries, to avoid limits 
on profit remittances, to take advantage of a more 
favourable exchange rate where a dual exchange rate 
mechanism exists, to avoid accusations of 'imperialist 
exploitation' or to obtain greater flexibility as transfer 
prices can be used to generate a continuous flow of funds as 
imports or exports are made, whereas profit remittances 
usually have to wait until the end of the financial year 
(Jenkins 1987: 117-8). 
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(b) Class Formation and Third World Labour Studies 
The implications of my discussion of uneven development 
should be clear for any study of labour in the Third World. 
As I argued in section three, class formation is highly 
uneven and so an industrial relations model is not very 
useful. In Trinidad, the capital-labour relation is the main 
relation of production in that the direct producers are 
separated from the means of production, but the export of 
capital which is so common in peripheral capitalist 
economies ensures that the processes of class formation and 
development are highly uneven. The result is that the 
securely employed, unionised, usually male, wage worker of 
the industrial relations school represents at most a large 
minority of the labour force, and there is large-scale and 
constant unemployment and a large informal sector (often 
with close links with the peasant or domestic economy). In 
Trinidad, out of an estimated labour force of 369 600 in 
1985, approximately 100 000 workers were unionised (Council 
of Progressive Trade unions 1985c: 1). Moreover, the labour 
force as a whole is stratified along the lines of race and 
gender, and these factors must be accounted for in any study 
of labour. It is therefore more accurate to use the term 
working classes rather than the singular working class. 
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Part Four: Labour Organisations and Labour Resistance 
The case study outlined in chapters two to six focuses 
mainly on the organised labour movement, and in particular 
on political parties and trade unions. However, I argue that 
the character of these institutions must be seen in the 
context of wider uneven class, gender and ethnic relations. 
Before moving on to my case study, I will briefly discuss 
the general character of trade unions and political parties, 
and relate this to the specific conditions in peripheral 
capitalist economies. 
The orthodox Marxist-Leninist view of trade unions is that 
they are not particularly effective institutions in 
advancing the cause of socialism. Lenin distinguished 
between economic, trade union consciousness and the 
revolutionary socialist class consciousness embodied in the 
vanguard party (Lenin 1988). Perry Anderson has similarly 
'written off' trade unions as vehicles of socialist advance, 
arguing that they "do not challenge the existence of a 
society based on a division of classes, they merely express 
it. Thus trade unions can never be viable vehicles of 
advance towards socialism in themselves; by their nature 
they are tied to capitalism. They can bargain within the 
society, but not transform it." (Anderson 1978: 334) A 
general strike is dismissed as "an abstention, not an 
assault on capitalism." (ibid.: 336) This view of trade 
unionism is contrasted with the political party, which is 
seen as "a rupture with the natural environment of civil 
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society, a voluntarist contractual collectivity, which 
restructures social contours: the union adheres to them in a 
one-to-one relationship ... Thus, the political party alone 
can incarnate a true negation of existing society and a 
project to overthrow it." (ibid.: 335) 
Such a sharp dichotomy between 'economic' trade unionism and 
'political' parties is not dissimilar to the views of Kerr 
and his colleagues, discussed in section one. In Trinidad, 
this view has informed both right and left wing politics in 
the labour movement. For instance, in the 1940s and 1950s 
British TUC advisers in colonial Trinidad advocated a 
complete separation of industrial and political demands (see 
chapter three), while in the 1970s many Marxists took a 
similar position in the united Labour Front (see chapter 
five). Two left-wing Trinidadian writers have even argued 
that "(t)he biggest barrier to further development of the 
workers' self organisation and initiative is the trade union 
which emaSCUlates and limits the scope of working class 
activity, channelling it in a particular direction as 
determined by the wage system and bourgeois democratic 
process." (Howe and Rennie 1982: 135) 
In section one I outlined the reasons why the 'economic' 
demands of trade unions can never be wholly separated from 
politics. If one takes a socialist perspective, it should be 
stressed that, for all its limitations, 'trade union 
consciousness' is never wholly compatible with capitalism. 
For instance, the basic trade union demand of a 'fair day's 
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work for a fair day's pay' can develop into more radical 
objectives; as Hyman states, "(i)f workers were to define 
'fairness' in terms of 'the full fruits of their labours', a 
demand which is superficially economic would have obvious 
revolutionary implications .•. In some contexts, any demands 
for improvements are unrealizable; and in any situation, 
there will be some point in excess of which demands are 
intolerable." (Hyman 1978: 386) Lenin himself took a far 
more subtle position than is often credited to him and he 
was fully aware of the 'educational functions' of a strike. 
He wrote that "(a) strike ... opens the eyes of the workers to 
the nature, not only of the capitalists, but of government 
and the laws as well ... strikes, therefore, teach the workers 
to unite ... This is the reason that socialists call strikes 
'a school of war', a school in which the workers learn to 
make war on their enemies for the liberation of the whole 
people, of all who labour ... " (Qu. Hyman 1978: 387) 
In Third World societies, trade unions often playa more 
explicitly political role than similar organisations in 
advanced capitalist countries. As I stated in section one, 
the presence of a large reserve army of labour weakens the 
collective bargaining position of trade unions and so 
compels trade unions to take positions on wider political 
issues - one factor behind the phenomenon of 'social 
movement unionism', discussed in chapter six. Moreover, as 
Hyman points out, "(f)or a ruling class pursuing rapid 
capital accumulation within the constraints of an 
imperialist world economy the options are clearly limited: a 
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fact which does much to explain the lack of tolerance for 
independent and assertive labour organization by most post-
colonial regimes." (Hyman 1979: 329) In other words, given 
the unevenness of development in peripheral capitalist 
societies, Third World capitalist states often attempt to 
control organised labour. Thus in practice, many states take 
a far more realistic view of the political nature of trade 
unions and often pass legislation which attempts to curtail 
their power - as was the case in Trinidad and Tobago in 1965 
(see chapter three) . 
Conclusion. 
The approach of this thesis is influenced by, but in some 
respects attempts to move beyond, Marxist theory. Neo-
classical, modernisation and cultural pluralist theory are 
all incomplete because they do not adequately conceptualise 
the link between labour and development. Dependency and 
world systems theories at least have the merit of focusing 
on the international economy, but they tend to one-sidedly 
regard systems of labour control as the functional outcome 
of the mechnisms of the world system. While numerous Marxist 
approaches are overly reductionist and stagist, this does 
not have to be the case. A theory of uneven development, 
combined with a 'human action' approach to class, race and 
gender, provides the theoretical framework for an analysing 
labour and different periods of development, such as 
slavery, indentureship and peripheral capitalism. 
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Analysing development in order to explain the context in 
which labour operates is necessary, but is still 
insufficient. Labour is not simply a factor in explaining 
development; in terms of understanding the dynamics of 
history, it is the key factor. As my quotation from Marx at 
the beginning of the chapter illuminates, the exploitation 
of one country by another is based on the exploitation of 
one class by another. Robert Brenner has argued that three 
conditions must be fulfilled if there is to be an 
unprecedented expansion of the productive forces. Firstly, 
there must be a potentially mobile labour force (i.e. one 
not tied to the land or a particular owner). Secondly, there 
must be the potential for developing labour productivity 
through the specialisation of tasks. Thirdly, the potential 
must exist for enforcing continued pressure to increase 
labour productivity: "Only under conditions of free wage 
labour will the individual producing units (combining labour 
power and the means of production) be forced to sell in 
order to buy, to buy in order to sell and reproduce, and 
ultimately to expand and innovate in order to maintain this 
position in relation to other competing productive units." 
(Brenner 1977: 32) In the caribbean, such conditions have 
largely not existed and so it has generally had a weak 
competitive position in the world market. 
Even in the period of post-war capitalist industrialisation, 
the region has either had to compete with countries that 
have superior technology and therefore higher productivity, 
or it has been forced to produce low productivity, 
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unfinished goods, where the 'value added' is low and so 
potential for 'modernisation' is not high. In the case of 
the former, the region has therefore had to import 
technology which has led to balance of payments problems, 
and has failed to attract sufficient capital investment (due 
to capitalism's 'agglomeration tendencies' within the world 
market) in order that new employment opportunities could be 
created. In the case of the latter, the terms of trade are 
generally unfavourable. This is not due to the higher wages 
of workers in the metropolitan countries, Prebisch's 
argument, but is instead caused by different rates of labour 
productivity (of which wages are a reflection). 
The politics of labour should therefore be analysed in the 
context of uneven capitalist development in the periphery. 
'Political' trade unionism should not be seen as a sign of 
the 'political immaturity' of a labour movement but should 
be regarded as a rational response to the conditions of 
capital accumulation in the Third World. Divisions within 
the working classes, both class and non-class based, should 
come under scrutiny. The political potential of less 
organised groups such as those working in the petty 
commodity sector should be assessed. These tasks are 
undertaken in chapters two to six. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Class Formation and Labour History 
..... the Britain of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
was admired and envied the world over for its liberty, (and) 
for the comparative well-being of its inhabitants." 
Margaret Hilda Thatcher (1979: v) 
As I showed in chapter one, the Caribbean's integration into 
the world economy was an unfavourable one, a situation 
strongly influenced by processes of class formation in the 
area. While Trinidad suffered a similar fate to the rest of 
the region, the actual process of class formation was 
significantly different (with the partial exception of 
British Guiana) from the rest of the West Indies. My purpose 
in this chapter is to examine the particular way that 
classes developed from the late eighteenth century to the 
late 1930s, and in doing so show how these patterns helped 
to shape labour resistance. In particular, I am concerned 
with how uneven development interacted with ideology to 
create a fluid class structure divided by race and gender. 
To clarify the events of this period, the chapter is divided 
into three sections. Firstly, I look at the period of 
slavery, from its comparatively late establishment in the 
1770s to Abolition in 1834. The second section investigates 
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the period from 1838 to 1917, and in particular the system 
of indentured labour, the development of 'reconstituted' 
peasantries (Mintz 1984: 132) and the unification of 
Trinidad with Tobago. Finally, the period from the 1890s to 
the 1930s is examined, a period characterised by intensified 
proletarianisation and the beginnings of organised labour, 
the development of the oil industry and the emergence of 
'modern' trade unionism. 
section One: The Period of Slavery 
(i.) Introduction: Trinidad as a 'Colonial Slum': 1498-1770s 
Columbus is alleged to have discovered Trinidad on July 31, 
1498. In fact this 'discovery' was the beginning of the 
island's contact with the developing European commercial 
network, led at this stage by Spain and Portugal. The actual 
discovery of Trinidad was made by the Arawak and Carib 
Indians who inhabited the island for hundreds of years 
before Columbus' arrival, and had established an agrarian 
society based on soil cultivation, hunting animals and 
gathering shell-fish (Williams 1964: 1). 
The spanish colonisation process was markedly slow in 
Trinidad, and the first permanent Spanish settlers probably 
did not arrive until 1592. Even after this, Trinidad 
remained undeveloped compared to the rest of the Iberian 
Empire. It was basically an "outpost of Spanish colonialism" 
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(Brereton 1981: 2), where a few Spaniards and Spanish-
Americans (mestizos) cultivated a little tobacco and cocoa 
for export, but most production was for direct sUbsistence. 
The plantation form of production did not yet exist, but 
attempts were made to develop it in the seventeenth century. 
Up to the 1780s, the Arawaks and the Caribs provided much of 
the labour for the developing estates. Production was based 
on the encomienda system, whereby the Spanish encomendero 
was granted a parcel of land, and had the right to extract 
tribute (in the form of labour and/or crops) from the 
Indians living on the land. This system of production was 
typical of the Spanish Empire in the sixteenth century but 
was limited in Trinidad to just four encomiendas, and in 
1712 only about 600 Indians lived in them (Brereton 1981: 
5). Most Indians still lived in the forest, in independent 
settlements. 
There were further attempts to control the labour of, and to 
'Christianise' , the Indians, such as the mission villages 
established between 1687 and 1708. Each mission was 
ultimately controlled by the Capuchin missionaries, and 
Indians were required to work for several days a week on the 
settlement. These efforts to increase labour control met 
with only limited success and they were abolished in 1708. 
Nine years previously, the Indians at the mission of San 
Francisco de los Arenales rose up against the Capuchins and 
killed them (Brereton 1981: 6). 
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Various half-hearted attempts to establish forced labour 
systems continued, but until the late eighteenth century, 
slavery was not utilised. Up to this period, Trinidad 
remained "a colonial slum of the Spanish Empire", in which 
"(n)o serious attempt was ever made to develop its 
resources ... " (Millette 1985: 1). 
(ii.) The 'Modernisation' of Trinidad. 1773-97. 
It was clear by the 1770s that if Spain wanted to maintain 
its Empire, it must develop its colonies. This view was 
reinforced by the fact that Britain was increasingly 
dominant in the region. From 1761, Spain and France were 
allies, and by 1776 the Spanish recognised that immigration 
was necessary to develop Trinidad. The following year 
Trinidad's Spanish governor, Manuel Falquez, received a 
visit from the French-Grenadan planter Roume de st. Laurent. 
The latter became the semi-official spokesperson for a group 
of French planters who suffered discrimination at the hands 
of the British after the latter had taken Grenada in 1763. 
Under st. Laurent, these planters were encouraged to move to 
Trinidad. 
Almost immediately, foreign immigration commenced and this 
procedure was given official recognition in the 1783 Cedula 
of population. This decree offered incentives to prospective 
new planters, such as a free grant of land to every settler 
who came to Trinidad with his slaves. The size of the land 
depended on the the number of slaves owned by the planter; 
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i.e. the larger the number of slaves owned, the larger the 
amount of land awarded. A free-coloured property-owning 
class was also encouraged to settle, as they too were 
awarded land (albeit half as much as their white 
counterparts), often as slave owners. Also, provisions were 
made for the granting of full Spanish citizenship for all 
free settlers, including coloureds, after five years 
residence, provided that they adhered to Roman Catholicism. 
The effect of the Cedula was quite clear. In 1784, there was 
a population of almost 6 000, of whom 2 627 were slaves 
(there were a further 1 495 Caribbean Indians. This section 
of the population was in decline due to overwork, food 
shortages, contact with European diseases and murder); by 
1797, the population had increased to 17 643, of whom over 
10 000 were slaves (Brereton 1981: 14-15; Williams 1964: 
47). 
Unlike many of the other islands, Trinidad's economy was not 
based solely on one crop and the production of sugar was (at 
least initially) accompanied by that of cotton, cocoa and 
coffee. Nevertheless, by the 1790s, the economy shared most 
of the features of slave society outlined in chapter one and 
it was centred on the production of sugar for export. 
(iii.) Trinidad as a British Slave Colony, 1797-1838. 
Spain's attempts to prevent further British expansion were 
in vain and the latter conquered Trinidad in 1797. This 
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takeover reflected the increasing dominance of the British 
in the region. It was tolerated by the planters because they 
feared that the revolutionary events in France and Saint 
Domingue would spread to Trinidad if it continued under weak 
spanish rule. 
The conquest was led by Sir Ralph Abercromby, but he left 
the island after a few days and left one of his officers, 
Sir Thomas Picton, as Military Governor and Commander-in-
Chief. From 1799-1802, Picton ruled Trinidad as an effective 
tyrant. Harsh treatment such as flogging and executions were 
inflicted on people of all classes and colours, but the most 
severe was usually reserved for the coloureds and blacks 
and, although Picton was eventually disgraced, successive 
governors were only marginally more humane. 
The slave owner had absolute power over the slave; the slave 
was the master's legal property. There were laws which 
supposedly protected slaves from the worst kind of abuse by 
her or his master, but in practice murder or rape often went 
unpunished (Patterson 1975: 82). Work on the plantations was 
very hard, particularly in the sugar crop season. Slaves 
were also subject to ill-treatment on the estates by 
overseers, and once again received little effective 
protection. 
There was no sexual division of labour under slavery. Female 
slaves were expected to work on the estates from an early 
age and, on at least one island (Jamaica) there were more 
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women field slaves than men (Reddock 1985: 64-5). As 
Patterson argues, "Slavery abolished any real social 
distribution between males and females. The woman was 
expected to work just as hard, she was as indecently exposed 
and was punished just as severely. In the eyes of the master 
she was equal to the man as long as her strength was the 
same as his." (Patterson 1975: 67) The family was generally 
treated with contempt by slaves, and women were not keen to 
bear children, probably because of their demanding tasks on 
the estates. Abortion and infanticide were widely practiced 
(Patterson 1975: 106-7). This suited the planters' 
interests, as it was usually cheaper for them to buy new 
slaves, rather than pay the social reproduction costs of 
children. 
Slave resistance was a common occurrence, thus belying the 
myth of the 'passive, happy, negro'. At times, this 
resistance took the form of open rebellion (e.g. Jamaica 
1798 and 1831), or even revolution (Saint Domingue 1791), 
but more commonly it involved everyday, 'hidden' forms of 
protest such as laziness, satirising their master's 
prejudices (the Quashee personality), running away, and 
poisoning their masters (Patterson 1975: 261; Heuman 1986b; 
Bauer and Bauer 1942). In Trinidad, resistance tended to 
take the form of more covert protest, but even in the most 
'passive' of slave colonies there were planned open 
rebellions. In 1805, martial law was declared by Governor 
Hislop in response to the fear of an imminent slave revolt. 
As a result of this planned uprising, four slaves were 
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executed, five were deported after their ears had been cut 
off, and many others were flogged (Craton 1982: 236). There 
was no other known planned rebellion in Trinidad before 
Emancipation, but resistance in its everyday form persisted. 
Open rebellions were the exception rather than the rule and 
they usually affected only a small minority of slaves. 
However, this had less to do with the so-called 'happy, 
contented Negro' than with the fact that the slaves "had to 
accept the institution of slavery and make their adjustments 
to their institution." (Bauer and Bauer 1942: 390) The 
monopoly of the means of coercion by the planters was such 
that everyday resistance could only realistically take 
covert forms. 
Slavery was abolished in 1834 although an apprenticeship 
period of six years (reduced to four) was inaugurated, under 
which former slaves had to work for their master for three 
quarters of the week without a wage, while they were free to 
seek paid work for the rest of the week. The planters were 
also paid £20 million compensation. The announcement of the 
apprenticeship period led to spasmodic resistance by the 
former slaves, some of whom protested outside Government 
House in Port of Spain. These protests eventually died out, 
a reaction reinforced by the conduct of Governor Hill, who 
ordered the arrest and flogging of the protestors. 
section Two: 1838-1917: Indentured Labour, 'Reconstituted 
Peasantries' and the unification of Trinidad and Tobago. 
(i.) Trinidad after Emancipation 
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The end of the apprenticeship period in 1838 opened up a new 
period in the history of the Caribbean, and the newly 
emancipated societies followed divergent paths of 
development. In Barbados, for example, the plantation system 
was easily maintained as there was a limited availability of 
land to which the former slaves could move. In Trinidad, on 
the other hand, a period of covert, yet intensified, class 
struggle took place in which the planters attempted to 
maintain a labour supply for the plantation, but the former 
slaves tried to secure a degree of freedom beyond that of 
'free' wage labour. The former slaves wanted to leave the 
plantation and become independent peasant proprietors; they 
"demanded control over their own labor and access to their 
own lands to use for the production of food and other 
crops." (Klein and Engerman 1985: 256) 
This struggle was initially balanced in favour of the former 
slaves. In 1838, only 20 656 former slaves inhabited the 
island, a high proportion of whom were domestics. At the 
same time, only 43 000 out of a total of 1.25 million acres 
of land was cultivated (Brereton 1981: 77). This abundance 
of land relative to population aided a movement by the ex-
slaves off the estates on to land that was previously 
uncultivated. By 1861, there were 5 833 freeholders owning 
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land of between one to ten acres. One should not conclude 
from this, however, that population was the decisive factor 
because natural factors exist in an historically determined, 
social environment. A situation of widespread land 
availability, or 'open resources' (Nieboer 1971: 384-5), can 
only aid social phenomena, they cannot determine them. In 
post-emancipation Belize, for instance, former masters 
maintained their mahogany-producing labour force, in a 
situation of 'open resources', through a system of debt 
peonage (Bolland 1981: 608). 
In Trinidad, the planters carried out a variety of measures 
in an attempt to maintain a constant labour supply. These 
included relatively high wages (which were also in part 
forced on them as the demand for labour exceeded the 
supply), and accommodation and food for labourers. Wages 
increased from 15d. in 1838 to 25.5d. in 1839 (Sebastien 
1979: 53), and payment was also made by 'task'. Under this 
system a specific piece of work was given to the labourer 
and a fixed payment was made, so high wages could be made by 
those who completed a number of tasks in one day. The 
planters also used their dominance in the Legislative 
council and passed a Territorial Ordinance which prohibited 
the purchase of land below one hundred acres. 
None of these measures were particularly successful and the 
ex-slaves responded to the Territorial Ordinance by 
squatting on Crown land or abandoned estates. There were 11 
000 field slaves in 1834; only 4 000 of these had remained 
90 
on the estates by 1859 (Brereton 1981: 79). The former 
slaves became independent producers of cocoa and coffee, or 
petty traders, while the prosperous few became shopkeepers. 
Many combined 'independent' work with occasional work on the 
plantations. These independent producers were by no means 
wealthy and they led a materially precarious existence, but 
they at least had freedom from direct control by the 
plantation owners. 
Attempts to remove squatters were largely ineffective. 
Communications and pOlicing were poor, and some of the 
smaller planters were happy with a system of occasional 
and/or seasonal labour because it meant that wages did not 
have to be paid all the year round. The larger planters, 
such as W.H. Burnley, who could afford to pay annual wages, 
were the real opponents of squatting. A Proclamation of 
March 30 1839 empowered stipendiary Magistrates to evict 
squatters of less than one year's standing. However, many of 
the smaller estate owners "were unwilling to lay information 
before the Magistrates about those squatters who were a 
source of labour for their own estates." (Wood 1968: 51) 
The larger plantation owners therefore began to look to 
external sources for a supply of labour. The first source 
was the Eastern caribbean, and from 1839-49 over 10 000 
immigrants arrived from Grenada, Nevis and Montserrat. A 
steady inflow continued throughout the 19 century, 
particularly from Barbados, but few stayed on the 
plantations and instead went to the towns or settled as 
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independent cultivators. Alternative sources from China, 
Sierra Leone, st. Helena, Madeira, and even France and 
Germany suffered a number of setbacks such as the high 
mortality rates of the settlers, expense of importation (in 
the case of China) and insufficient numbers to fill the gaps 
in labour supply. However, an alternative supply was found 
and the Fatel Rozack arrived in Trinidad on May 3 1845, 
complete with the first load of labourers from India. 
(ii.) The Indentured Labour System and the Recovery of 
Sugar. 
The sugar planters' need for a steady labour force was 
highlighted by the crisis that hit West Indian sugar 
immediately after emancipation. Sugar production declined 
from 14 312 tons (1838) to 12 228 tons in 1840 (Brereton 
1981: 82). The arrival of the first ship-load of labourers 
from India in 1845 was therefore directly linked to the 
crisis of the sugar industry. In the first wave of 
immigration, from 1845-48, 5 167 Indians arrived in Trinidad 
(Wood 1968: 114). At this time, it was widely believed that 
the appearance of Indian labour would be a temporary 
phenomenon, and part of their labour contract included 
provision for a return passage (see below). However, in 1846 
the Sugar Duties Act was passed by the British government, 
which made provisions for the equalisation of duties on 
foreign and British colonial sugar. One consequence of this 
Act was that Trinidad (and the rest of the English 
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Caribbean) would have to compete with cheaper sugar, 
including that produced by slave labour in Cuba and Brazil. 
This prospect convinced planters of the need to re-open the 
link with India and in 1851, the second wave began, which 
lasted until 1917. Altogether, from 1845-1917, Trinidad 
imported 143 939 Indians, and it was their labour which re-
stimulated the sugar industry (Sebastien 1979: 223). In the 
1850s, production consistently expanded, and by 1866 had 
reached 40 000 tons per annum (Brereton 1981: 84). 
The labour system utilised by the planters was not one based 
on free wage labour. Instead, a system of indentured labour 
was used. Changes were made to the immigration rules over 
time and were embodied in the 1854 Consolidating Ordinance. 
Indians who had entered Trinidad before 1854 were entitled 
to a free return passage after five years, while others had 
to spend ten tears in the colony. Both groups had to serve 
as labourers for a period of three years, and could then re-
indenture themselves for a further two years or buyout 
their remaining time by paying a certain sum to the colonial 
government. These conditions were subject to continual 
amendment throughout the century; for example, under 
Governor Gordon (1866-70), the Indians were awarded a plot 
of land at the end of their period of indentureship, and by 
the 1890s, Indians wishing to return home were expected to 
pay a sUbstantial proportion of the package themselves. 
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As well as conditions concerning duration and termination, 
the contract contained a number of additional stipulations. 
The labourer was guaranteed medical attention, housing and a 
wage under the contract. However, although a wage was paid 
the labourers were not 'free' wage labourers. This was 
because regulations were introduced (initially in 1846, but 
they were also incorporated into the 1854 Ordinance) that 
made it illegal for Indians to move off the estates without 
a pass granted to them by their employers, and which 
disallowed them from giving up work with one employer 
without a certificate of discharge. Moreover, negligence and 
absence from work were defined as criminal offences. 
This degree of control over the labourers enabled planters 
to pay low wages. The Immigration Ordinance of 1870 stated 
that indentured labourers should not receive less than the 
average wage, but planters could easily ignore these 
regulations. Even when the labourers broke the rules of the 
pass system, and illegally left the estates, they were not 
always guaranteed a sympathetic hearing. In giving evidence 
to the 1909 Sanderson Committee (on indentured labour in the 
Empire), W.H. Coombs, Trinidad's Protector of Immigrants 
described his usual response to Indian complainants: "I take 
down their complaint and I tell them plainly that I do not 
believe them ... lf the man comes to me and makes what I 
consider a frivilous complaint ... then I give the manager a 
certificate to that effect so that I can prosecute him." 
(Qu. Tinker 1974: 432) six years previously, Coombs did 
precisely this in response to a strike at the Harmony Hall 
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estate, after sixty seven labourers marched off the estate, 
complaining about conditions and wages. The strikers refused 
to return to the estate after Coombs dismissed their 
grievances, and 64 of them were given seven days 
imprisonment. The strike leader, Daulat Singh, was 
repatriated to India (Tinker 1974: 228-9). It was hardly 
surprising, then, as Coombs himself noted (though apparently 
oblivious to the reason why), that complaints "got less and 
less every year ... there are scarcely any." (Qu. Tinker 1974: 
309) 
Although wages were fixed, this did not help the Indians, 
even in times of economic recession. During the sugar crisis 
of the mid-1880s, employers still had to pay the statutory 
minimum wage of 25c per task; their response was to simply 
increase the size of the task, which had the same effect as 
reducing wages. The wages of indentured labourers may have 
fallen by as much as an average 60c per day to 35c in the 
1880s (Tinker 1974: 186). 
wages for Creoles were consistently higher, and they 
monopolised the supervisory positions on the plantation. As 
Sebastien notes, liThe very principles on which the 
indentureship system was founded divided labour within 
itself. Especially during the early period of the system, 
the creole was virtually the coolie's policeman." (Sebastien 
1979: 249) Numerous ordinances empowered Creole servants to 
arrest a 'coolie' who had fled the estate. In the district 
of Tacarigua, a Bounty System was introduced in 1862, 
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awarding servants a bounty of six pence for every mile away 
from the estate for capturing escaped 'coolies'. 
social conditions on the estates were very bad. Although the 
labour contract guaranteed housing and medical treatment, 
the actual quality of these services was very poor. The 1897 
Royal Commission on the West Indies described hospitals as 
"pig sties ... unfit for human habitation." (Qu. Sebastien 
1979: 273) A Creole witness told the Sanderson Committee 
that the Indians were housed in "something like a mule pen, 
about 150 feet long, and about eight to ten feet square; and 
sometimes two or three are housed in each room." (Qu. Tinker 
1974: 208) Alcoholism was common among the Indians, and the 
practice of the truck system often went so far that a 
monetary transaction did not take place and the labourer 
received payment in rum in its place. 
The degrading conditions that the Indians lived under, and 
the superior economic and social position of the Creole led 
to a "process of voluntary segregation" (Oxaal 1968: 44), 
reinforced by the compulsory pass system, on the part of the 
Indian population. Mutual suspicion and racial stereo-typing 
became common, and Indian men were regarded as wife-
murderers, perjurers and misers. Ill-feeling was also 
increased by the fact that the abundance of labour that 
indentureship engendered led to a decline in the bargaining 
position of the whole of the labour force. This was 
especially the case during the sugar crisis of the 1880s. 
These factors led the Indians to resist assimilation into 
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the European or Creole cultures, and Hinduism remained their 
major religion. 
It was, however, the minority Muslims who successfully 
established a festival that rivalled the Carnival of lower 
class Creoles. The Muharram festival of the minority Shi'ite 
Muslims commemorated the deaths of Mohammed's grandsons, 
Hassan and Hussain. Although the festival's religious 
significance was restricted to a tiny section of the 
population, by the 1880s it had genuine mass appeal and some 
Creoles, as well as Sunni Muslims and Hindus, took part. In 
the economic crisis of the 1880s (see below), the Colonial 
authorities became increasingly intolerant of the festival, 
and prohibited the 1884 festival from entering any towns. 
The procession attempted to enter the town of San Fernando, 
only to be shot at by the colonial police and British 
soldiers. sixteen people were killed as a result and over a 
hundred were wounded (Singh 1987: 1-41). 
The division between 'African' and 'Indian' was therefore 
'racialised' at this time. A process of racialisation occurs 
in instances "where social relations have been structured by 
the signification of human biological characteristics in 
such a way as to define and construct differentiated social 
collectivities." (Miles 1989: 75) The ideology of racism is 
not therefore a capitalist or a colonial conspiracy, or 
simply a function of capitalist exploitation, as some 
writers have implied (Cox 1959). Racism is a way of 'making 
sense' (albeit wrongly) of the way in which the world 
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operates (Miles 1989: 80-1; Hall 1978: 26). In Trinidad, the 
newly freed slaves of African descent, saw that their 
bargaining position with the planters was undermined by the 
arrival of indentured labourers from India. Their response 
was to 'blame the victims', the East Indians, rather than 
the perpetrators, the plantation owners. The impact of these 
developments on what is now called 'race relations' in 
Trinidad is particularly significant, because it shaped the 
pattern of labour resistance that persists (in a modified 
form) to this day. The roots and nature of racism may have 
changed, but its origins lie in this period. The 
significance of the impact of racism on dividing the labour 
force should not be underestimated, as most labour histories 
have done (see for instance Rennie 1974; Ramdin 1982), but 
at the same time the historical roots of racism must be 
explained, rather than described (as is the case in the 
plural society model), in terms of a timeless cultural group 
conflict. East Indians, like Africans before them, were 
taken to Trinidad to perform a specific task, as labourers, 
and as labour control and social life became segregated, so 
too did labour resistance. 
(iii.) The Development of Other Classes. 
(a) Cocoa Farmers 
As I have shown, after emancipation a new peasantry emerged, 
but they owed their existence largely to the lack of 
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enforcement measures against squatting. Under the 
governorship of A.H. Gordon (1866-70), a new policy was 
carried out which encouraged the development of a small, 
legally recognised, peasant class. The price of land was 
reduced to £1 per acre and the minimum requirement for 
purchase was reduced to just five acres. The result was an 
increase in the sale of land, along with a simultaneous move 
against squatting (a policy reinforced by programmes to 
develop communications and transportation). Most people 
bought their land and forests were cleared to accommodate 
the increase in land-ownership. 
Most of the new land-owners cultivated their land in cocoa 
and this became very lucrative (at least for the larger 
planters) from the 1860s onwards. By the 1890s, cocoa had 
emerged as Trinidad's largest export earner. As sugar 
production became increasingly concentrated in fewer, mainly 
British hands, so cocoa became dominated by planters of 
French-Creole origin. Technological advances in the 
processing of cocoa in Europe turned cocoa and chocolate 
into goods of mass consumption, which in turn led to an 
increase in the demand for unprocessed cocoa (cacao). 
The development of cocoa in Trinidad was largely built up 
through two similar means. Firstly, a peasant would buy a 
portion of Crown land, clear it, and plant cocoa trees. 
After the trees began to develop, they would sell the plot 
to a cocoa planter and buy new land, and repeat the process. 
Secondly, there was the contract system, under which a 
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planter would buy a large amount of land and fell the 
forest. He would then contract out the land to a peasant on 
the condition that the latter would plant cocoa trees. When 
the trees developed the owner took over the land, paying 
agreed sums for each tree. During their period of occupation 
of land, the contractor/peasant was allowed to grow food on 
the land. The major contractors were initially the peons, 
who were of Spanish-Indian origin, but the other ethnic 
groups (including in the 1870s, the Indians) followed. 
While many of the cocoa peasants may have regarded access to 
land as a means of independence from the plantation, the 
contract system actually increased the growing hegemony of 
capital. Temporary land tenure was often insufficient in 
terms of food provision and so peasants were often forced, 
by economic necessity, to try to find work on the cocoa 
estates. Secondly, the actual contract system was, from the 
point of view of the planter, a cheap way of developing 
cocoa, as they 'bought cheap and sold dear'. As Sebastien 
states, "Cocoa contractors were in truth and in fact hired 
underpaid laborers of the big cocoa planters. 1I (Sebastien 
1979: 403) 
(b) Sugar Cane Farmers 
The development of cocoa was reinforced by the crisis of the 
sugar industry of the mid-1880s, caused by competition from 
subsidised European beet sugar, and overproduction on the 
world market. The response of the sugar planters was to 
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encourage the development of 'independent' sugar cane 
farming. This had existed before the 1880s, but it was in 
spite of the large planters, rather than because of them. 
The planters now became more willing to foster the 
development of an independent peasantry because they bought 
the crushed sugar cane relatively cheaply, and after 
grinding, it was sold at a more expensive price. By 1899, 
cane farmers produced 20 per cent of all the cane that was 
crushed; by 1919, it had increased to 49.5 per cent 
(Sebastien 1979: 408). 
Although cane farming was initially taken up by the Creoles, 
it was the Indians who became increasingly dominant in this 
sector. From 1869, under Governor Gordon, a new policy was 
introduced whereby Indians could be awarded a plot of land 
at the end of their period of indentureship, in return for a 
relinquishing of the right to a passage back to India. Most 
Indian cane farmers simply purchased their land, however. 
From 1891-95, 34 per cent of the sales of Crown lands were 
to Indians and, although some was utilised for rice and 
cocoa production, the majority was for the purpose of sugar 
(Sebastien 1979: 408). 
These developments led to the restoration of Indian women to 
a position of subservience to Indian men. Women were always 
a minority of the indentured labourers, and those that 
entered Trinidad were often single, or separated from their 
husband (Reddock 1986: 35). A major reason for their leaving 
was to escape the patriarchal relations that existed in 
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India, and their work on the estates gave them some 
independence from Indian men (although not from male 
planters or their overseers). The increase in sugar cane 
farming resulted in a reduction in the demand for female 
labour on the estate and provided the basis for a 
reconstitution of the traditional Indian patriarchal family 
(Reddock 1986: 35). The challenge to women's independence 
manifested itself in a number of ways, including a high rate 
of wife murder among the Indian population (Wood 1968: 154), 
which in turn increased the incidence of racial stereotyping 
amongst the African population. By 1891, 54.7 per cent of 
Indo-Trinidadians were resident outside of the plantation 
system (Poynting 1988: 233), and the traditional Indian 
village, and patriarchal relations, were revived. Some women 
were forced to work unpaid on Indian land, and with the 
continued scarcity of women, child marriage became the norm. 
So, by the late nineteenth century, a complex pattern of 
class, race and gender stratification had emerged. 
(c) The Development of an Urban Indian and Chinese Middle 
Class 
An urban middle class was also established among the Indian 
population. A significant number became shopkeepers, 
merchants, and even estate owners. According to the Royal 
protector of Immigrants, in 1874 all the wealthy Indians 
were of high caste origin (Cited Sebastien 1979: 279-81). 
Wage labour alone was not sufficient to provide the means 
for movement to the middle class. Instead, n(i)t was wage 
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labour above the average, in the form of the headman 
(Sirdar) and men of upper caste, many of whom were also 
sirdars and who readily won status on the plantation both 
among management and workers, that advanced their social 
position above the average worker by using above average 
means." (Sebastien 1979: 84) On the estates, the sirdars 
acted as overseers for the planter and they used this 
position to accumulate wealth at the expense of the field 
labourer. For instance they often made the 'coolie' pay a 
percentage of their wage to them. Once a certain amount of 
wealth was accumulated, the sirdar would buy a shop near the 
estate, or alternatively they may have controlled the shop 
owned by the planter. These shops were generally run along 
the lines of the truck system and the credit given to 
labourers was often repayable at extortionate rates of 
interest. Sirdars also loaned money to indentured labourers 
in order that the latter could purchase their freedom. 
However, this led to a new system of bondage to the sirdar -
debt peonage. Interest rates were again extremely high, and 
generally varied from 60-120 per cent, but far higher rates 
were also recorded (Sebastien 1979: 288-9). On the whole, 
the Indian population continued its isolation from the rest 
of the population, and tended to confine itself to the rural 
areas. 
The smaller Chinese population was more easily accepted by 
the rest of the population than the Indians, but they too 
suffered harsh treatment. A great number of the Chinese 
indentured labourers were denied the chance of social 
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mobility because maltreatment, on both the journey to 
Trinidad and the plantation, led to a very high mortality 
rate among them. A large proportion of those that survived 
did prosper and became artisans, market gardeners, butchers 
and shopkeepers. By 1895, there were Chinese rum and grocery 
shops throughout the island, some owned by the Lee Lum 
family, who later developed their business interests and 
formed an influential part of the national bourgeoisie. 
(d) Class Development among the Creole population 
The period after emancipation also saw the development and 
consolidation of a black and coloured middle class. This 
sector of society originally emerged before emancipation, 
from the coloured and black population freed from slavery. 
with the concentration in sugar ownership after 
emancipation, this small group was forced into new 
occupational groupings including small business operations, 
such as pharmacies and printers. others were lawyers, 
doctors and newspaper editors. Some members of this group 
were 'self-made' and basically owed their position to the 
education system. Education expanded after Lord Harris 
founded 54 primary schools in 1846, but its development was 
held back by religious differences, poor attendance and bad 
administration. Nevertheless, the system still provided one 
of the few means of escape from a life of poverty and 
drudgery. Mobility did not, however, always involve entry to 
a higher class; it also led to the development of an 'upper 
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working class', composed of teachers, and low ranking civil 
servants and clerks. 
Some members of this new class attempted to shed their 
cultural roots, and disassociated themselves from the black 
masses. On the other hand, a significant number, 
particularly those in white collar work such as teaching, 
championed the cause of 'black pride'. One of the 
outstanding black figures was J.J. Thomas, who in 1889 wrote 
a perceptive reply to a racist diatribe by James Anthony 
Froude, in which he outlined how the black population was 
subject to racial discrimination and social and economic 
exploitation (J. Thomas 1969; Froude 1888). Thomas was 
himself a victim, and was continually passed over for the 
job of Inspector of Schools, despite his superior 
qualifications for the job. Other leading black teachers 
included H.A. Nurse and Henry Sylvester Williams, who later 
founded the Pan-African Conference in the US in 1900. Nurse 
had a son called Malcolm who, under the pseudonym George 
Padmore, became an influential Communist and later led the 
Pan-Africanist movement. 
The urban working class, which was still primarily of 
African descent, increased dramatically from the 1870s, 
mainly because of internal immigration from the rural areas 
and external immigration. The net immigration into Trinidad 
between 1871-1911 has been estimated at around 65 000 
(Brereton 1979: 110). These immigrants entered occupations 
such as domestic servants, petty traders, shopkeepers, cab-
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drivers, dockworkers and shopworkers. Some light industry 
also developed, including a brewery, some bakeries and a 
match factory. Most of the working class lived in barrack 
ranges, situated behind the front of each city street (with 
their respectable shops), hidden from the passer-by. The 
barrack ranges were long sheds built along a back wall, each 
one divided into a number of small rooms. Water supply was 
communal and shared among a large number of people. 
Overcrowding was common and made worse by urban growth. A 
Building Ordinance of 1868 prohibited the erection of new 
wooden buildings, thus worsening the situation. Disease was 
common, and the inadequate health system was run on the 
basis of curative rather than preventative medicine, an 
arrangement conducive to the interests of the wealthier 
classes, but one that did not benefit the urban poor in 
their overcrowded conditions. The infant mortality rate was 
high: in 1891, 18.4 per cent of children under the age of 
one year died, and children under the age of five accounted 
for 44.6 per cent of all deaths (Brereton 1979: 120). 
An urban working class culture began to develop, especially 
during the 1880s, when the sugar depression led to increased 
unemployment. This did not yet take the form of organised 
labour resistance, because there was no major concentration 
of the labour force in anyone industry; although sugar was 
a partial exception, even in this sector, labour was 
dispersed and isolated through the growth of cane farming. 
There was also the factor of the urban masses' cultural 
diversity, as the population had cultural roots in st. 
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Helena, Sierra Leone, North America, the East Caribbean, and 
pre-Columbus Trinidad. Nevertheless, a common black culture 
(one which excluded Indians) began to develop on the basis 
of a response to exclusion from political life, racist 
discrimination and a low socio-economic position. Of 
particular importance were the gangs of unemployed, the 
jamets, who took over the Carnival in the 1860s. Many of 
these gangs were involved in petty crime and there was a 
great deal of tension between the Colonial Government and 
the jamets at Carnival, culminating in riots in 1881. 
(e) 'Race relations' 
'Race relations' in this period were extremely complex 
because Creole-Indian tensions tended to conceal the fact 
that European culture was still predominant. As I have 
shown, middle class and white collar blacks and coloureds 
were the victims of discrimination. The Trinidad Telegraph 
reported in 1872 that a Secretary of State had told a West 
Indian Governor "that on no account whatever was the 
'subject race' to be employed in any office .•• of trust and 
responsibility." (Qu. Brereton 1979: 100) Such a view was 
reflected in the crude racist tracts of the time, most 
notably Thomas Carlyle's Discourse on the Nigger Question 
and Anthony Trollope's The West Indies and the Spanish Main 
(Trollope 1968). It was also developed by pseudo-scientific 
theories of 'social Darwinism', which regarded black people 
as lower down the evolutionary scale, and therefore 
biologically inferior. 
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Such views 'justified' social discrimination against blacks 
and Indians throughout the Empire. In Trinidad, the 
Government often 'promoted' the most capable of the middle 
class to positions in remote areas, thus making sure that 
they were safely out of the way; this was the fate of the 
aforementioned J.J. Thomas, who was 'promoted' to the 
Clerkship of the Peace for Cedros in 1871-2. Nevertheless, 
it was the lower class Creoles and Indians, who were the 
chief victims of racial discrimination. As well as socio-
economic exploitation (i.e. low wages and poor living 
conditions), attempts were made to deprive the workers and 
peasants of their 'inferior' cultural roots. The practice of 
obeah, a form of magic that had its origins in Africa, was 
subject to criminal punishment. This failed to curtail its 
practice, however, and the Creoles, as well as the Indians, 
were generally successful in maintaining some of their 
values and traditions (best reflected in Carnival, which was 
still potentially subversive at this time). These traditions 
were important because they were Iia source of strength and 
comfort to people whose material living conditions were 
usually wretched, just as religion and traditional cultural 
forms performed the same function for the Indian 
population." (Brereton 1981: 135) 
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(iv.) Social structure and Underdevelopment. 
This was the shape of Trinidad's basic social structure from 
1845 until the early twentieth century, when oil production 
became significant. In chapter one I outlined the link 
between forms of labour control and development and argued 
that the system of indentureship left Trinidad in a 
disadvantageous position against the economies of western 
Europe. This can be demonstrated by looking at the 
international sugar industry at the time. 
Over the period 1840-90, sugar beet's share of the world 
market increased from four per cent to 60 per cent 
(Sebastien 1979: 480). Germany produced more than all the 
Caribbean territories put together. As Williams points out, 
liThe European beet sugar industry represented the triumph of 
science and technology. Beet was the great school of 
scientific agriculture. Where the Caribbean planter remained 
dependent on the man with the hoe, the beet cultivator 
introduced deep ploughing ... 11 (Williams 1964: 154) The 
average output of sugar per factory was slightly more than a 
quarter of the German average (Williams 1964: 155). 
Trinidad's sugar economy was the most advanced in the 
British Caribbean, but its development was 'held back' by 
its comparative lack of technological advance. A 
contemporary observer commented that liThe planters of this 
island are not very advanced in the science of agriculture, 
if we measure their skill by the product of their estates .• " 
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(Sewell 1862: 102) This was measured at 1-1.5 hogsheads of 
sugar to the acre. At this time, 165 mills were worked with 
steam, around 100 with cattle, and a few with water-power 
(Sewell 1862: 102). Planters were reluctant to improve sugar 
cUltivation methods and were content to make profits through 
cheap labour. This was because there was little incentive to 
innovate as commodity production was not generalised: i.e. 
the direct producers still had direct access to land (see 
chapter one). 
However, while science could narrow the gap between beet and 
cane, it could not overcome it. This was because cane had a 
superior sucrose content. According to the 1897 Royal 
Commission on the West Indies, the yield per acre in 
Trinidad was 18 tons, compared with 10.7 tons of beet in 
France and 12.85 in Germany (Williams 1964: 156). While 
superior technology almost overcame these differences (the 
rate of extraction was 12.5 per cent in Germany, compared 
with only 9.5 per cent in Trinidad - Williams 1964: 156), 
production costs remained slightly cheaper in Trinidad 
compared with Germany. The crisis in sugar was actually 
brought to a head by the European practice of sUbsidising 
beet production (the Bounty System) and flooding the 
European market with cheap sugar. This led to West Indian 
sugar losing a SUbstantial proportion of the British market, 
and to the collapse of some of the most backward sugar 
producers (including those in Tobago, as I will show). 
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The use of out of date methods was more common in the rest 
of the British west Indies, British Guiana apart, than it 
was in Trinidad. While many of the islands concentrated on 
producing low grade, muscovado sugar, almost one-third of 
Trinidad's sugar (in 1891-2) was produced by the more 
advanced vacuum pan method (Sebastien 1979: 128). The result 
was that the crisis affected those manufacturers that 
employed the most out of date methods. This in turn led to a 
concentration of capital in the sugar industry. In 1878, 
there were 130 estates; by 1917, the number had been reduced 
to just 49, with only 13 owners (Sebastien 1979: 113). 
with the crisis of the sugar industry in the 1880s, cocoa 
emerged as the nation's leading export, and remained so 
until the 1920s (when the crop was devastated by witchbroom 
disease). Although production methods were similarly 
'backward' in this industry, it did not matter so much 
because there was little foreign competition. Trinidad was 
in fact one of only three producers (the others were Ecuador 
and Venezuela) of fine cocoa in the world at this time. 
However, archaic methods of production meant that decline 
eventually occurred and Trinidad's proportion of world 
production was reduced from 14 per cent in 1895 to 5 per 
cent by the late 1920s (Sebastien 1979: 506-08). 
(v.) Tobago. 
Tobago was also 'discovered' in 1498 by Columbus, and like 
Trinidad developed very slowly. It was subject to the 
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rivalries of competing powers and control of the island 
changed hands many times. It was annexed to Britain in 1763, 
(although it was briefly re-captured by the French in 1781, 
who controlled the island until the British re-established 
control in 1793) and the production of sugar by slave labour 
was rapidly generalised. Slave rebellions were common, 
including two particularly bloody revolts in 1771 and 1774 
which were brutally suppressed by the British. In the case 
of the latter, six rebels were burnt to death after their 
hands had been chopped off (Craton 1982: 156). 
Production on the estates was probably the most inefficient 
in the Caribbean. On his arrival in Tobago in 1807, Governor 
Young commented on the "distressed condition of the 
Colony .. " (Qu. Craig 1988: 3) The situation was aggravated 
after emancipation by Britain's free trade policy and a 
hurricane in 1847, which destroyed 26 sugar works and 
damaged a further 33 (Woodcock 1867: 106). The major 
problem, particularly in the long term, was Trinidad's 
social structure and the effect that this had on living and 
working conditions, and on Tobago's international 
competitiveness. 
Tobago's social structure after emancipation, and 
particularly from the 1850s, was based on the metayage 
system, under which the metayer worked on his or her own 
plot of land, but also worked on the plantation. This 
represented "a 'halfway house', in which planters could 
secure labour, and labourers, land, since under the economic 
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and political conditions of the island neither class could 
fully achieve its goals." (Craig 1988: 7) The social 
structure was such that there was little incentive to 
innovate and planters relied on the system as a provider of 
cheap labour and profitability. The metayers therefore had a 
number of grievances, including low wages, the truck system, 
and debt peonage, and these were the chief factors behind 
the 'Belmanna Riots' on the Roxborough estate in 1876 
(Brereton 1984: 113). It was largely as a result of these 
riots that 'representative government' (representative, that 
is, of a few planters) was abolished and Crown Colony 
Government introduced the following year. 
While Trinidad's sugar industry was backward vis-a-vis 
European production, Tobago was backward vis-a-vis the rest 
of the Caribbean. The inefficiency of the system of 
production was exposed by the virtual collapse of the sugar 
industry in Tobago in 1884-5. Unlike Trinidad, the sugar 
produced in Tobago was almost totally the low grade 
muscovado variety, which European-subsidised beet could 
easily undersell. The British no longer regarded Tobago as 
an island with a viable separate economy and polity, and it 
was united with Trinidad in January 1889. Originally Tobago 
retained its own separate Treasury and financial board, but 
in October 1898 these last vestiges of independence from 
Trinidad were removed, and Tobago was declared a 'Ward of 
the Colony of Trinidad and Tobago'. 
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section Three: Proletarianisation, Resistance Movements, the 
oil Industry and the Development of Trade Unionism. 
(i.) Proletarianisation 
In the period from 1898-1938, wage labour became more 
generalised, and some light manufacturing and the petroleum 
industry developed. This was reinforced by the 
aforementioned (see chapter one) policy of encouraging 
Indian settlement within Trinidad, which made independent 
peasant production more difficult. 
It was also in this period that the role of women as 
independent labourers was further undermined, especially 
amongst the Creole population. The European concept of the 
family wage was imported, and where women remained employed, 
it was usually in a subordinate role to that of men (Reddock 
1984: 274-306). The percentage of women employed in the 
labour market declined from 73.9 per cent in 1891 to 26.1 
per cent in 1946 (Reddock 1987: 13). However, the withdrawal 
of many women from the formal labour force did not always 
lead to them working as housewives, and many continued to 
work as peasants or petty traders. 
(ii.) Early Resistance Movements 
In the late nineteenth century, sections of the coloured 
middle class began to question the justice of colonial 
government. They resented the domination of sugar interests, 
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the racial discrimination that held back their life chances, 
and their lack of political representation. A petition in 
1887, containing about 5 000 signatures, called for 
elections to the Legislative Council. Demands for 
representative government continued in the 1890s, but the 
British response was unsympathetic. In 1898, the Unofficial 
majority on the Legislative Council was removed by the 
Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, and the following 
year, the Port-of-Spain Borough Council was abolished. These 
measures were regarded as further examples of authoritarian 
colonial rule, especially so in the case of the latter, 
because it was the one institution that allowed for some 
autonomy from the colonial government. 
A number of short-lived resistance organisations were formed 
at this time, partly as a response to such measures, 
including the Pan African Association. By 1902, many of its 
members had defected and had joined the Ratepayers 
Association, an organisation that was designed to safeguard 
their interests in the absence of the Borough Council. 
Protest became centred around government plans to cut off 
water supplies to homes where taps leaked and to introduce a 
meter system. This issue seemed unlikely to attract working 
class support, because most workers did not have their own 
water supply. Nevertheless, it did attract widespread 
support, possibly because of a threat to communal water 
supplies, and because workers may have regarded it as an 
issue of wider significance, indicative of authoritarian 
colonial government. A mass protest against the government's 
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planned measures, known as the 'Water Riot' of 1903, led to 
police killing sixteen people and wounding many others. In a 
Colonial Office inquiry into the causes of the riot, it was 
argued that the matter was simply a dispute between 
ratepayers and the planned Water Bill. However, Chamberlain 
told Governor Moloney to pay more attention to the wishes of 
the Unofficials in the Legislative Council, and in 1914, the 
Borough Council was revived (albeit, once again, on a 
limited franchise). 
working class opposition was also developing at this time, 
although this was at a comparatively slower rate. In the 
late 1890s the Working Men's Reform Club and the Trinidad 
Working Men's Association (TWA) were founded. Although the 
former rapidly declined, the latter, formed by water Mills 
in 1897, eventually emerged as an important political force. 
In its early days, it was basically a friendly society, 
although it also had a number of policies on political and 
social matters. Under the leadership of Alf Richards (1906-
14), links were established with the British Labour Party, 
and in particular two MPs, William Summerbell and Joseph 
Pointer. However, the weakness of the TWA's (and Pointer's) 
essentially urban, Creole-centred, approach to politics is 
shown by its attitude toward indentured labour. The Indian 
population was basically regarded as passive and 
uninterested in politics. On a visit to Trinidad, Pointer 
failed to denounce the harsh conditions faced by the Indians 
on the estates, and instead stated that "creole labour was 
paid less than it would be if there were no Indians." (Qu. 
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Charles 1978: 5) In its submission to the Sanderson 
Commission, the TWA expressed regret that indentureship had 
not been abolished, not on the grounds of opposition to 
forced labour, but rather because of who the forced 
labourers were. The Indian population responded by forming 
their own organisations, such as the East Indian National 
Association, which refused to work with the TWA as it 
believed that "opposition to indentured immigration was 
actually opposition to their presence per se." (Charles 
197B: 5) 
Sporadic resistance continued up to 1914 but trade unions, 
regarded as 'criminal conspiracies' under common law, did 
not yet exist. The colonial authorities had not yet 
considered the introduction of widespread labour 
legislation, and they would only be forced to do so by the 
events of 1919. 
(iii.) Post-191B Labour Revolt and its Aftermath. 
Indentureship was abolished in 1917 and after the First 
World War, the oil industry successfully sustained the boost 
of an increased demand for its products. The abolition of 
the indentured labour system was largely a result of 
pressure within India, particularly from G.K. Gokhale's 
Indian National Congress, rather than opposition from the 
indentured themselves. The development of the oil industry 
was particularly marked in the war years, although its 
labour force only became a significant actor in the 
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rebellion of the 1930s. Nevertheless, its development was 
important because although the majority of its labour force 
was Creole, there was (and still is) a significant Indian 
minority, far larger than is generally assumed (on this 
point see Ramsaran 1989: 55-6). Although this desegregation 
of the labour force did not alleviate mutual suspicions, it 
did manage to break down some barriers and there were a 
number of strikes in the oilfields as early as 1917. 
Of most immediate importance however, was the impact of the 
First World War. This was fought by Britain on the alleged 
basis of a war for democracy against tyranny, and this 
rallying cry had an impact in the British West Indies. The 
British West Indies Regiment was formed to 'join the fight 
for democracy', but these soldiers instead suffered racial 
discrimination (for example, through lower wage rates and 
racial abuse by officers), and so they began to question the 
legitimacy of British rule. In Italy in 1918, the Caribbean 
League was formed by some of these soldiers, and plans were 
made to improve the grievances of West Indians at home. 
Feelings of injustice were increased by news of racist 
attacks on blacks, including West Indian sailors, at 
Liverpool and Cardiff. On their return to the West Indies, 
the soldiers and sailors recounted their experiences, and 
this in turn influenced the growing consciousness of the 
working classes, particularly among the Creole sectors. This 
was reinforced by the importation of black nationalist 
literature (despite official hostility), especially the 
Garveyite movement's (officially banned) Negro World. 
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It was clear then, that employers and the government faced a 
different situation to that existing prior to 1914, when 
resistance was spontaneous and individualised. However, they 
did not at first appreciate this change and in 1918 the 
Habitual Idlers' Ordinance was passed. This particularly 
repressive piece of legislation stated that any male worker 
lacking means of sUbsistence should be made to work: if he 
failed to do so he could be confined to a government run 
agricultural settlement to be taught the 'habits of 
industry' and then handed over to private industry where he 
would be paid a low wage. The bill eventually became law in 
1920, after some doubts by the Colonial Office, but it was 
never effectively implemented and the 'agricultural 
settlements' were not constructed. The legislation was of 
more immediate significance because of the ill-feeling that 
it bred. Workers regarded it as a replacement for 
indentureship and a means of maintaining low wages. By the 
end of 1919, the cost of living had increased by 148 per 
cent since 1914, while wages had increased by 36 per cent 
for men and 28 per cent for women (Basdeo 1983: 26). 
It was against this background that the labour unrest of 
1919 took place. The first major strike in May 1919, 
involved asphalt workers, who employed the services of a 
rejuvenated TWA to demand a wage increase, a reduced working 
day, and better overtime rates. In November 1919 the 
waterfront workers, the sector with the most concentrated 
labour force, struck for higher wages and better working 
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conditions. The strike actually reflected wider issues such 
as repressive management, the lack of any institutional 
bargaining mechanisms, and the heightened consciousness of 
the developing working class (Rennie 1974: 25). strike-
breakers were used to ensure minimum operations, but on 
December 1 the strikers chased them off the waterfront, and 
then proceeded to march to Port of Spain. This led to an 
increase in strike activity, as workers in other sectors, 
including sugar, oil, construction and council employees, 
made similar demands to those of the dock-workers. Two days 
later a compromise was reached and the dockers were awarded 
a 25 per cent wage increase. This agreement did not lead to 
moderation on the part of the workers and instead encouraged 
others to strike for higher wages. Riots also continued, 
most notably in Tobago, where an attack on a government 
wireless station was suppressed by troops from HMS Calcutta. 
The events of 1919 were the first time that Creole and 
Indian had cooperated on any significant scale: the 1919 
strikes "seem to indicate that there was a growing class 
consciousness after the war and this transcended racial 
feelings at times." (Samaroo 1972: 218) 
The significance of the events of 1919 cannot be 
underestimated and were in many ways the forerunner of 1937 
and 1970 (Samaroo 1987: 21; Elkins 1969: 75). Their 
importance was not lost on the employers at the time, but 
rather than respond with widespread reform, as in Jamaica 
and British Guiana, where (limited) trade union laws were 
passed in 1919 and 1921 respectively, the government 
120 
introduced new repressive measures. A number of arrests 
and/or deportations were made, including TWA leaders active 
in the strikes. The Dispute Settlement and the Industrial 
Court Ordinances passed in 1920 together had the effect of 
prohibiting strikes and making arbitration compulsory. The 
dilatory attitude towards labour reform at this time is 
demonstrated by the fact that the proposed Industrial Court 
was never actually set up and so the law remained a dead 
letter. A Sedition Ordinance, also passed in 1920, made 
provisions for strong penalties for seditious libel and the 
circulation of seditious publications. 
Some reforms were made, however, including the Truck 
Ordinance 1919 which required (with some exceptions) that 
wages be paid in money, and the Labour Bureau Ordinance, 
which attempted to improve recruitment practices through the 
provision of information to employers. In 1921, the Wood 
Commission of Inquiry was set up to investigate the social 
and political climate in Trinidad and Tobago and, after 
extensive consultation with a number of informants, 
including the TWA, made its recommendations the following 
year. As a result of this report, it was decided that the 
first ever elections to the Legislative Council would be 
held in 1925, albeit with a very limited franchise. 
(iv.) The TWA and Colonial Labour Policy in 1920-31. 
The events of 1919 showed that there was still not a 
consistent labour policy on the part of the British 
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government. The haphazard reforms which followed were 
clearly inadequate, and pressure for more far-reaching 
reforms was made by various institutions, including the 
British Labour Party and the TUC, and the newly established 
International Labour Organisation. In 1920, the Labour Party 
set up a Colonial Affairs Committee, followed two years 
later by a Labour Committee, whose task was to examine 
colonial labour problems. Links were re-established between 
the TWA and the Labour Party in 1921 when the former sent J. 
Howard Bishop to London to discuss social and economic 
questions. 
within Trinidad and Tobago, the TWA reached new heights of 
popularity, and despite a limited franchise, returned three 
deputies to the Legislative Council in the 1925 elections. 
One of these was A.A. 'Captain' Cipriani, who had fought in 
the war, and on his return had emerged as the champion of 
the labouring masses (colloquially known as the 'bare-footed 
man'). He was chosen as leader of the TWA in the hope that a 
'neutral, white man' could unite the Creole and Indian 
working classes. His success in this regard was limited, and 
the TWA remained a primarily Creole supported movement. 
support for Indian petty bourgeois organisations such as the 
East Indian National Association remained strong among 
(largely male) East Indian workers and peasants. 
Nevertheless, under Cipriani's leadership the TWA became a 
popular organisation and campaigned on a wide variety of 
issues, including the abolition of child labour (an 
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Ordinance was passed to this effect in 1925), the need for 
trade union legislation, and the introduction of an eight 
hour working day. Cipriani was not a radical however; his 
campaigns were not fought through popular demonstrations or 
strikes, but were instead limited to pleas to the Colonial 
Office and debates in the Legislative Council. Furthermore, 
he placed great faith in the ability and will of the Labour 
Party to carry out reform in the colonies. In 1925, Cipriani 
visited England and met with Sir Samuel Wilson, Permanent 
Under Secretary at the Colonial Office, and attended the 
Labour Commonwealth Conference. The following year, the 
Labour MP Frederick Roberts visited Trinidad and British 
Guiana. Cipriani joined him in British Guiana, where they 
attended the Conference of the British Guiana Labour Union. 
These links reinforced cipriani's commitment to the belief 
that a Labour government would introduce labour reform in 
Trinidad and Tobago. He therefore placed much faith in the 
imminence of change when the second Labour government was 
elected in 1929. A Royal Commission on West Indian sugar was 
set up and chaired by the Caribbean specialist, Lord 
Olivier, which recommended continued imperial preference for 
Empire sugar and some loans to producers. These measures 
were carried out but it was trade union legislation that 
most concerned Cipriani. In 1930, the Colonial Secretary 
Lord Passfield chaired a Colonial Conference which discussed 
the need for labour legislation in the colonies. Two months 
after the Conference (in September), the 'Passfield 
Memorandum' was issued, which requested to the colonies that 
workers' compensation and trade union legislation be 
introduced as soon as possible. 
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However, in Labour's period in office (1929-31), no 
significant labour reforms were carried out in Trinidad and 
Tobago. The basic excuse used by the Trinidad government was 
that economic depression (see below) made labour reform 
impossible. For instance, in response to the request that 
Masters and Servants Ordinances be repealed, the Trinidad 
government said that this would be done "when a suitable 
opportunity presents itself." (Qu. Basdeo 1983: 92) The 
Labour government in Britain appeared to accept this 
explanation. There was widespread disappointment with the 
performance of the Labour government in office, and by 
implication (due to his heavy reliance on the Labour Party), 
cipriani. This disillusionment was to increase in the period 
of unrest in the 1930s. 
(v.) The 1930s: From Labour Rebellion to Trade Unionism. 
The labour rebellions in the 1930s were of great 
significance because they paved the way for the emergence of 
an organised labour movement in the Caribbean. Their 
importance is in fact deeper than this because the riots 
also led to the adoption of universal suffrage, which 
operated first in Jamaica in 1944, and in Trinidad two years 
later. The rebellion also expressed, albeit in an incomplete 
way, growing (and, more importantly, organised) anti-
colonial feeling in the region. In this section, I examine 
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the background, the main events and leading figures, and the 
consequences of the disturbances in Trinidad and Tobago. 
Ca) Economic and Political Background. 
Trinidad and Tobago's economy was still comparatively 
underdeveloped in the 1930s. Although 'free' wage labour was 
more widespread than it was under indentureship, it was now 
difficult to industrialise in the same way that Britain had 
because the 'rules of the game' had changed. Underdeveloped 
countries had to rely on the import of machinery from, and 
more profitable opportunities in, the 'advanced' countries. 
As a result, despite the increased existence of free wage 
labour, Trinidad and Tobago's economy remained particularly 
vulnerable to changes at the international level such as 
those which occurred in the depression of the 1930s. 
Sugar recovered from the crisis of the 1880s, and the 
industry enjoyed a boom period both during and immediately 
after the First World War. Although prices fell in the early 
1920s, production steadily grew and sugar once again became 
the major export. However, this was at the cost of large 
state subsidies and low wages paid to agricultural workers. 
The sugar cane farmers were particularly vulnerable to 
'market forces', as the sugar companies often prohibited 
them from selling alternative crops. The economic recession 
of the 1930s significantly worsened the situation as world 
demand for sugar contracted and as a result, wages declined, 
peasants could not sell their crop, and unemployment 
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increased. By the mid-1930s, the dispossessed organised 
hunger marches to the capital, protesting against bad 
working conditions, poor wages (in the case of those who had 
work) and squalid living conditions. 
Cocoa's boom period ended in the 1920s as increased 
production elsewhere, and the decline in importance of fine 
cocoa, led to a collapse in the world market price for 
Trinidad's produce. Problems were re-inforced by the spread 
of witch-broom disease in the late 1920s, so that by the 
recession of the 1930s, it was only low wages and subsidies 
to planters (such as the Agricultural Relief Ordinance 1921) 
that kept production gOlng. 
Even more critical, however, was the development of the oil 
industry. The existence of oil in the south of Trinidad was 
well known, but it was only with the development of the 
internal combustion engine that ongoing attempts were made 
to develop it. This was reinforced by the conversion of 
British ships to oil power (from the first decade of this 
century), which led to British investment of capital in the 
sector. Higher wages, unemployment, the importation of 
labour and the problems in the sugar and cocoa sectors meant 
that a labour force for the industry was guaranteed. By 
1913, there were two major oil companies, united British 
Oil fields of Trinidad, a subsidiary of Shell, and Trinidad 
Leaseholds Limited. The industry enjoyed a sustained boom 
period during and after the First World War, and, except for 
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a brief recession in the early 1930s, it largely escaped the 
problems that beset sugar and cocoa at this time. 
Nevertheless, there were a number of long term grievances, 
including debates about foreign ownership, and the small 
amount of taxation paid by the industry. The workers also 
suffered racial discrimination, low wages (these were higher 
than in other sectors, but low in comparison to productivity 
levels), poor working conditions and the infamous 'Red 
Book'. Under this system, any worker wishing to change her 
or his job had to show a book describing her or his 
employment record to any prospective employer. However, it 
was not the grievances per se that were of most 
significance, but the changing context in which they 
operated. The development of the industry had entailed the 
creation of a highly concentrated (around 14 thousand 
people) and potentially powerful labour force. 
The changing economic, political and social circumstances 
also aided the demise of Cipriani's leadership over the 
Creole working class. Constitutional methods and reliance on 
the Labour Party were insufficient in the context of 
depressed living standards. This had been demonstrated as 
early as 1927 when he introduced the Workers' Compensation 
Bill, which planned to compensate labourers injured at the 
workplace. This was passed but it only applied to a small 
number of workers, and not to domestic servants or field 
labourers. Cipriani's position was further undermined by the 
aforementioned disappointments of the second Labour 
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Government, and by his failure to support the liberalisation 
of laws on divorce, which divided the TWA and led to the 
mobilisation of prominent women (of which Audrey Jeffers -
the first woman to be elected to the city Council - was the 
most famous) against him. Finally, cipriani failed to give 
unequivocal support to hunger marchers from Caroni in 1935. 
There was one further piece of legislation which 
simultaneously hastened Cipriani's decline and demonstrated 
the necessity for extra-parliamentary activity: this was the 
Trade Union Ordinance of 1932. The passing of this piece of 
legislation was a response to the Passfield Memorandum, but 
it did in fact constitute a reform of limited value. 
Although trade unions were now accorded legal status, the 
Ordinance did not include provisions for peaceful picketing 
or immunity from civil actions by employers for restraint of 
trade (which effectively deprived trade unions of the right 
to strike). The Ordinance also called for the compulsory 
registration of trade unions, and the strict audit of funds 
(which could not be used for political purposes, for 
example). After two years discussion with the British TUC, 
Cipriani decided not to register the TWA as a trade union 
and instead re-formed it as a political party under the new 
name of the Trinidad Labour Party. 
(b) Labour Unrest and the Rise of New Leaders. 
with the decline in Cipriani's leadership of the Creole 
working classes, new organisations and leaders emerged to 
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fill the void. These included the Marxist and proto-feminist 
Negro Welfare Cultural and Social Association (NWA) , which 
was founded in 1934 and led by Elma Francois, Jim Barrette 
and Christina King. The NWA was very effective in mobilising 
the urban Creole working classes in protest against the 
Italian invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935, and in 
particular against Britain's conciliatory approach to 
Mussolini. This issue was instrumental in raising the 
consciousness of blacks in the world, and it played a 
significant part in increasing tension in the West Indies. A 
contemporary observer noted that "West Indians felt that in 
that issue the British government betrayed a nation because 
it was black, and this has tended to destroy their faith in 
white government, and to make them more willing to take 
their fate into their own hands." (Lewis 1977: 19) 
The NWA was however, largely confined to Port of Spain, and 
the real 'centre of gravity' had shifted to the oil fields 
and the sugar belt in south and central Trinidad. This was 
clearly demonstrated by the strike at the Apex Oilfield in 
March 1935. Although the strikers settled for a small wage 
increase, its real importance was the emergence of Tubal 
Uriah Butler as a working class leader. During the strike 
Butler led a march to Port of Spain which was intercepted by 
Cipriani, who was mayor at the time. Cipriani promised to 
take up the strikers' grievances, but once again his 
constitutional methods were a failure. It was this lack of 
action that led to a final rupture between the radicalising 
working class and the conservative Cipriani. 
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Butler was among those who had previously sympathised with 
Cipriani (he was a member of the TLP) but in August 1936 he 
formed the British Empire Workers' and citizens' Home Rule 
Party. The name of the party reflected Butler's belief in 
the legitimacy of the Empire, despite frequent outbursts 
condemning it. His attitude to the Empire was expressed at 
the Party's foundation when he stated that "We are 
British ... I am proud to be British." (Qu. Rennie 1974: 79) 
In an open letter dated June 10, 1937, Butler wrote that 
"(w)e who have sworn to lead you on to victory or die in the 
attempt, order you to prepare if necessary to shed your 
loyal Black British Blood so that Black British Trinidad 
might enjoy the principles of British freedom and Justice on 
equal terms with all others in our Trinidad." (Oilfield 
Workers Trade Union n.d.) As well as a conciliatory approach 
to the Empire and a view of British justice almost as naive 
as that of the quotation which introduced this chapter, 
Butler's party lacked a consistent political approach and 
was poorly organised. 
Nevertheless, Butler remains one of the most significant 
figures in the labour history of Trinidad and Tobago. His 
importance lies in his role as a 'catalyst', whose 
historical role was "to crystallize and articulate the 
grievances that people had long nursed, and to offer them an 
'acceptable' outlet for aggressive dispositions which 
Cipriani had held in check." (Ryan 1974: 56) His emergence 
as a labour leader reflected the consciousness of the 
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working class in the 1930s. He was a physically disabled oil 
worker who had left his native island of Grenada, in search 
of work in Trinidad. Unlike Cipriani then, he was a 'man of 
the people', sharing a similar under-privileged background 
and similar economic and social grievances. He therefore 
found a willing audience among workers and peasants of both 
African and Indian origin, playing the role of "an agitator, 
with the gift and energy for prolific emotional word 
spouting, that sometimes meant very little when analysed 
but ... nevertheless, at that time, touched the depths of 
working class feelings which proved to be enough." (Rennie 
1974: 64) Butler was also unique in Trinidadian labour 
history in that he managed to achieve a significant degree 
of unity between Creoles and East Indians. 
In Tobago, on the other hand, the TLP remained dominant 
among the more radical sections of society. There was not 
yet a sector in which a concentrated working class existed. 
The TLP enjoyed a strong base in the more populous Leeward 
district, where there was some wage labourers, but they did 
not generally share the more radical politics of the 
strategic sectors of Trinidad's economy. 
(c) 1937 and its Aftermath. 
The general climate of Butler-inspired unrest continued and 
hunger marches and strikes persisted, and Police leaders in 
the south of Trinidad were keen "to deal with him as an 
undesirable person." (Oifield Workers Trade Union n.d.) In 
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June and July of 1937, the unrest reached a climax. The 
rebellion started with a sitdown strike at the Forest 
Reserve Oilfield on June 19, which turned into a bloody riot 
after the police attempted to arrest Butler. He was forced 
into hiding, but the absence of the workers' main agitator 
did not stop the momentum of the strike. The following day, 
other oilfields joined the strike, and by the 21, it had 
spread to other sectors, including sugar. within a week, 
most of the economy in Trinidad (but not Tobago) was at a 
standstill. 
In Butler's absence, leadership had passed to his assistant, 
the East Indian, Adrian Cola Rienzi. He realised that the 
spontaneous nature of the rebellion meant that it would only 
last for a short while, a view reinforced by the arrival of 
the Ajax and the Exeter three days after the start of the 
strike. This view was confirmed and by July 6, the rebellion 
was over. 
In the meantime, Rienzi set about winning concessions from 
the relatively liberal governor, Murchison Fletcher. A 
Mediation Committee was set up to investigate the causes of 
the rebellion, but this was suspended (through employer 
pressure) pending the arrival of a Commission of Inquiry 
from London. This inquiry, chaired by John Forster made no 
specific recommendations concerning wages and working 
conditions, but did advise the establishment of the 
machinery for collective bargaining, and of Labour 
Departments to assist in this process (and withhold 
recognition in 'unsatisfactory' circumstances) (Forster 
Commission 1938: 81, 86-7). 
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This recommendation had already been forced on the Colonial 
Office and the more sympathetic Trinidad-Tobago government 
and by the end of 1937, several trade unions had obtained 
government recognition. These included the Oilfield Workers' 
Trade Union (OWTU), the All-Trinidad Sugar Estates and 
Factory Workers' Trade Union (ATSEFWTU), the Federated 
Workers' Trade Union (FWTU), the Amalgamated Building and 
Wood Workers' Union (ABWWU), the Public Workers' Trade Union 
(PWWTU), and the Seamen and Waterfront Workers Union 
(SWWTU). In 1938, on the advice of the British TUC General 
Secretary, Walter Citrine, the Trinidad and Tobago Trade 
Union Council was founded. The Trade Disputes (Arbitration 
and Inquiry) Ordinance 1938 laid down the conditions for a 
tri-partite system of collective bargaining, although 
peaceful picketing and immunity from civil actions were not 
introduced until 1943, when the Trade Disputes and 
Protection of Property Ordinance was passed. 
The unions still faced many problems such as the 
continuation of poor wages and working conditions, high 
unemployment, and employer recognition, so the context in 
which collective bargaining was to operate was automatically 
unfavourable towards the working class. There was also the 
problem of the diffuse nature of the working classes as 
capitalist development was very uneven. In the oil industry, 
where there was a large concentration of workers, union 
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membership was high. In sugar, on the other hand, where a 
high proportion of production was still carried out by cane 
farmers, union membership was low. These problems were to be 
reinforced in later years as rival unions competed for the 
right to represent workers. Any prospective labour party 
that would arise out of the trade union movement would also 
have to deal with the question of uniting a labour force 
divided by race and gender. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the development of trade 
unions was an important step forward for the working class. 
A further stride was taken when the Moyne Commission 
recommended universal suffrage for the English speaking 
Caribbean, in response to the labour rebellions that took 
place throughout the West Indies in the 1930s (West India 
Royal Commission Report 1945: 379-80). In the post-war 
period the British government played a more active role in 
the colonies, including in the field of labour relations, as 
they prepared for gradual, 'constitutional decolonisation' 
(Munroe 1983). Trinidad's post war labour history will be 
discussed in chapter three. 
Summary and Conclusion. 
The labour history of Trinidad and Tobago cannot be 
described as one notable for the 'liberty' or the 'well 
being of its inhabitants'. British colonial rule in Trinidad 
and Tobago was actually quite mild compared to Ireland, 
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India and parts of Africa, but it still had the classic 
hallmarks: repression, racism, exploitation and uneven 
development, and neglect when economic and political 
interests turned to other parts of the world. Intellectuals 
therefore had to invent justifications for colonialism, and 
it was on this basis that (judging by the view cited at the 
start of this chapter) still powerful falsehoods emerged. 
The actual history was one in which economic growth 
benefited a tiny minority and social and political factors, 
including labour relations, were largely neglected. 
At the risk of over-simplification, the history of Trinidad 
and Tobago from 1776-1937 can be divided into five major 
periods. 
(i) 1776-1838. 
In this period, slavery became the dominant form of 
production, and Britain established its rule in both 
Trinidad and Tobago. Sugar became the major crop in both 
islands. Slavery was abolished in 1834, although this was 
followed by a four year 'apprenticeship period'. 
(ii.) 1838 Onwards. 
The period following emancipation saw a struggle in both 
islands between the planters and the newly freed slaves. In 
Tobago, a compromise was reached and former slaves won 
access to land and the metayage system became the dominant 
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form of production. In Trinidad, planters used the state 
apparatus and legislation secured new supplies of labour, in 
particular from India. Although these labourers were paid a 
wage, they were still unfree because they were subject to a 
number of restrictions, including a pass system which 
limited freedom of movement. It was in this period that race 
and ethnicity became powerful political factors as the major 
'racial' groups became divided, both as producers and in the 
wider social sphere. 
(iii.) 1866 Onwards. 
New peasant classes emerged after 1866, as it became easier 
to purchase land. The production of both cocoa and, from the 
1880s, sugar, was carried out by many 'independent' farmers. 
This can be regarded as a partial victory for the lower 
classes (at least in the case of cocoa) as they successfully 
resisted direct subordination to the employer (or his or her 
agents) at the workplace, but they were still indirectly 
controlled by capital because of the latter's stronger 
market position; indeed, in the case of sugar, planters 
actually led the way in encouraging the growth of small 
farmers. Planters benefited from these arrangements by 
paying low prices for peasant produce, a process facilitated 
by their control of the later, more lucrative, stages of 
production. It also meant that planters could pay low wages 
to those casual labourers that worked directly for him or 
her. 
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In this period a growing sexual division of labour emerged, 
in which women were forced into the home or into certain 
professions that were considered to be consistent with their 
'domestic role'. This process was intensified during the 
period of proletariansation from the 1890s. 
The other major event of this period was the union of 
Trinidad and Tobago in 1889. This was forced on Tobago as 
the island was practically bankrupt, due to the crisis in 
west Indian sugar from 1884. The metayage system was too 
inefficient to effectively compete with the technologically 
superior methods of production employed in Europe. 
(iv.) 1890s Onwards. 
In Trinidad, this period saw a wider, but still highly 
uneven, process of proletarianisation, and the beginnings of 
organised resistance to the worst excesses of colonial rule. 
A number of middle class organisations developed, such as 
the Ratepayers' Association and the East Indian National 
Association, but there were also organisations that 
attracted some working class support, of which the Trinidad 
Working Men's Association was most important. In Tobago, on 
the other hand, there was still little organised resistance 
and in this period the peasantry flourished. 
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(v.) 1919-37. 
Resistance reached higher levels in Trinidad, as workers 
became concentrated in certain sectors, particularly in oil 
and at the waterfront. Labour unrest and widespread strikes, 
especially in 1937 forced the colonial government to make 
some concessions to labour. As Lewis observed at the time, 
" .. the general strike and the riot have been the worker's 
only weapon for calling attention to his conditions." (Lewis 
1977: 19) 
The events of 1937 are important because they (albeit 
momentarily) united the working classes across the lines of 
gender, race and politics. Despite the long term process of 
'housewifeisation', women played a key role in the 
rebellion, in both the Butlerite movement and the NWA. 
Butler was also successful in uniting both of the major 
ethnic groups behind his political programme. This unity was 
to prove short-lived however. 
In terms of the development of the labour force in Trinidad 
(less so in Tobago), the period from 1797 to 1937 saw a 
transition from forced labour regimes to the development of 
a proletariat. Given the uneven character of this process 
(see chapter one for an explanation for such unevenness), 
class formation was extremely complex and diverse. The 
working classes were made up of the proletariat (both urban 
and rural), the peasantry (which was itself highly 
stratified), 'informal' petty traders and producers (again 
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present in both town and countryside), the unemployed and 
lumpen elements such as vagrants (more common at this time 
in rural areas). These divisions were further reinforced by 
racial and sexual divisions of labour and ideologies of 
racism and sexism, which were not simply products of 
colonialism or capitalism. Women were increasingly assigned 
domestic and related tasks, especially (but far from 
exclusively) among the Indian population, which left them in 
a subordinate position, both in the developing labour 
market, and in society more generally. Indians arrived in 
Trinidad as indentured labourers and were initially the 
poorest ethnic group among the working classes. An Indian 
petty bourgeoisie emerged in the 1870s and l880s, but the 
majority of Indians remained part of the working classes. 
These differences shaped the politics of the emerging labour 
movement in the period after 1937. 
CHAPTER THREE 
Labour Parties and Trade Unions in the 
Independence Period 
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The period from 1939-65 saw a number of political conflicts 
among workers and (to a lesser extent) the peasantry, which 
were expressed through political parties and different 
conceptions of trade unionism. No single political party 
managed to establish hegemony over a working class divided 
by ideological and ethnic boundaries. These divisions 
enabled a party dominated by the black middle class, the 
Peoples' National Movement (PNM), to establish its 
leadership of the black majority and pave the way for 
independence in 1962. 
This chapter documents and analyses the processes whereby 
the nascent 'labour movement' lost the initiative it had 
established in 1937 to an organisation led by the black 
middle class. It is divided into four sections: firstly, I 
briefly return to a discussion of the relationship between 
trade unions and politics (see also chapter one), 
concentrating on Third World societies in the era of 
decolonisation. I argue in this section that it is essential 
to grasp the political role of labour in order to understand 
events in Trinidad and Tobago (and elsewhere) before and 
after independence. This le"ads on to my second section, 
which describes the political conflicts among trade unions 
and political parties from 1939-56. Section three covers the 
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period from the first election victory of the PNM (1956) to 
independence in 1962. Finally, I examine the conflicts 
between the PNM and a militant section of the trade union 
movement after independence. 
section One: Trade Unions and Politics in the Independence 
Period - A critical Analysis of the 'Berg-Butler' Thesis. 
Before documenting the 'politics of labour' in Trinidad and 
Tobago from 1939-65, I will first briefly return to a 
discussion of the relationship between trade unions and 
politics, this time confining the argument to colonies in 
the period immediately before and after independence. More 
specifically, I will discuss the work of Elliot Berg and 
Jeffrey Butler. In an influential article on trade unions in 
Africa, they ask three questions concerning the relationship 
between trade unions and politics in the independence 
period. Firstly, what are the structural relations between 
trade unions and political parties? Secondly, what political 
activities did trade unions engage in, and how successful 
were they? And thirdly, how significant were unions after 
independence? (Berg and Butler 1964: 341) They argue that 
"(i)n the period before independence, African trade unions 
were rarely the instrument of political parties. To the 
extent that they entered the political arena their role was 
usually negligible. After independence they were quickly 
subdued by governing parties •. " (Berg and Butler 1964: 341) 
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Their basic argument then, is that trade unions in Africa 
generally limited themselves to industrial, rather than 
political demands. Although their analysis is confined to 
Africa, Berg and Butler's thesis could equally 'fit' the 
case of Trinidad and Tobago. The trade union movement failed 
to establish a political party that led the movement for 
independence, and it failed to win sUbstantial concessions 
from the PNM for labour representation during, and after, 
1956. If one takes Berg and Butler's arguments as a starting 
point, then one can easily conclude that trade unions were 
irrelevant to the political struggle for independence. 
There are, however, valid reasons for rejecting the thesis 
as a starting point, because it is based on certain 
untenable assumptions. I argued in chapter one that the 
separation of the industrial and political spheres is purely 
arbitrary; as Alan Fox has stated, n(i)ssues have no 
intrinsic quality which lead us to put some in one category 
and some in the other. The difference simply lies in the 
methods by which we try to provide for their resolution." 
(Fox 1985: 162) 
This arbitrary separation leads to two basic weaknesses in 
the argument. Firstly, Berg and Butler show an "almost 
obsessive concern with trade union/nationalist party 
relationships .. " (Sandbrook and Cohen 1975: 18); a 
separation of a nationalist political party and trade unions 
does not necessarily imply that the latter is apolitical in 
nature. In the case of Africa "(m}any unionists 
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were ... conscious of the need to preserve a power base 
independent of the nationalist party even where they were in 
accord with common anti-colonialist objectives." (Cohen 
1974: 243-4) Secondly, strikes "have frequently had both an 
immediate and long term political impact unintended by the 
strikers." (C.H. Allen 1975: 118) In the African case this 
has, for example led to government changes in economic 
policy and undermined the security of governments. 
Berg and Butler's attempts to marginalise the political role 
of labour in the independence period is therefore not a very 
useful starting point. Rather than assume that trade unions 
did not playa political role in this period, it is more 
fruitful to analyse the conflicting political tendencies 
among would-be representatives of the working class and 
peasantry. The basic idea of the Berg-Butler thesis, namely 
the rejection of political unionism and trade union 
confinement to industrial demands, can then be analysed as 
one particular political project among others. In section 
two, I show that such thinking was behind the British TUC's 
policies for developing 'responsible' trade unions in the 
colonies. 
section Two: Trade union and Party conflicts, 1939-56. 
In this section, I document the divisions in trade unions 
and political parties up to the first election victory of 
the PNM. The history of the trade unions and labour parties 
is analysed in three parts, in chronological order. 
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(i) The Impact of the 1937 Rebellion and the Second World 
War. 
I showed in the last chapter that trade union organisation 
accelerated after 1937, and that the Colonial Office began 
to take a more active interest in the labour affairs of the 
colonies. The new unions still faced the problem of small 
membership, as well as the problem of organising in what was 
still a predominantly rural society. There was also the 
problem of what political direction the unions would take. 
Would they, for instance, simply organise as defensive 
institutions at the workplace, and rely on the Colonial 
Office to introduce reforms cUlminating in a gradual process 
of constitutional decolonisation? Or would they organise 
outside of the workplace, through a political party, in 
order to promote their demands? And would the racial unity 
that had began to develop during the July events continue, 
or would the old divisions re-emerge? These basic questions 
of trade union strategy were to dominate the nascent labour 
movement after 1937. 
contrary to the intentions of the Colonial Office, the 
formation of trade unions did not initially lead to a 
moderation in the demands made by labour. This was reflected 
in struggles for employer recognition of unions and for 
higher wages. The Colonial Office therefore adopted, in 
addition to its reformist approach, a strategy of 
repression. A number of labour leaders were tried for 
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sedition, including Butler, and NWA leaders Elma Francois 
and Jim Barrette. Although Francois was found not guilty, 
Barrette and Butler were both sentenced to imprisonment. 
Butler successfully appealed to the Privy council, but by 
the time this appeal had been upheld, he had already been 
released after serving twenty one months of his prison 
sentence. 
On his release, he was welcomed by the Oilfield Workers' 
Trade Union, but relations quickly turned sour, and he was 
expelled in August 1939. Butler formed a rival union, the 
British Empire Workers', Peasants' and Ratepayers' Union and 
he resumed his strategy of widespread protest, which 
rejected the separation of 'political' and 'industrial' 
demands. As I showed in the previous chapter, the colonial 
authorities in Trinidad were particularly concerned about 
Butler because his agitation had brought the oil and sugar 
workers together, and these two sectors were the most 
important (in terms of foreign exchange earnings and 
employment) in the economy (Forster Commission 1938: 12). 
Almost immediately after his release, Butler was put under 
police surveillance, and there was a general feeling in 
official circles (in both Port of Spain and London) that, 
with war approaching, Butler's agitation must be curtailed. 
The Colonial Office in London regarded it as especially 
important to curb unrest in Trinidad because it was one of 
the largest suppliers of refined oil in the Empire in the 
1930s (and this supply became even more significant during 
the war years). In November 1939, Butler was detained for an 
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'indefinite period', which in practice meant that he was 
imprisoned for the duration of the war. The Colonial Office 
was also concerned about the activities of other labour 
leaders, including Adrian Cola Rienzi, but differences were 
settled in July 1940 when the Trades Union council (of which 
Rienzi was President) passed a resolution supporting the 
defeat of fascism. 
During the war years, the economy recovered from the 
recession of the 1930s. The most important reason for this 
was the signing of the leasing agreement in March 1941 under 
which the British government gave land and military bases to 
the United states, in return for a number of old us 
warships. Construction work at Chaguaramas, the site of the 
main military base led to the employment of a large number 
of workers - at one stage, 28 000 men (Cross 1988: 294). 
Labour was imported from Barbados, but the main source was 
indigenous labour attracted by relatively high wage rates. 
The oil industry also boomed in the war years and by 1943 it 
employed 15 000 workers and was responsible for 80 per cent 
of Trinidad's exports (Brereton 1981: 211). People abandoned 
traditional agricultural exports and as a result output 
declined in these sectors during the war years. 
Despite the increased concentration of the workforce, labour 
made little advance in the war years. Labour parties were 
formed, but their development was hindered by personal and 
political rivalries and "ready made alternative symbols to 
those of class .• " (Cross 1988: 296), factors that retained, 
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and indeed increased their significance after the war when 
universal suffrage operated, and industrial unrest revived. 
The most important of these 'alternative symbols' was 
ethnicity. My analysis in chapter two showed how tensions 
emerged between African and Indian during the indentureship 
period as the former were given supervisory positions on the 
sugar estates and blamed the latter for effective wage 
decreases. The Indians similarly distrusted the Africans and 
generally regarded them as inferior. The events in 1937 were 
the first time that real ethnic unity had been achieved 
(with the possible exception of 1919 - see chapter two), but 
the long-term mutual suspicions quickly returned as the 
labour struggle began to wither. This process was reinforced 
when a major symbol of ethnic unity in 1937, Adrian Cola 
Rienzi, resigned from the trade union movement in 1943, and 
accepted a government post the following year. 
Political rivalry for the labour vote after 1937 also became 
apparent in this period. In 1942 the West Indian National 
Party was formed, and included David Pitt, Patrick Solomon 
and Roy Joseph among its leading members. Despite the 
party's pro-labour programme, it failed to attract the 
support of unions beyond the Federated Workers' Trades 
Union. The Trades Union council was already divided and it 
had formed its own party, the Socialist Party of Trinidad 
and Tobago, in 1941. However, the support of the WINP was 
largely confined to the north (with the partial exception of 
pitt who won some support in San Fernando), while the 
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Socialist Party dominated in the south, and there was no 
attempt to overcome these geographical divisions. 
(ii) Labour and Politics, 1946-50. 
In 1946, the first elections based on universal suffrage 
were held. As well as many independent candidates, there 
were five major parties, four of which claimed to represent 
labour. These were: (i) The united Front, led by Jack 
Kelshall, which included the West Indies National Party, the 
Indian National Council and the Negro Welfare Association 
(NWCSA) among its supporters; (ii) the Trade Union council 
and the Socialist Party of Trinidad and Tobago, led by John 
Rojas, whose main support came from the OWTU, the Seamen's 
Union and, contrary to its position in the war, the FWTU; 
(iii) the Trinidad Labour Party, which, after Cipriani's 
death in 1945, was led by Gerald Wight; and (iv) Butler's 
British Empire, Workers', citizens' and Home Rule Party 
(Butler was released at the end of the war). In the 
elections, political parties won eight of the nine seats, 
but the labour vote was fragmented: the United Front won 
three seats, the Butlerites three, and the Socialist Party 
two. The leaders of these three parties were all defeated by 
rival labour candidates. The divisions between the parties, 
and the dominant personalities, enabled middle class 
politicians to dominate successive governments after 1946. 
These differences were reinforced by the appointment of four 
of the elected members (Gomes, Joseph, Abidh, Roodal) to the 
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Executive Council, in which they usually gave support to the 
Governor. This was best exemplified by the debate on 
constitutional reform. In spite of the introduction of 
universal suffrage, the Legislative Council still had a 
majority of non-elected members. A Constitutional Reform 
Committee set up in 1947 outlined its Majority Report the 
following year, and, despite recommending an elected 
majority in both the Executive and Legislative Councils, 
fell short of recommending responsible self-government. Some 
members resigned from the Committee, including Patrick 
Solomon who published a minority report recommending self-
government. However, the Majority Report was accepted by the 
Colonial Office, with some modifications, and it formed the 
basis for the 1950 elections. Among the leading advocates of 
the report was Albert Gomes, who two years previously had 
strongly advocated self-government. 
The continued problem of ethnic differences was also 
highlighted by a second minority report, drafted by the one 
successful independent candidate in the 1946 election, 
Ranjit Kumar. His report was similar to Solomon's, but 
Kumar's differed in that it did not support immediate 
responsible government. He argued that Trinidad was not an 
economically viable institution independent of Britain, and 
he expressed fears for the Indian minority if independence 
was achieved: "In Trinidad we have a minority problem, and 
it is the duty of the majority to gain the confidence of the 
minorities by showing them that in any proposal for self-
government, the minorities would have equal rights. I am 
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afraid that in this colony, the majority community has not 
yet done that." (Qu. Ryan 1974: 82) 
Meanwhile, industrial unrest had returned after the interval 
in the war years. The major strike of this period took place 
in December 1946 over the oilfield employers' recognition of 
Butler's union. Although Butler's call for a strike led to 
an initially strong response, the strikers quickly drifted 
back to work. This strike showed the ideological differences 
in the trade union movement between Butler's conception of 
trade unions as a political instrument and the more 
conciliatory approach of other leaders. For instance, OWTU 
leader John Rojas consistently expressed his support for 
socialism and the Soviet union at this time, but this was 
mere rhetoric and he was unwilling to support calls for 
strike action by oil workers. In this particular oilfield 
strike he actually co-operated with the employers and 
supplied them with labour during the strike. 
unrest persisted among Butler supporters until 1948 (when 
Butler went to England where he hoped to win an audience for 
his demand for home rule), but the trade unions as a whole 
remained weak. In 1948 there were as many as twenty seven 
trade unions with a total membership of only 20 000 
(Trinidad and Tobago 1950: 8), while the total population in 
1946 was 557 970 (West Indian Census 1946: vii). 
Ideological differences were reinforced by the segregation 
of the international trade union movement in 1949, caused by 
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the Cold War. According to the British TUC's adviser in 
Trinidad, Western trade unions (with some exceptions) left 
the World Federation of Trade Unions because of the soviet 
bloc's attempts lito turn the WFTU into an instrument of the 
Cominform - the organ of soviet communist policy.1I (Dalley 
1954: 57) After 1949, on the one side there was still the 
pro-communist World Federation of Trade Unions; on the other 
was the new, pro-West International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions. Within Trinidad, the Trades Union Council 
refused to adopt the British Trades Union Congress' advice 
to leave the WFTU and join the ICFTU. However, six trade 
unions, led by C.P. Alexander's Seamen's Union, split from 
the TUC and formed the Trinidad and Tobago Federation of 
Trade Unions, which became an ICFTU affiliate in 1951 
(Oil fields Workers' Trade Union 1986b: 16). 
Attempts were also made to form a Pan-Caribbean trade union 
movement and in 1945 the Caribbean Labour Congress (CLC) was 
founded, which included the Trinidad and Tobago Trades Union 
council among its affiliates. The CLC in turn affiliated to 
the World Federation of Trade Unions, and organised on the 
basis of a belief in an independent West Indies Federation 
and the need for a corresponding labour organisation 
(Caribbean Labour Congress 1945: 15). However, efforts to 
develop the CLC as an influential political force were 
hindered by internal divisions over questions like anti-
colonial attitudes and political unionism (ibid.: 15-16; 
Harrod 1972: 239), and these were exacerbated by the split 
in the international trade union movement. The CLC remained 
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affiliated to the WFTU, but the former had by this time 
become largely ineffective, and the resultant loss of 
membership that the CLC decision entailed, simply hastened 
its decline. In 1952, it was effectively disbanded as the 
Jamaican People's National Party adopted a pro-British 
stance on trade unionism. 
This period also saw an increase in direct TUC involvement 
in the colonies, which was largely a response to the 
activities of Butler and his followers in 1946. The 
following year, at the request of the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, a TUC adviser, Fred Dalley, was sent to 
Trinidad. He noted the continued existence of low wages, 
poor living conditions and casual labour, including 
unofficial child labour (Dalley 1947: 4, 27), but his major 
task was to 'educate' the labour movement on the strategies 
of 'responsible' trade unionism. Of particular concern was 
the strike prone and 'impatient' nature of trade unions and 
Butler's refusal to separate industrial and political 
demands. His report concluded that "all the Trade 
Unions ... should dissociate themselves from Uriah Butler and 
his methods. This is not a matter of 'lines of demarcation' 
or of trade union rivalry. Responsible Trade Unionism and 
'Butlerism' cannot exist side by side; they are 
incompatibles, and the workers of Trinidad should be helped 
to realise this by all the responsible elements in the 
Colony." He also commented on Butler's alleged "mental 
abnormality" (Dalley 1947: 35). 
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While trade union influence extended beyond it small 
membership, its continued lack of strength in numbers both 
reflected and facilitated ideological divisions that 
hindered the development of working class political 
leadership before 1956. Four basic tendencies existed among 
those claiming to represent the working class and peasantry: 
firstly, there were those predominantly black workers who 
were inspired by the populist rhetoric of Butler; secondly, 
there were the more conservative elements that supported 
Gomes, the British government, and the British TUC, and were 
prepared for a gradual process of de-colonisation; thirdly, 
there were the East Indians in the rural areas who were 
conscious of ethnic differences, and, despite Butler's 
attempts to revive 'Afro-Indian' solidarity in 1947-8, were 
concerned about the consequences of black majority rule; and 
fourthly, there were a number of more organised, and more 
explicitly socialist (or labourist) parties, but they lacked 
stable support, especially in the trade union movement 
(Cross 1988: 295). 
(iii) 1950 Onwards: The 'Knox street Quintet', Union Rivalry 
and further TUC Intervention. 
The new constitution permitted competition for eighteen 
seats to the legislature. Divisions were once again common, 
particularly among those parties claiming to represent 
labour. The five main political organisations were: the 
Political Progress Group, a moderate party led by the 
increasingly conservative Gomes; the Trinidad Labour Party, 
153 
now led by Raymond Hamel-Smith; the Caribbean Socialist 
Party, founded by Patrick Solomon after the collapse of the 
united Front, but which also suffered from internal 
divisions; the Trade Union Council, who vainly called for 
labour unity; and the Butlerites, who stood on a platform of 
'Afro-Indian' unity, and for a break with the existing trade 
union movement. 
The result was a minor triumph for Butler, whose party 
returned six candidates (four of whom were Indians), but the 
election was again inconclusive as the TLP, CSP and the PPG 
each won two seats, and six were won by Independents. The 
Butlerites won the support of two of the successful 
Independent candidates, but this only gave them eight out of 
twenty six seats in the legislature (eight members were 
still unelected at this time). Butler's 'radical' politics 
were clearly unacceptable to the Colonial Office which, 
together with manoeuvres by Governor Rance and the other 
parties, ensured that no Butlerite held a seat in the 
Executive Council. 
A far more acceptable and conservative regime was instead 
established, which was based on collective leadership and 
known as the 'Knox Street Quintet'. This system lacked party 
discipline, but it had the great virtue (from the British 
viewpoint) that it would not challenge British (or US) 
interests in the region, whereas Butler advocated 
nationalisation of the oil industry. The quasi-ministerial 
regime implemented a far more a conservative economic 
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strategy. This bore the hallmarks of the Puerto Rican model 
discussed in the first chapter: efforts were made to attract 
foreign capital through tax incentives (the Pioneer 
Industries Ordinance 1952 for example), thereby (or so it 
was believed) facilitating the transition to an advanced 
capitalist economy. 
Meanwhile, ideological and personal differences continued in 
the trade unions and were most clearly visible through the 
phenomenon of trade union rivalry. As well as two rival 
trade union federations after 1949, union competition 
existed in particular sectors. For example, in 1947, six 
unions competed for representation of the railway workers. 
In 1952, a similar number existed in the the sugar industry, 
and an uneasy 'alliance' (secured in in December 1953) 
between the ATSEFWTU and the Sugar Industry Labour Union was 
broken after a strike was called at the Usine ste. Madeleine 
estate in November 1954 (Dalley 1947: 7; Catchpole 1955: 3-
4) • 
In 1954, concerned with what they regarded as the continued 
backwardness of trade unionism in Trinidad and Tobago, the 
British TUC again sent Fred Dalley to advise on the 'proper' 
direction that trade unionism should take there. This visit 
was decisive in convincing TUC leaders such as John Rojas to 
leave the WFTU and affiliate to the ICFTU. In an attempt to 
establish trade union unity in the region, the ICFTU also 
set up a Caribbean Area Division of ORIT (the Latin American 
Regional organisation) and most Caribbean unions affiliated 
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to it (a notable exception was the Bustamante Industrial 
Trade Union in Jamaica). 
This second report again expressed concern with the state of 
labour organisation in Trinidad and Tobago, and cited three 
major problems for trade unions and labour parties. Firstly, 
there were no established political parties; secondly, 
"politicians and political aspirants cUltivate and sponsor 
certain trade unions .. to further their own political careers 
(rather) than to assist the union and their members .. "; and 
thirdly, voters did not give much support to trade union 
candidates anyway (Dalley 1954: 38). 
The TUC also sent an adviser, Martin Pounder, to help sort 
out the problems of unionisation in the sugar industry. He 
spent nine months in Trinidad, and with TUC financial help, 
the All Trinidad union increased its membership from around 
350 to 4 000 (Roberts 1964: 39). This reconstitution of the 
'All Trinidad' as a 'responsible' union failed to completely 
marginalise a group of 'rebels' who quite legitimately 
demanded democracy in the union. However, trade union 
democracy was not one of the primary goals of TUC advisers; 
as pounder said in his farewell speech, "what these rebels 
are doing is a lot of damned nonsense. It is a tragedy. 
While others try to build good relationship (sic.) between 
the workers and the employers, the rebels who possess only 
nuisance value try to destroy it.1I (Trinidad Chronicle June 
27, 1958) So, for Pounder, the establishment of a moderate, 
'responsible' trade union took precedence over the 
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establishment of a democratic one. The rebel movement, 
however, was not totally defeated and, in collaboration with 
the OWTU, it became an increasingly powerful force, as I 
show below. 
The underlying premise of British TUC advice was the belief 
that there are separate industrial and political arenas and 
that trade unions should confine themselves to the former 
(Davies 1964). (The 'social scientific' equivalent of this 
view, held by Clark Kerr, is discussed in the opening 
chapter.) In other words, Dalley was concerned that trade 
unions should playa purely 'economistic' role in the 
context of a voluntarist collective bargaining environment 
in which the state would abstain from intervention in the 
industrial sphere. Such a theory of trade unionism was 
hardly adequate from the point of view of the defensive 
interests of the nascent working class in a peripheral 
capitalist economy, as I argued in the opening chapter. 
Moreover, such a view of trade unions hardly corresponded 
with the historical reality of British industrial relations; 
as Hyman has pointed out "trade union economism has always 
rested on certain historically contingent preconditions ... 
voluntarism had its roots in an era when unions were 
relatively weak (through limited membership and often high 
unemployment) and willing to exercise considerable self 
restraint in the use made of power they did possess." (Hyman 
1989: 46-7) The TUC turned this 'historical moment' into a 
dogmatic programme for trade unions in the colonies, which 
was important in steering trade unions into a 'more 
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acceptable' direction (again from the British and American 
viewpoints) . 
section Three: 1956-62 - The Rise of the Peoples' National 
Movement, the Trade unions and Independence. 
(i) The Rise of the PNM. 
While the non-party government from 1950-56 had shown a high 
degree of unity, the population generally felt that a 
united, nationalist, political party was needed to lead 
Trinidad to independence. In 1948, the prominent scholar 
Eric Williams returned to Trinidad as a deputy chairperson 
of the Caribbean Research Council of the Caribbean 
Commission. By the early 1950s, he was carrying out public 
lectures throughout Trinidad and Tobago. At the end of 1954 
he emerged on the centre-stage of Trinidadian society as he 
engaged in a formal debate on education with Dom Basil 
Matthews. By this time he was involved with the Peoples' 
Education Movement and in June 1955 he announced his 
dismissal from the CRC and formally launched his political 
campaign. After consultations with C.L.R. James, George 
Padmore and Arthur Lewis, the Peoples' National Movement was 
officially founded in January 1956. 
The elections of 1956 were fought by a large number of 
parties, and again included parties claiming to represent 
labour. As well as the PNM there were three other new 
parties: the Caribbean National Labour Party, the West 
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Indian Independence Party, and the Peoples' Democratic 
Party. The CNLP was led by John Rojas and emerged from the 
failure of trade unions to win concessions from the PNM. At 
the inaugural conference of the PNM, union attempts were 
made to seek guarantees of candidates, but these were 
rejected. As Williams later stated, "with the experience of 
the British Labour Party before us, we were careful not to 
allow our movement to be dominated by the trade union block 
vote." (Williams 1969: 146) 
Rojas and Williams were also divided over the issue of 
Texaco's takeover of Trinidad Leasehold Limited in 1956. 
Rojas opposed this and argued that the state should be the 
majority shareholder. Williams' support for the Texaco deal 
(Trinidad Guardian 22.6.1956) was important in convincing 
the British government that the PNM did not represent a 
threat to its interests, which by now had come to represent 
a close (but highly unequal) alliance with the United states 
and a growing political disinterest in the declining Empire. 
As well as rejecting direct connections with the trade union 
movement, the PNM rejected a socialist strategy. Instead, 
Williams advocated the Puerto Rican model of 
industrialisation and diversification in an attempt to move 
the economy away from an over-reliance on oil (Williams 
1955: 16-21). He acknowledged that the previous regime had 
given tax incentives to industry, but argued that increased 
tariffs were needed to allow industry to develop. Above all, 
he denounced politics based on religion, colour or class and 
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called for "the united efforts of the entire population." 
(Williams 1955: 34) However, the reality of the strategy was 
that it would promote the interests of already privileged 
groups and it was hoped that this would lead to the creation 
of a dynamic, indigenous capitalist class. In practice, such 
a strategy was compatible with sections of foreign capital 
and the political and strategic interests of western 
countries playing the 'cold war game'. 
The other new parties were the WIIP and the PDP. The former 
was a Marxist-oriented organisation that had been created in 
1952 and was led by Lennox Pierre and John La Rose. Its 
membership was always small and it only fielded one 
candidate in the 1956 election, advising its supporters to 
vote for the PNM. The PDP, on the other hand, was an Indian-
based petty bourgeois party which appealed to Indians on the 
basis of their ethnic origins. Its leader was Bhadase Maraj, 
who was also a leading figure in the ATSEFWTU. Of the older 
parties the Political Progress Group, Trinidad Labour Party, 
and the Butlerites all stood. Butler's party began to 
decline almost immediately after 1950, when Butler went to 
Britain to agitate for the end of colonial rule. He believed 
that his party could win the 1956 elections but under-
estimated the appeal of Eric Williams and the PNM, and they 
won only two seats. 
During the campaign it became clear that the two major 
parties competing for office were the PNM and the PDP. Both 
parties were of basically petty bourgeois origin and both 
160 
had pro-capitalist programmes. By far the most divisive 
issue was that of race. with the absence of a united labour 
party alternative, the two parties appealed to labour 
according to its racial origin. The PNM effectively combined 
populism at the ideological level (in other words, the 
promotion of nationalism and a barely concealed racism) with 
clientelism at the organisational level (in other words, a 
highly restrictive recruitment of key political personnel, 
including, as I will show, trade union leaders). As Sudama 
states, "the method of selection of the top party personnel 
and the thinly disguised propaganda emphasizing the 
historical and continuing discrimination against Negroes 
(though at times couched in nationalist terms) was 
sufficient to keep the organization firmly in the hands of 
the Negro petty bourgeoisie and at the same time make an 
emotional appeal to the Negro working class." (Sudama 1983: 
85) Williams' claim to represent the whole population was 
therefore rather hollow. Instead, the PNM appealed to 
sufficient sections of the population to secure electoral 
victory, even if this was at the cost of further racial 
disunity in the country. The PDP, for its part, presented 
itself as the protector of the cause of East Indian cultural 
interests, and its leaders argued that such a 'champion' was 
all the more necessary as Trinidad was close to independence 
and the prospect of black majority self-government. 
Race was the most important and emotive issue in a bitter 
election campaign. The informal leader of the Knox street 
Quintet captured the mood during the election campaign when 
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he later stated that lithe dismal fact is that exploitation 
of race had been the decisive factor in the elections, a 
fact which everyone recognised, even though, as with a 
guilty secret, people hesitated to make public mention of 
its existence." (Gomes 1974: 175) 
The result of the election was not decisive. The PNM won 39 
per cent of the popular vote and thirteen of the twenty four 
contested seats, while the PDP won five seats, with 20 per 
cent of the popular vote. The TLP, the Butlerites and 
Independents each won two seats. The Political Progress 
Group, which largely represented the indigenous white and 
'off-white' population, clearly lacked a social base and 
failed to win any seats. This result did not give the PNM a 
majority in the Legislature, as seven seats were still non-
elected. However, Governor Beetham was convinced that a PNM 
government was not incompatible with British or American 
interests (as the Texaco deal had shown) and successfully 
persuaded the Colonial Office to allow the PNM to form the 
government and guarantee them support among the appointed 
members. As a result, the PNM formed the government and Eric 
Williams became the Chief Minister (Ryan 1974: 166). 
(ii) Trade Union Activity 1956-62. 
After the 1956 elections, the Trinidad Labour Party, the 
Political Progress Group and the People's Democratic Party 
united to form the Democratic Labour Party (DLP). The white 
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and 'off-white' population was numerically the smallest, but 
economically the most dominant group in the country, but the 
1956 election results demonstrated the necessity of entering 
into a political alliance with an organisation that had 
wider popular appeal than the Political Progress Group. 
Whites were particularly concerned that black majority rule 
would threaten their economic interests so they were 
prepared to enter into an alliance with the PDP. 
In 1958, elections for the West Indies Federation (a 
colonial experiment which collapsed in 1961) were held, thus 
providing the DLP with the first test of its popularity. To 
the dismay of the over-confident PNM, the DLP won six of the 
ten seats. Racial hostility became more overt as Williams 
denounced DLP appeals to the Indian nation and described 
Indians in Trinidad as a "recalcitrant and hostile minority 
masquerading as the Indian nation, and prostituting the name 
of India for its selfish, reactionary political ends." (Qu. 
Ryan 1974: 192) The objective of such an attack was clear; 
as Sudama states, "the Negro petty bourgeoisie was 
determined to mobilize the whole Negro working class behind 
it to maintain its power by projecting the racial threat of 
the East Indians." (Sudama 1983: 87) 
The PNM therefore correctly perceived that the DLP was a 
serious electoral threat and took appropriate action. 
Changes were made to the electoral boundaries for the 
national elections of 1961 which would increase the PNM's 
chances of victory (although, in fairness to the PNM, the 
163 
changes also made the results more representative of the 
national popular vote). Williams also combined a strategy of 
attracting black labour support through anti-Indian scare-
mongering with a pro-labour stance. He continued to reject 
any direct trade union base because he did not want to 
present the PNM as a party dominated by labour and a trade 
union bloc vote. The image put forward was one of a 
nationalist movement capable of uniting the 'whole 
population' (which in practice actually meant the black 
population plus some secular Indians) in its movement 
towards independence. Nevertheless, the working class was by 
far the largest sector within the black population and so 
Williams gave his vocal support to a number of strikes in 
this period. 
For instance, in March 1957 he supported workers who wanted 
union organisation in a US firm which assembled office 
equipment. Williams said that "any industry coming here and 
behaving decently will be given decent treatment. If they do 
not like our action, let them pullout." (Trinidad Guardian 
23.3.1957) This support continued in June-July 1960, when 
oil workers at Texaco and Apex went on strike over 
threatened redundancies. By early July the strike had spread 
to Shell. There was also a shortage of cooking oil, the 
price of coal had increased, and public transport was 
affected. Despite mounting pressure on the government to 
intervene in the dispute, their only concession was to call 
a meeting between the parties, and secure an agreement to 
maintain essential services. The strike ended a few days 
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later and Williams continued to defend the right of workers 
to withdraw their labour power. Williams also described 
workers as his 'friends' and stated that "(i)f there is one 
group in the community which is going to defend democracy 
and self-government, that group is the workers." (Qu. Parris 
1976: 14) 
williams also won popular support during his 'left turn' in 
1958-60, and in particular over the issue of Chaguaramas. 
This reached a peak in April 1960, as PNM leaders marched to 
Chaguaramas to demand that the United states return the land 
to the people of Trinidad and Tobago. The PNM later adopted 
a far more conciliatory attitude (the us abandoned 
Wallerfield and Carsen Field, but only part of Chaguaramas), 
and williams assured the Colonial Office of his support for 
the West. Once this guarantee was ensured (to the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, lain MacLeod, in 1960) Britain 
was prepared to let the PNM lead the country to independence 
(Ryan 1974: 220). 
But the Chaguaramas issue showed that the PNM was committed 
to some, albeit rather tame, nationalist principles, and the 
black working class for its part was sympathetic to the 
nationalism of the PNM. The election campaign of 1961 had a 
distinctly populist tone as Williams, appealing 'over the 
heads' of black trade union leaders, claimed that the old 
days of the plantation society were over, that 'massa day 
done'. The PNM also expressed its support for independence 
in the 1961 election, and relations with the black working 
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class and the trade unions reached a peak. The Trinidad and 
Tobago Trades Union Congress (created in 1957 out of the re-
unification of the two rival labour federations) noted that 
the DLP supported restrictive labour legislation, while the 
PNM claimed to oppose any policy of this kind. However, TUC 
leaders rejected too close an allegiance to the PNM because 
they felt that "it would be dangerous for labour to become 
too closely identified with the PNM .. " (Ryan 1974: 256). 
This was because they feared the consequences for labour 
should the PNM lose the election, and, as Cohen (writing on 
Africa, but still of direct relevance) states, "(f)or the 
unions to stand consistently shoulder to shoulder with 
parties deriving their power base from traditional rulers or 
from members of the political class was tantamount to giving 
up any claim to represent the working class." (Cohen 1974: 
243) In other words, Berg and Butler's contention that 
unions were apolitical in the transition to independence is 
incorrect in the case of Trinidad and Tobago (as well as 
several African countries, as Cohen points out), precisely 
because of the absence of this direct union-party link. 
Even without this direct link, the TUC still played a 
directly political role in the 1961 election campaign. The 
Civil Service Association, political dissenters in the TUC, 
decided to organise demonstrations against the government. 
There were strong suspicions of collusion with the DLP, but 
the government decided to take no action and allowed the 
demonstrations to go ahead. This was important in the TUC as 
the marches "provided the excuse which pro-PNM labour 
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elements were looking for in order to get the TUC to come 
out openly in support of the PNM." (Ryan 1974: 257) 
Demonstrations in support of the PNM were organised and 
these probably contributed to the size of the PNM victory. 
Racial tensions reached a climax during the election 
campaign as Indians were attacked and DLP leader Rudranath 
Capildeo incited racial violence (Ryan 1974: 266-70). A 
major crisis was only averted by the declaration of a state 
of emergency in some areas, and the willingness of both 
sides to ultimately hold back from full-scale confrontation. 
The outcome of the election was that the PNM won 58 per cent 
of the popular vote and twenty seats, while the DLP won the 
other ten, thus establishing a two-party system (in which 
the two sides were divided by race). After the election, 
Williams decided to opt for independence for Trinidad and 
Tobago. 
After consultations with the population, including sections 
of the trade union movement, independence was granted on 
August 1, 1962. 
section Four: Trade Unions and politics, 1962-65 -
'Political Confrontation' and the Industrial Stabilisation 
Act. 
The PNM therefore won office and led Trinidad and Tobago to 
independence by 'courting' the black working class 
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independently of the official trade union movement. A year 
after independence, Williams attempted to carry out a 
coherent corporatist strategy of institutionally co-opting 
trade unions which would actually lead to their effective 
control. The National Economic Advisory Council was formed, 
consisting of representatives from business, labour and 
government, and in which the co-operation of (undemocratic 
but responsible) trade unions was secured. Control over the 
trade union movement was reinforced by a policy of 
incorporation of trade union leaders into the PNM hierarchy. 
However, the ascendance of 'responsible' trade unionism was 
not fully secured and the aforementioned 'rebels', claiming 
allegiance to Uriah Butler, had increased their influence in 
a number of unions. Most significantly, in 1962, a new rebel 
leadership was established in the OWTU under the leadership 
of George Weekes. Bhadase Maraj's authoritarian leadership 
of the ATSEFWTU continued to be challenged, culminating in 
the creation of the National Union of Sugar Workers in 1963. 
The conservative leadership of the Amalgamated Workers Union 
was challenged by workers at the Princes Town Bus Company, 
and this led to the formation of the radical Transport and 
Industrial Workers Union. So, by the time that 
independence had been declared, there were two clear 
divisions in the trade union movement: on the one hand, 
there were the 'responsible' trade union leaders who 
believed that the role of the trade union was based on a 
collective bargaining approach; on the other, there were the 
more radical unions whose leaders believed "we had to 
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negotiate for improved wages and for better working 
conditions ... but we also felt that the trade union had to 
politicize workers so that they could accept the view of a 
more just and equitable social order." (Young 1976: 164) 
Rivalry between the PNM and these rebel leaders was visible 
from as early as 1960. For instance, the afore-mentioned 
oilworkers' strike of that year was significant in the long 
term for two principal reasons. Firstly, it had been largely 
forced on the increasingly conservative John Rojas by the 
increasingly influential 'rebel' group in the OWTU, and 
George Weekes later remarked that "(t)he 1960 strike marks 
the achievement of maturity and the realisation that the 
workers are now powerful enough not only to seek, but to 
fight successfully for their rights." (Qu. Kambon 1988: 48) 
Secondly, and not unconnected to the first point, Williams 
hinted at his later stance on labour relations when he wrote 
that n(i)rresponsible elements on the workers' side injected 
race into the strike, talked about emulating Castro, 
advocated nationalisation of the oil industry .. " (Qu. Kambon 
1988: 46). These radical trade union leaders enjoyed the 
support of a membership disorientated with the undemocratic 
practices of most trade unions, but they did not constitute 
a threat to the PNM or the DLP at the electoral level. These 
leaders were regarded by their members as trade union 
leaders only, and not (at least in the short term) as 
potential political leaders. Nevertheless, the rebels were 
still considered to be a 'threat' because the PNM government 
was concerned that its inability to control some trade 
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unions would discourage capital investment, and so weaken 
its industrialisation strategy. In the 1960 strike, these 
differences were set aside as both parties shared the 
immediate goal of independence, and so the radicals largely 
supported the PNM (with some reservations) in the 1961 
elections. After independence, this situation rapidly 
altered, and culminated in the PNM's decision to introduce 
the Industrial Stabilisation Bill in 1965. 
Hostilities between the PNM and the more radical elements of 
the trade unions became more visible in the context of an 
economic recession, increased post-independence expectations 
on the part of organised labour, and a consequent decline in 
the industrial relations climate after 1961. Economic growth 
had increased by an average of 10 per cent a year from 1955-
61 (Thomas 1988: 280), but in 1961 and 1962 the world price 
of oil fell, sending the economy into a significant 
downturn. Economic growth slowed down to just one per cent 
in 1962, and, with a population increase of three per cent 
it meant that per capita income actually fell. Per capita 
income grew very slowly in the following two years as well 
(Farrell 1975: 46-7). The Government response was to blame 
the trade unions (Williams' 'friends' in 1961) for the 
country's economic difficulties. During the passage of the 
Industrial Stabilisation Bill through the House of 
Representatives in 1965 (see below), Williams outlined the 
strike statistics for the years 1960-64: in this five year 
period there were 230 strikes, involving 74 574 workers; the 
total number of work days lost (for each individual) was 803 
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899. Williams expressed particular concern at the 
disproportionately high number of days lost in the oil and 
sugar industries: 144 363 related to the sugar industry and 
286 001 to oil (Cited Thomas 1984: 49-50). The number of 
work days lost in 1964 was actually less than for each of 
the previous four years, but by 1965 this hardly mattered to 
Williams. By this time "(w)hat was escalating was official 
hysteria about strikes and official identification of 
strikes with political subversion .. " (Kambon 1988: 123). 
The 'honeymoon period' between the PNM and the trade union 
movement had, however, actually ended two years earlier. In 
February 1963, BP oil workers went on strike over the 
company's planned retrenchment of two hundred workers. The 
OWTU expected Williams to support the strike but he instead 
announced his intention to set up a commission of Inquiry 
into subversive activities in the trade union movement. 
Williams was particularly concerned that the climate of 
labour unrest was discouraging foreign investment. Instead 
of attempting to respond to the demands of radical sections 
of organised labour, Williams tried to placate them. This 
clearly demonstrated the differences between the PNM's and 
the radicals' conceptions of nationalism. For the PNM, 
"nationalism was now sUbservience (sic.) to the 
multinational corporations, in the national interest as they 
saw it. For Weekes and the OWTU, it was war against the 
multinational corporations, in the national interest as they 
saw it." (Kambon 1988: 70) 
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The divisions in the trade union movement were formalised 
when the National Trade union Congress, now led by George 
Weekes, boycotted Tripartite Committee talks in October 
1964. Weekes justified this position on the grounds that the 
government was now openly hostile towards the trade union 
movement, but a number of unions rejected this argument and 
resigned from the TUC. The ATSEFWTU and the Amalgamated 
Workers Union (later joined by the Communication Workers 
Union, the Seamen and Waterfront Workers Trade Union and the 
Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers) set up an 
alternative federation, which they called the National 
Federation of Labour. 
The Commission of Inquiry (Mbanefo 1965) was set up in 1963 
and its findings were laid before the House of 
Representatives on March 18 1965. It was particularly 
concerned with politically 'subversive' activity in the 
trade union movement. A number of trade union leaders co-
operated with the Inquiry, including Anthony Geoffroy and 
Rampatap singh (ATSEFWTU), Daniel Reid (SWWTU), W.W. sutton 
(AWU) and James Manswell (CSA). However, the most 
sensational (some would say sensationalised) evidence was 
given by the former OWTU President General John Rojas, who 
repeated his allegations (first made in Senate in August 
1962) that there was a plot by Marxist trade union leaders 
to lead a revolution in Trinidad and Tobago (Mbanefo 1965: 
7). Rojas claimed that in 1962, at the twenty fifth 
anniversary celebrations of the OWTU, CLR James had confided 
in him that "(t)he country is ripe for revolution" (Mbanefo 
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1965: 9). James Manswell of the CSA denied Rojas' 
allegations and the Commission politely dismissed the former 
OWTU leader's evidence (Mbanefo 1965: 10). In fact, given 
that the government was using the radical trade union 
leaders as a scapegoat for the failure of its development 
strategy, the findings of the Commission were surprisingly 
balanced. Although Weekes was described as a communist 
(ibid.: 35), the Commission argued, contrary to Williams 
assertions, that n(t)he fact that the strikes (of 1962 and 
1963) were spread over all the major unions negatives (sic.) 
the suggestion of subversion." (ibid.: 45) 
Its specific contents were however less important than the 
general atmosphere in which the report was presented to the 
House of Representatives. Undemocratic practices in the 
sugar workers union continued, as the leadership failed to 
implement a pension plan in 1963 and agreed to a wage freeze 
without consulting its members. Sugar workers collected a 
petition calling for a Special Conference of Delegates in 
accordance with ATSEFWTU rules, but the leadership refused 
to concede. The ATSEFWTU membership decided that there was 
only one course of action open to them. On February 21, 
1965, a strike was called by sugar workers at the ste. 
Madeleine Factory. Industrial action quickly spread, and by 
March 8 the entire sugar industry had withdrawn its labour 
power, in a protest against the union as much as the company 
(Caroni Ltd.). The following day the OWTU leadership gave 
its support to the sugar workers. There were also strikes at 
the Lock Joint sewerage scheme, at Federation Chemicals, and 
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in addition the civil Servants Association was threatening 
to institute a go-slow over wage demands. The government's 
response was a request to the Governor-General to introduce 
a state of Emergency in the sugar belt (as he was entitled 
to do under the Emergency Powers Ordinance 1947). Emergency 
regulations were introduced the following day which 
restricted freedom of movement and banned public meetings in 
the sugar belt area, thus effectively banning contact 
between the oil fields and sugar belts. 
New legislation was presented to the House of 
Representatives on March 12, and after the presentation of 
the Mbanefo Commission's report on the 18, the Industrial 
Stabilisation Bill was rushed through Parliament and 
received the Governor general's assent on the 20. The debate 
on the bill in the Senate clearly showed that the trade 
union movement was being blamed for the economic 
difficulties in the country. For instance, Senator Walke 
stated that "(t)he trade unions have brought this on 
themselves. They have been given a long rope in which to 
operate, and have succeeded in hanging themselves." 
(Trinidad and Tobago 1966: 794) Government Senator and trade 
union leader Carl Tull spoke of a communist plot in the OWTU 
and called on the workers "to eradicate these evil forces." 
(ibid.: 852) In introducing the Bill in the Senate, the 
Attorney General stated what the new legislation had in 
mind: "the necessity to maintain a certain level of capital 
accumulation with a view to increasing the rate of economic 
growth; the necessity to maintain and expand the level of 
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employment was necessary; the necessity to prevent gains in 
the wages of workers not being adversely affected by 
unnecessary and unjustified price increases." (ibid: 788) 
The third and final consideration did at least place some 
limitation on the power of capital, and some measures for 
the establishment of price controls were undertaken in the 
Act (Trinidad and Tobago 1965: 6), but this part of the Act 
was never implemented (and quietly dropped from the 
amendment in 1972). The first two considerations are of more 
interest because they show that the government blamed the 
'irresponsible' trade unions for low capital investment. 
Williams himself believed that the problem was simply one of 
the impact of high wages "on the rate of of investment in 
the whole economy and on the competitive position of 
exports." (Williams 1965: 5) However, as my discussion in 
chapter one suggested, it was the development strategy 
itself, rather than the capacity of the trade union movement 
to win high wages, which was at fault. 
The Industrial Stabilisation Act broke with the tradition of 
voluntarism under which the state had played a restricted 
role in the field of industrial relations (the Boards of 
Inquiry set up since 1948 were the notable exceptions) and 
basically outlined provisions which restricted the right to 
strike. strikes and lockouts were forbidden in essential 
services - electricity, fire, health, hospital sanitation, 
water services and sanitation. An Industrial Court was also 
established which functioned "to hear and determine trade 
disputes .•• (and) to register industrial agreements and to 
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hear and determine matters relating to the registration of 
such disputes .. " (Trinidad and Tobago 1965: 6) Any party to 
a dispute could report its existence to the Minister of 
Labour, who then had to certify that such a report had been 
made, and take steps to settle the dispute. If the Minister 
was unable to settle the dispute within twenty one days, the 
matter had to be referred to the Industrial Court for 
settlement. A strike could only take place on the condition 
that the Minister had been given fourteen days notice, and 
strikes (or lockouts) were prohibited if a dispute was 
before the Industrial Court or the Court of Appeal (Thomas 
1984: 55-7). The official justification for these 
limitations on the right to strike was that the interests of 
'the people', or the 'general community', had to be 
protected (Trinidad and Tobago 1965: 10). So once again 
Williams appealed 'over the heads' of trade union leaders 
(particularly those that did not support the government) and 
used the inconvenience caused by strikes as the basis for an 
appeal to the 'people'. 
On the day that the Industrial Stabilisation Bill passed 
through the House of Representatives, a number of 
organisations, including trade unions, expressed their 
support for the Bill by demonstrating outside the House. 
Most prominent among these were the Communication Workers 
Union and the Amalgamated Workers Union. Their leaders (Carl 
Tull and w.w. sutton respectively) forcefully denounced the 
TUC and successfully encouraged some unions to join their 
rival federation. Divisions also opened up in the TUC and 
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Weekes resigned from his position as President General later 
in 1965 (Weekes 1965 reprint). 
The basic purpose of the ISA was "to depoliticize organised 
labour." (Parris 1976: 5) Williams himself argued that trade 
union leadership "is not going to be able to utilise 
legitimate trade union activities, or to subvert them, for 
purely political ends." (Williams 1965: 6) He later 
described the ISA as "(m)y outstanding responsibility in 
Parliament in the second five year period" and explained 
that it was necessary because "(t)he subversive elements in 
the society ... were at work; the background was an open 
attempt to link the trade unions in oil and sugar." 
(Williams 1969: 311) The ISA was introduced because the 
trade union movement had played a political role in the 
movement for independence, and precisely because the 
government, former allies of nearly all the trade unions, 
feared that this process may, at least in some cases, become 
uncontrollable. Williams had appealed to black labour before 
independence on the basis of their support for independence 
and as the major social group that represented 'the national 
interest'. After independence, the PNM government became 
concerned that sections of this group were a threat to the 
national interest, as embodied in the PNM's strategy of 
industrialisation by invitation. Williams continued to 
appeal to black labour on a populist, non-class basis, 
arguing that the establishment of the Industrial Court was 
necessary to protect 'the general community' (the third 
party in disputes presented to the Court) from 'political 
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subversives' in the trade union movement. He therefore 
simply by-passed those unions which challenged the 
government's development strategy, and appealed 'over their 
heads' to the black masses (including many OWTU members). 
These developments in turn altered the racial and class 
alliances that had occurred since 1956. Relations between 
the black and white petty bourgeoisies improved after the 
1961 election, and by 1965 there were close consultations 
through employer bodies such as the Chamber of Commerce and 
the Manufacturers Association. This reflected the fact that 
the PNM was not concerned with radically threatening their 
interests. The East Indian petty bourgeoisie also played an 
increasingly ambivalent role, as some co-operated with, or 
chose to tolerate the PNM, and the DLP ceased to play an 
active role in opposition (see chapter four). 
Conclusion 
The events discussed in this chapter can be divided into 
three periods. Firstly, from 1937 to 1956, several attempts 
were made to form a mass labour party out of the trade union 
movement. The failure of these endeavours can be attributed 
to the racial divisions among the labour force, and the 
diffuse nature of the class structure, which militated 
against the formation of a unified class-based organisation. 
Added to this were the problems of trade union rivalry, 
conflicts of personalities, and official attempts to 
depoliticise trade unions. The second period, from 1956 to 
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1962, can be characterised as one in which a black middle 
class movement, eschewing direct links with trade unions, 
led the country to independence. In the third period, after 
1962, the PNM became hostile to some trade unions and this 
led to anti-union legislation in 1965. 
The absence of a trade union-based party does not confirm 
the Berg-Butler thesis that labour was largely irrelevant in 
anti-colonial movements. The PNM was successful in capturing 
the support of the black working class on the basis of non-
class politics, but trade unions were vocal in supporting 
the party in the 1961 election. Moreover, after independence 
trade unions continued to playa political role and this was 
a major determining factor in the government's decision to 
pass the Industrial Stabilisation Act. 
By 1965-6, non-black petty bourgeois opposition was largely 
vocal (the DLP still won its 'safe twelve' seats in the 1966 
elections, but it ceased to provide an effective 
Parliamentary Opposition), as it became increasingly clear 
that their interests were largely compatible with PNM 
policy. The only other significant challenge to the PNM, 
represented by the 'political subversives', had been 
contained by the ISA and the split in the trade union 
movement. 
The most immediate labour dilemma for the PNM concerned the 
administrative difficulties that were now faced in 
regulating industrial relations. The creation of the 
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Industrial Court failed to resolve (on its own terms) the 
problem of unstable industrial relations, as it quickly 
became clear that the court was ill-equipped to deal with 
the large number of disputes presented to it (Okpaluba 1975: 
70-1) . 
The absence of political opposition to the PNM was also 
short-lived, as I discuss in chapter four. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Race, Class and the 'Informal Sector': The Black Power 
Revolt of 1970 
Introduction. 
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The increase in capitalist industrialisation after 1950 
intensified, rather than alleviated, uneven development, and 
so the size of the urban unemployed and 'informal' sectors 
dramatically increased. These processes formed the economic 
and social framework for a new opposition to the Peoples' 
National Movement, centred in the urban, predominantly black 
areas, where unemployment and underemployment was high. 
Inspired by the Black Power struggles in the USA, new 
political organisations were established that challenged the 
direction taken by the PNM government since independence. 
These new organisations won widespread support for their 
ideas among the ranks of the dispossessed, and the new 
opposition took its grievances on to the streets, 
culminating in the uprising of February to April 1970. 
On February 26, students from the University of West Indies, 
st. Augustine, led a march in Port of Spain to protest 
against the trial of West Indian students in Canada who had 
occupied the sir George Williams University computer centre. 
After the march, the students staged a sit-in at a Roman 
Catholic Cathedral and later protested outside the local 
bastion of privilege, the Chamber of Commerce. The following 
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day, nine of the protesters were arrested and various 
charges were made against them. This led to an escalation of 
unrest as students, some workers, and the unemployed 
sustained a fairly spontaneous protest against economic 
policies and social conditions. A series of mass 
demonstrations were held throughout March, culminating in 
the 'Long March' to Caroni, which was an attempt by radical 
black youths (through the most important organisation of the 
period, the National Joint Action Committee) to win the 
support of East Indian sugar workers and transcend 
traditional 'racial' boundaries. The PNM government appeared 
to regain the initiative but on April 6, the police shot a 
young NJAC supporter, Basil Davis, which provided the 
stimulus for further activity. From April 6-21 there were 
further marches, ministerial resignations, rumours of unrest 
in the armed forces, and an increase in organised labour 
movement involvement. widespread strikes and marches were 
planned for April 21, but they never took place as the 
government declared a state of Emergency, which restricted 
freedom of movement and led to the arrest of the leading 
figures in the revolt. While there was spasmodic opposition 
to williams' decision, the most serious challenge to his 
authority came from a section of the army which initially 
regarded the seizure of state power as its ultimate goal. 
However, the mutineers eventually decided to negotiate with 
the government, by whom they were out-manoeuvred and the 
mutiny came to an end on May 1. 
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In this chapter, I look at the causes of the 'February 
Revolution', and the role played by different fractions of 
the working classes (and their organisations) in it. The 
chapter is divided into four sections, the first of which 
examines the social effects of the economic strategy 
employed by the PNM government, and the rise of the new 
opposition that arose out of this. Section two examines in 
more detail the movements and ideas behind the events of 
1970, and assesses the degree to which they provided the 
basis for a long term political alliance of the working 
classes. In section three I briefly examine the mutiny in 
the army and finally, section four examines the unrest that 
persisted until the dramatic change in the government's 
economic fortunes in 1973. 
section One: The Economic and social Background to the 
'February Revolution'. 
(a) Government Economic Strategy and its Social 
Consequences. 
It became clear by 1969 that the 'Lewis model' of economic 
development, discussed in chapters one and three, had not 
succeeded. The average annual growth rate from 1955-68 was 
high (eight per cent), but the major objective of 'balanced 
growth' had not taken place. Three weaknesses were 
particularly manifest by the late 1960s: firstly, tax 
incentives offered to attract foreign capital meant that the 
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state lacked the resources needed for sustaining a programme 
of economic expansion; secondly, manufacturing had failed to 
provide the sUbstantial increase in employment that was 
expected; thirdly, the industrialisation strategy had led to 
a neglect of agriculture. (Sandoval 1983: 252-5). The 
capital intensive nature of investment was such that in 1967 
it would have required more than three times the (second) 
Five Year Plan development budget to provide employment in 
pioneer manufacturing industries for the unemployed 
(Carrington 1971: 145). According to official figures 
released in 1968, the 74 pioneer industries (those 
industries granted tax holidays, depreciation allowances and 
duty free imports) and 180 additional enterprises granted 
concessions (such as free import of raw materials and 
equipment) provided employment for only 7 959 people (Cited 
Ryan 1974: 385). 
More generally, the strategy was also typical of the 
weaknesses of import-substitution-industrialisation 
programmes. The internal market for domestically produced 
goods was too small to generate sustained economic growth, 
and the strategy was heavily dependent on importing foreign 
capital goods, which led to balance of payments difficulties 
(R. Ramsaran 1989: 115-17). On the other hand, those 
industries that attempted to cater for the international 
market (such as the fertiliser industry) were effective 
enclaves under the control of foreign capital, and which 
lacked internal linkages (Sandoval 1983: 255-6). 
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The strategy also failed to create the strong, indigenous 
capitalist class that Lewis and the PNM had hoped for: in 
1970, there was TT $2 billion in foreign investment in 
Trinidad and Tobago, including over TT $500 million in oil; 
the seven major commercial banks were all foreign: almost 
half the land was owned by foreign capital; and perhaps most 
importantly (from the point of view of the PNM's economic 
strategy), 80 per cent of manufacturing investment was by 
foreign capital (Kambon 1988: 207). Williams himself 
recognised the inadequacy of the programme and proposed a 
new 'third way' between the castroite and Puerto Rican 
models (Williams 1970: 111-2), which formed the substance of 
the third Five Year Plan in 1969. A draft of this plan 
expressed concern about the economic state of the nation and 
in particular criticised local business persons for their 
failure "to seize the numerous investment opportunities in 
agriculture, industry, fishing, tourism, and housing" (Qu. 
Sebastien 1985: 116). 
So, to reiterate my discussion in chapter one, the basic 
problem of the PNM's economic strategy was that it was 
premised on the belief that there were 'equalising 
tendencies' within capitalism. If the government provided 
the right incentives, so it was believed, capital would be 
attracted to Trinidad and Tobago. When it became clear that 
this strategy was not working, the government blamed 
'political' trade unions for discouraging capital investment 
through their 'excessive' wage gains and anti-capitalist 
politics (which conveniently left aside the fact that most 
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foreign capital investment was concentrated in the sector -
oil - where these 'problems' were most acute), and passed 
the Industrial Stabilisation Act. But despite this piece of 
legislation, foreign capital investment (outside of the oil 
sector) continued to be largely insignificant, and often 
(due to their high import content or failure to provide 
linkages to the rest of the economy) not particularly 
beneficial. 
Nevertheless, the government's economic strategy had a major 
impact on the development of the working classes. From the 
1940s to the 1960s there was a high rate of growth in, and 
important changes in the social structure of, the 
population. Between the two censuses of 1946 and 1960, there 
were "startling increases in the population of a few parts 
of the country ..• as people continued to move from the rural 
areas to rapidly growing urban centres at ever increasing 
rates." (Simpson 1973: 11) In 1946, the proportion of the 
population that lived in urban areas was 23.25 per cent; by 
1960 this had increased to 36.39 per cent (ibid.: 15). The 
proportion of the population involved in agriculture or 
agriculture-related activities declined from 27.5 per cent 
in 1946 to 21.1 per cent in 1960 (Harewood 1960: 77). This 
process continued in the 1960s: the proportion of the 
population that lived in urban areas in 1960 was 40 per 
cent; by 1970, this had increased to 53 per cent (Cross 
1979: 75). The major reason for migration was the perception 
that urban areas could offer the advantages of employment 
and affluence, which were not readily available in the 
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poorer rural areas. The emphasis placed by the government on 
industrialisation meant that it was at the expense, and 
therefore further impoverishment, of the rural sector, which 
served to reinforce the growth of urban areas. 
The problem with these developments was of course that 
industrialisation failed to 'deliver the goods'. The 
proportion of the population involved in mining and 
manufacturing showed little change between the 1946 and 1960 
censuses. In 1946, the figures were 3.2 per cent for mining 
and 19.1 per cent for manufacturing; by 1960, the 
proportions were five per cent and 17.5 per cent 
respectively (Harewood 1960: 77). In the period up to 1970, 
the proportion may have actually declined to 21 per cent of 
the total (Craig 1982c: 401). There was also high 
unemployment, especially among the young. While the official 
rate of unemployment stood at 14 per cent at the time of the 
crisis, among the 20-24 year age group the figure was 20 per 
cent, and the rate for school leavers (in the 15-19 year age 
group) it was as much as 30 per cent (Sutton 1983: 119; 
Muschkin 1980: 50-1; Trinidad and Tobago 1975: 56). 
Moreover, the official rate does not tell the whole story as 
a significant part of the labour force was only seasonally 
employed. For example, the Census of 1960 showed that 71 per 
cent of the population were regularly employed, but the 
official rate of unemployment at the time was recorded at 
around 14 per cent, which left another 14.5 per cent as 
underemployed (Harewood 1960: 71). According to one 
scholarly publication, by 1967 seventy thousand people (that 
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is, one in every five employed person) worked for less than 
32 hours a week, and of these, 26 000 (seven per cent) 
worked for less than 16 hours a week (Tapia 28.9.1969). 
Given the level of poverty, it is fair to assume that most 
of these people were genuinely underemployed rather than 
part-time workers by choice. 
The devaluation of the Trinidad and Tobago dollar in 1968 
paved the way for further retrenchment, including the loss 
of 8 000 jobs in the public sector. This came at a time when 
the PNM's expansion in education (introduced in 1961) began 
to take effect. Secondary school courses lasted for six 
years, but the recession in the late 1960s meant that a 
significant number of well educated people could not find 
employment. This process further discredited the government 
in the eyes of young people. 
The PNM's industrialisation strategy also largely failed to 
redistribute income among the population. The actual 
distribution of income was quite equitable by Third World 
standards: one study found that the upper 10 per cent of 
income earners shared 33 per cent of national income, 
compared to 43 per cent in Jamaica (1958), 30 per cent in 
the united states (1950), and 46 per cent in Mexico (1957) 
(Ahiram 1966: 105-08). It was generally felt, however, that 
income differentials remained too wide. According to the 
1970 Census, the median income of professional and technical 
workers was TT $304 per month, compared to TT $158 for 
construction workers and TT $85 for service workers. The 
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average monthly wage for women in the latter group was only 
TT $45 a month (Trinidad and Tobago 1973: 2-3). Income was 
also unevenly distributed among the different ethnic groups, 
as I show below. 
The continuation of unequal income distribution was 
accompanied by another characteristic of the colonial era -
racial discrimination. In an important article published in 
1971, Acton Camejo examined the racial composition of 
executive and managerial staff in (private) firms employing 
more than a hundred people. He found that whites constituted 
53 per cent of this 'business elite', 'off whites' 15 per 
cent, mixed 15 per cent, Chinese nine per cent, Indians nine 
per cent and Africans four per cent (Camejo 1971: 300). He 
also found that of the 71 directors that inherited their 
position, 41 per cent were white, 25 per cent off white, 14 
per cent Indian, and seven per cent mixed (ibid.: 301). No 
director of African origin inherited his or her position. 
These figures suggest, but do not demonstrate, the existence 
of racial discrimination by private enterprise: for instance 
they do not tell us anything about the educational 
qualifications of the elite. Most revealing then, are 
camejo's findings concerning those with low educational 
qualifications who were appointed to top and middle 
positions in the business elite: of these, 71 per cent were 
white, 24 per cent off white, and five per cent were mixed. 
No one of African or Indian origin had this easy access to 
managerial and executive positions (ibid.: 302-4). At this 
time, there were also frequent accusations that white, often 
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foreign, managers discriminated against and abused black 
workers. This was the case at transnational companies like 
Dunlop and Badger (Turner 1972: 125). 
The distribution of income also 'cut across' racial, as well 
as class, boundaries. According to the 1960 Census, the 
median monthly income for white male employees was over TT 
$500, compared with TT $104 for those of African origin, and 
almost TT $77 for Indians. Income distribution was also 
affected by a third factor - gender. The median monthly 
income for white women in the same period was TT $176, 
compared with TT $42 for Indian women and TT $38 for African 
women (Harewood 1971: 278). This inequality obviously 
reflects differences in skill and education, but Camejo's 
statistics suggest that these alone can only explain part of 
the income differentials, due to unequal access to better 
paid jobs. Moreover, differences in educational and skills 
levels suggest unequal access to these facilities among 
different racial, class and gender groups. 
So, industrial development led to major changes in the 
economy, but it failed to create a stable, 'modern' economy 
with full employment and a relatively equal distribution of 
income. The old planter and merchant classes had been 
weakened by the rise of manufacturing and mining 
capitalists, generally of foreign origin, and a black, 
middle class, political elite. The problem, however, was 
that unequal income distribution, racial discrimination, and 
urban deprivation continued, the latter on an unprecedented 
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scale. Nevertheless, some sections of the organised working 
class had managed to win a fairly privileged position for 
themselves. This was particularly true of the workers in the 
oilfields, who enjoyed far higher wages than other 
labourers. 
(b). The Resurgence of Opposition to the Government and the 
Rise of 'Unconventional Politics'. 
The radical, 'subversive' elements in the trade unions had 
been defeated by the introduction of the Industrial 
Stabilisation Act, and effectively by George Weekes' 
resignation from the Presidency of the TUC in 1965. This 
defeat was reinforced by the dismal performance of the newly 
formed Workers and Farmers Party (WFP) in the 1966 election, 
in which all the candidates lost their deposit. The WFP was 
formed by radicals in response to the passing of the 
Industrial Stabilisation Act. Its leaders included CLR 
James, Weekes, Lennox Pierre and Stephen Maharaj, the latter 
of whom was formerly a leading parliamentary figure in the 
DLP. Its primary aim was to break the racial bases of the 
two major parties and create a "political organisation based 
on politics not on race." (Daily Mirror 11.8.1965) Apart 
from this appeal to African and Indian class unity, the WFP 
had a rather vague political programme which did not differ 
significantly from the PNM or the DLP. In its election 
manifesto, the WFP called for limits to ownership of the 
sugar estates and, more ambiguously, 'planning', 'control of 
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public finance' and promotion of 'local industry, commerce, 
labour' (Workers and Farmers Party 1966: 2). In the election 
campaign, both the major parties used the idea of a 'hidden 
agenda' and 'communist bogey' to discredit the WFP. The 
Minister of Home Affairs, Gerald Montano, claimed that all 
that the WFP "can offer is dictatorship." (Daily Mirror 
27.7.1966) Even more importantly, the PNM and the DLP once 
again successfully appealed to race for their respective 
constituencies. The WFP ultimately failed because it simply 
appealed to class unity and ignored the 'social reality' of 
race. As Kambon argues, "(t)he tools of analysis put the 
racial realities out of focus instead of creatively seeking 
to come to terms with their implications." (Kambon 1988: 
162) After the 1966 election, the WFP quickly disintegrated 
as Maharaj became ill, James left Trinidad, and the other 
leaders appeared to lose interest. 
Meanwhile, challenges from the official opposition became 
equally mute, as the Democratic Labour Party was left in 
disarray over attitudes to the ISA and Maharaj's defection 
to the WFP. Its leader, Rudranath capildeo, pushed the DLP 
in an ill-defined social democratic direction, while others 
maintained a strictly 'centre-ist' (Vernon Jamadar) or even 
right wing (Ashford Sinanan) path. The party still won 34 
per cent of the popular vote in the 1966 election, and so 
continued to be the official Opposition, but ideological 
divisions, reinforced by a new crisis over who was to lead 
the party, weakened its effectiveness. 
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williams had not, however, defeated all political opposition 
in the country. As I explained in section one, his political 
victory over the radicals in the trade unions, (which itself 
was short lived - see below) was tempered by the fact that 
government economic strategy failed to 'incorporate' large 
elements of the population in the way that he had in the 
case of the black working class. 
This was obviously the case with the unemployed and 
underemployed, but it was also true of a radical 
intelligentsia based at the University of the West Indies. 
New organisations and newspapers were formed, such as Moko, 
which was started in 1968, and two years later became the 
official organ of James Millette's United National 
Independence Party (UNIP) and Tapia, the paper of Lloyd 
Best's Tapia House Organisation. These newspapers were run 
by university lecturers, but the ideas contained in them 
reflected a wider disillusionment with the outcome of 
independence at home, and, related to this, a challenge to 
North American imperialism in the Third World. In 1968 
Millette debated with local business person Tommy Gatcliffe 
in the Trinidad Express on the nature of the transnational 
corporation and its effects in Trinidad and Tobago. This 
affair heightened public consciousness of the issues in a 
way not too dissimilar, at least in the short term, to the 
williams-Matthews debate 13 years earlier. 
The challenge to the power of the United states of America 
did not only come from Vietnam and other regions of the 
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Third World, but also from within its own borders. The Black 
Power movement was a particularly potent symbol, and it 
served as an inspiration to the 'underclasses' and their 
sympathisers (particularly students) in the west Indies. The 
first major rallying point for Black Power sympathisers 
occurred in October 1968, when the radical activist and 
scholar Walter Rodney was expelled from the Mona campus of 
the University of West Indies in Jamaica. There was a major 
student and lecturer demonstration in support of Rodney, 
which, largely through the police's heavy handed tactics, 
became violent and led to fatalities (Moko 28.10.1968). 
A second major protest took place in Trinidad on February 26 
1969, this time over the visit of the Canadian Governor 
General, two weeks after the arrest of eleven Trinidadian 
students at Sir George Williams University in Canada. On the 
evening of the demonstration, the National Joint Action 
committee (NJAC) was formed by two young radicals from the 
st. Augustine campus, Dave Darbeau and Geddes Granger (now 
known respectively as Khafra Kambon and Makandal Daaga). 
NJAC was particularly important in the events of 1970 
because, unlike UNIP and Tapia, it won support for its views 
outside of the narrow confines of the university. Its views 
'struck a chord' with discontented urban youth, who were too 
young to be impressed by Williams' populist leadership. Most 
of them could not remember when the PNM had led the country 
to independence, and those who could remember were 
disappointed by the outcome. Populist nationalist appeals 
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were meaningless to those that faced unemployment and urban 
slums. 
NJAC described the PNM government as 'phoney nationalists', 
arguing that colonialism had been replaced by neo-
colonialism, based on an alliance between the 'Afro-Saxon' 
PNM government, international banking and transnational 
companies. In other words, the government was accused of 
failing to challenge the power of the white national and 
international capitalist class. westminster style politics 
were also criticised for leading to racial divisions and 
corrupt, ineffective government and opposition. The precise 
relationship between race and class was unclear, as I argue 
below, but NJAC placed heavy emphasis on a new black 
identity, which they called Black Pride. Black Power in the 
Trinidadian context therefore came to mean ownership and 
control of the economy by the black 'majority' (the 
relationship with East Indians is discussed below) . 
Meanwhile, radicals in the trade union movement had begun to 
recover some of their momentum. Trade disputes continued, 
albeit largely within the confines of the Industrial Court. 
In the oil industry, there were important disputes with 
Shell and BP in 1967 concerning plans to layoff workers. 
There was a three per cent decline in the number employed in 
the oil industry between 1965 and 1969, and automation in 
the sugar industry also led to retrenchment (Turner 1972: 
111). Weekes led a 'March of Resistance' of around 10 000 
workers in June 1968, protesting against retrenchment in the 
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industry. The government agreed to nationalisation of part 
of the industry, through a National oil Company, in 1968, 
but they were slow in carrying out their promises. There 
were however some challenges to the ISA, most notably when 
45 members of the Transport and Industrial Workers union 
were charged with violating its regulations when they went 
on strike at sissons Paints in September 1967. The union was 
fined TT $3 000, but this did not stop its leader, Joe 
Young, from calling bigger strikes in public transport in 
June 1968 and May 1969. The second of these, despite its 
failure to save bus workers' jobs, was significant because 
different sectors of the working classes gave active support 
to the strike by bus workers, including members of NJAC. 
(c). Conclusion. 
The long term causes of the 'February Revolution' lie in the 
fact that the Williams government was unable to maintain its 
social base among the black labouring classes. The 
Industrial Stabilisation Act tried to depoliticise sections 
of the trade union movement who did not support the PNM, and 
who had challenged the disunity between the Indian and 
African labourer. This operation was a short term success, 
but a new challenge was presented to the government from an 
increasingly 'marginalised', young urban black population. 
This challenge was reinforced by the radicalisation of 
university students and lecturers who were strongly 
influenced by international events and increasingly 
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alienated from the PNM and DLP. These changes gave renewed 
confidence to the radicals in the trade unions, some of whom 
led strikes which contravened the regulations of the ISA. 
The government's development strategy after 1956 laid the 
framework for the forging of new alliances. The chief 
critics of the PNM in 1956 were local and foreign capital, 
the press and the Roman Catholic hierarchy; by 1970, they 
were its main supporters. The main supporters of the PNM in 
1956 were black workers, progressive intellectuals and the 
unemployed; by 1970, progressive intellectuals and the urban 
unemployed, together with sections of the black proletariat, 
were its chief critics (Craig 1982c: 412). 
section Two: Black Power, Race and Class and the 'Alliance' 
of the Labouring Classes in 1970. 
One of the most important problems related to the study of 
social classes in underdeveloped societies concerns the 
prospects of an alliance between the (rural, as well as 
urban) working class, the urban marginals and the rural 
peasantry, and how the most progressive sections of these 
classes hope to achieve this unity. In this section, I 
highlight some of the difficulties of achieving such an 
alliance, which are compounded in the Trinidad case by the 
questions of race and ethnicity. 
(a) Black Power Ideology, its Trinidad and Tobago context 
and NJAC Leadership. 
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Although, the 1970 revolt won sympathy and/or active support 
from the progressive intelligentsia and sections of the 
working class, the leading social forces of the 1970 revolt 
were the urban marginals and radical students. These forces 
rallied behind the cry of Black Power. As I have already 
stated, this was a phenomenon which had its origins in the 
united states, and this led to a number of difficulties for 
the movement in Trinidad and Tobago. 
The basic problem was that the context in which Black Power 
operated in the united states was bound to be different from 
the Caribbean. In the former, Black Power was a reaction by 
an oppressed black minority to urban squalor; in the West 
Indies, blacks were usually the majority of the population, 
or at least the largest ethnic group (as they were in 
Trinidad at the time). Moreover, the government was largely 
composed of black members. NJAC attempted to deal with this 
problem by arguing that the political system was weak 
compared to the economic system, which was largely owned and 
controlled by whites. 
While this argument was useful in that it identified the 
oppressor, it did not deal with the problem of an alliance 
of the oppressed. The difficulty with the slogan Black Power 
was not so much its applicability to the West Indies, as its 
inherent ambiguity. Indeed, this was (and still is) just as 
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big a problem in the ethnically differentiated united 
states, as anywhere else. In Trinidad, the term Black Power 
was ambiguous because, like the United states, it was an 
ethnically heterogeneous society, and most importantly had a 
very large Indian population. In 1970, almost 43 per cent of 
the population were of African origin, compared to figures 
of 40 per cent Indian and 14 per cent 'mixed' (Trinidad and 
Tobago 1975: 6). 
The slogan Black Power could therefore mean two different 
things. On the one hand, it could represent a movement of a 
particular section of society, organised along racial, but 
not class lines. Or it could mean 'all' the oppressed 
(although feminism had little impact at this time, and so, 
in practice the term oppressed often excluded women) of the 
Third World. In other words, this position would combine a 
race and class analysis. After the death of Malcolm X in 
1965, stokely Carmichael (now known as Kwame Toure) emerged 
as the leading Black Power activist in the united states. In 
the last months of his life, Malcolm X appeared to be moving 
his political position from one of Black nationalism and 
separatism, to one of black nationalism combined with a 
class analysis of the United states. Thus, he began to move 
away from the first position to an approximation of the 
second. Carmichael however, continued to advocate a highly 
ambiguous position. In The Running Man, he stated that "we 
got brothers in Africa, we got brothers in Cuba, we got 
brothers allover the world." (Cited in Nicholls 1971: 444) 
This may imply that a class analysis (albeit a crude one), 
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that moved beyond skin colour was necessary, but it could 
also mean that the oppressed in the Third World constituted 
a homogenous mass in which internal conflicts did not occur. 
Carmichael appeared to accept this latter position during a 
visit to Guyana at the height of the rebellion in Trinidad, 
when he expressed admiration for the fact that the states in 
both Trinidad and Guyana were run by blacks and so argued 
that "the black man held position"; in other words, 'Black 
Power' already existed (Evening News 9.4.1970). Furthermore, 
he said nothing about state repression, which was often 
directed against black people, and appeared disinterested in 
the population of Indian origin. However, in a speech to a 
crowd at Brooklyn, New York, less than one month later, 
carmichael referred to the "heroic uprising" in Trinidad and 
Tobago (Evening News 4.5.1970). As well as these 
ambiguities, carmichael at times betrayed a particularly 
distasteful attitude towards the role of women in the Black 
Power movement. In 1964 he is alleged to have said that "the 
only position for women in SNCC (student Non-Violent Co-
Ordinating committee - R.K.) is prone." (Cited in Solomon 
1989: 84) Such a view which was apparently shared (according 
to its Public Relations Officer, Clive Nunez) by at least 
some NJAC sympathisers (Express 11.3.1970). 
The inconsistencies of Black Power ideology were not just a 
product of its leaders in the united states. The far more 
articulate and capable Walter Rodney was the leading 
exponent of Black Power in the West Indies, but he too had 
inadvertantly demonstrated the vagueness of the term Black 
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Power. In 1969 he wrote that Black Power in the West Indies 
meant three things: "(i) the break with imperialism which is 
historically white racist; (ii) the assumption of power by 
the black masses in the islands; (iii) the cultural 
reconstruction of the society in the image of the blacks." 
(Rodney 1969: 28) Rodney recognised that the term Black 
Power was complicated by the variety of racial types and the 
processes of class formation in the West Indies (although 
this conclusion could equally be applied to the United 
states), but stated that "(n)evertheless, we can talk of the 
mass of the West Indian population as being black - either 
African or Indian." (ibid.: 28) However, he later refers to 
blacks almost exclusively in terms of African identity, and 
states that n(i)f we, the blacks of the West Indies, accept 
ourselves as African, we can make a contribution to the 
development of African culture, helping to free it from 
European imperialism." (ibid.: 52-3, 37) Rodney also 
referred to the united states' "neo-colonialist puppets in 
the West Indies." (Ibid.: 52) 
It should be clear then, that there were a number of 
problems with the ideology of Black Power. Nevertheless, 
given proper clarification it could have provided a useful 
rallying point for an alliance of the East Indian and black 
working classes in Trinidad. Indeed, I show below that there 
was the beginning of some unity among sections (from both 
major 'racial' groups) of the organised working class, and 
that politics was as big a factor as race in explaining the 
defeat of the movement. Nevertheless, it remains the case 
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that in Trinidad a large majority of support for the 
movement came from the black population. Attempts were made 
to forge 'African-Indian unity', most notably through the 
'Long March' to Caroni on March 12, but, despite Geddes 
Granger's best efforts, this met with limited success. One 
observer present in Trinidad at the time has estimated that 
less than one per cent of those attending the marches 
between February and April were of Indian origin (Nicholls 
1971: 447). Indian petty bourgeois groups were hostile to 
the movement and many Indian workers and peasants were 
ambivalent, regarding the Black Power versus government 
confrontation as "an affair which concerned Negroes." 
(Nicholls 1971: 455) 
The problem with Black Power in Trinidad and Tobago was not 
the alleged inapplicability of a us ideology to the 
Caribbean, but the way that the leading organisation in 
Trinidad (NJAC) reproduced the ambiguities of the general 
term Black Power - that is, the problem was not Black Power 
per se so much as NJAC's particular interpretation of it. 
Many of NJAC's critics argue that the organsation borrowed 
too many ideas from the united states and falsely applied 
these to an inappropriate setting (La Guerre 1972: 9). My 
argument is that Black Power was as appropriate to Trinidad 
as it was to the united states, but I would question how 
this was articulated in both countries. The ideology of 
Black Power was unclear and even incoherent, but these 
problems, given the right leadership, were not 
insurmountable. The basic problem with NJAC was that it did 
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not attempt to overcome these ambiguities and indeed 
probably exacerbated them. On the question of racial unity, 
Granger argued that "Black Power has not turned against the 
Indian community ... lf you are not white you are black. Black 
Power is not confined to those of the African race. The 
Indian is the brother of the Negro." (Express 7.3.1970) 
Similarly, in one of its most important political tracts, 
NJAC stated that "African-Indian unity must be the basis for 
a new society." (National Joint Action committee 1971a: 34) 
However, in practice NJAC largely confined itself to 
propagating African history and culture, and at least some 
of its supporters (but not, it should be emphasised, the 
leadership) were openly hostile to the Indian population. 
This problem of ambiguity extended beyond the question of 
racial alliances. While the populace had a reasonable idea 
what NJAC was against (although even this was open to 
question), it was not clear what NJAC was for. Moreover, 
this was a situation that the essentially populist NJAC 
openly encouraged: for example, in its April 1970 pamphlet 
'Why Black Power', its leaders wrote that n(o)ur demands are 
simple; we want our freedom, we want our manhood, and we 
want it now •.. what we are involved in is a Revolution. A 
Revolution knows no manifesto." (Cited Riviere 1972: 25) 
Aldwyn Primus led the Black Panther movement, a small and 
largely insignificant rival of NJAC. In an otherwise bitter 
and sectarian attack on both NJAC and the Tapia House 
Movement, he alluded to this fundamental weakness of NJAC: 
"The marches organised .•. represent a politcal confrontation 
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with the government - the aim of which is forcing Williams 
and his gang to pack up and gO ... Nothing is wrong with 
that ..• but if that is the intention of the National Joint 
Action committee and Lloyd Best, then for God's sake, Let 
The People Know." (Express 9.4.1970) 
It is not surprising that the question of state power was 
not posed by NJAC because its leaders did not have a 
consistent political analysis of the PNM government. They 
tended to regard the government either as agents or as 
puppets of imperialism, which led to two conflicting 
political positions. If the PNM was a mere puppet, rather 
than a conscious agent, then there was some hope that they 
could change their policies for the benefit of the people of 
Trinidad and Tobago, and so the question of state power need 
not be posed. However, if the PNM consciously supported 
imperialism, the slogan of Black Power loses some of its 
potency, because the PNM leadership was predominantly black 
in composition. NJAC described the government as 'Afro-
Saxon' because of its support for 'neo-colonialism', but 
this implies the need for a deeper class analysis than NJAC 
allowed for. It was ironically the reformist Tapia House 
Movement that showed the contradictions of NJAC's conception 
of Black Power in Trinidad, arguing that activists "ought 
not to be thinking that 'black power' has to do with the 
colour of one's skin. If Castro is the blackest man in the 
Caribbean, the whitest, in these terms, are medieval figures 
such as Bradshaw of st. Kitts or Bird of Antigua - or Marie 
Antoinette Gairy of Grenada, the noted libertine who has now 
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prescribed floggings for obscene language and obscene 
behaviour. 1I (Tapia Special Issue on the Current National 
Crisis 1970: 2) Race was a major issue, as I showed in the 
first section, but it was not the only issue. 
To summarise: NJAC's leadership of the Black Power 
mobilisations was weak because it failed to clearly 
articulate the links between race and class and, following 
on from this, it failed to challenge the power of the state, 
as embodied in the PNM government. As Turner notes, "NJAC 
engaged in a celebration of the creativity of the masses and 
a condemnation of the regime rather than a conscious 
directing of popular resources toward the seizure of power 
and its transfer from one class to another." (Turner 1972: 
232) NJAC's leadership of the Black Power movement is one of 
two major reasons why the so-called 'February Revolution' 
did not actually constitute a revolutionary or even pre-
revolutionary situation. The other is discussed below. 
(b) The Role of Organised Labour in the Events of 1970. 
There were three central features of the 1970 rebellion. 
Firstly, it was a spontaneous revolt by 'marginalised' 
sections of the population, as I have attempted to show. 
Secondly, it was a period of marked industrial unrest, and 
thirdly, it was followed by a mutiny in the army. 
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It is the second of these features that I now want to 
discuss. However, before moving directly to an examination 
and assessment of organised labour's role in the rebellion, 
I want to first briefly reiterate why organised labour in 
general is so important a social force, even in situations 
where it is a small fraction of the size of the 'informal 
sector' or peasantry. While this is not the case in 
Trinidad, it is true that in terms of numbers the urban 
unemployed and underemployed was by far the most important 
force in the rebellion. However, even though the proletariat 
did not playa revolutionary role, in a sense its 
numerically small contribution was more important, because 
the government's decision to introduce a state of Emergency 
cannot be comprehended without understanding the strategic 
significance of organised labour. 
The revolt of 1970 took place against a general background 
of unrest throughout North and South America at this time. 
The 'cult of the ghetto' existed in the United States, where 
the Black Panthers hoped to emerge as a major political 
force. within the Third World, some writers believed that 
the traditional working class would not play the role 
assigned to it in traditional Marxist theory and that the 
new revolutionary force were the urban marginals. For 
instance, Frantz Fanon wrote that n(t)he lumpenproletariat, 
that horde of starving men, uprooted from their tribe, and 
from their clan, constitutes one of the most spontaneous and 
most radically revolutionary forces of a colonised 
people ... It is within this mass of humanity, this people of 
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the shanty towns ... that the revolution will find its urban 
spearhead." (Fanon 1967: 103) 
The evidence for such an assertion has been questioned (see 
Cohen and Michael 1973: 33-5) and Fanon himself noted the 
necessity that they be "urged on from behind" by other 
agents of revolution (Fanon 1967: 103). While Marx 
undoubtedly over-emphasised the ease with which the 
organised working class would acquire revolutionary 
consciousness, there are still strong grounds for believing 
that their potential for radical political action is greater 
than that of the informal sector. The latter is too 
dispersed and disorganised to undertake political action 
without strong leadership from outside its ranks. NJAC was 
not an organisation which seriously challenged the PNM 
government. The organised working class is certainly not 
automatically revolutionary, but it is more likely to playa 
leading role in undertaking radical change. Moreover, its 
organisational strength makes it a much greater constant 
threat to any government and this was the basic reason why 
the government declared a state of emergency in 1970. Any 
examination of the 1970 events must therefore look at the 
role of organised labour. 
The first important point to be made about the organised 
labour movement in 1970 is that it was a period when there 
was a marked increase in industrial unrest. There were 99 
600 work days lost through strikes in 1970, a large increase 
on each of the previous five years since the ISA was passed 
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(Turner 1972: 175). Moreover, less grievances were being 
referred to the Industrial Court, which shows that more and 
more workers were willing to ignore the 1965 legislation. 
Given the wider Black Power context in which many of these 
strikes operated, it was likely that these 'purely 
industrial' disputes could have wider implications. The 
question of the extent of proletarian support for the Black 
Power movement is therefore vital to an understanding of the 
reasons for its failure. 
At a leadership level, some trade unions had close contact 
with NJAC from the time of its formation. This was true of 
the Transport and Industrial Workers' and the Oilfield 
Workers' Trade Unions. However, at the start of the 
demonstrations in February there was little organised labour 
involvement. George Weekes quickly became associated with 
the Black Power movement, but there is no evidence to 
suggest that the OWTU membership followed his lead on any 
significant scale. 
One trade union leader, Bhadase Maraj (the veteran of the 
ATSEFWTU - see chapter three) was openly hostile to Black 
Power ideology and publicly threatened NJAC leaders after 
they had announced their plan to march to Caroni. Bhadase 
Maraj was a popular cultural leader among the Indian 
community, and some writers have argued that his cultural 
hegemony over Hindus was a major factor in the lack of 
support that NJAC won from this section of the population 
(Gosine 1984: 27-8). While there is a lot of truth in this 
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assertion, its weakness lies in its underemphasis on the 
dynamics of how the situation developed in 1970. Such an 
approach assumes that Maraj's cultural hegemony was 'total' 
and all embracing, and therefore incapable of being 
challenged. However, at the trade union level, he had faced 
persistent opposition to his leadership, most seriously in 
1965. His threats to NJAC should be seen in this light: his 
popularity among the Indian community notwithstanding, 
Maraj's authority as a trade union leader was continually 
under threat from a membership alienated by his undemocratic 
and corrupt practices. Indeed, significant links were 
established between sugar workers (who were mainly Indian) 
and NJAC, albeit tentative and short-lived ones. This point 
is examined in more detail below. 
As the momentum of the Black Power marches developed in both 
Trinidad and Tobago, developments were taking place in the 
trade union movement. There were some changes firstly in the 
OWTU. The day before Basil Davis was killed (April 6) by the 
police in Woodford Square the OWTU General Council (rather 
than just Weekes) expressed its support for the Black Power 
struggle. More significantly, as it concerned the rank and 
file workforce rather than its politicised leadership, on 
April 8, OWTU members at the Trinidad and Tobago Electricity 
Commission rejected management wage offers. At this point 
however, this development was entirely separate from the 
Black Power struggle. 
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These events were followed by the surprising decision of the 
Trinidad and Tobago Labour Congress to give its support to 
the Black Power movement. The Labour Congress had been 
established in 1966 by those conservative unions whose 
leaders had given support to the Industrial Stabilisation 
Act. On April 11 1970, its President, Clive Spencer, called 
for joint May Day celebrations between the Black Power 
movement and the Congress. He stated that in these planned 
marches the emphasis "shall be on the recognition and 
furtherance of Black Awareness. The Congress welcomes and 
invites all organisations and individuals to join with it in 
demonstrating on May 1 in the interest of overcoming 
oppression of the masses." (Express 11.4.1970) However, 
spencer's statement also contained an implicit criticism of 
NJAC, one which was to become more significant once the 
state of Emergency was called. Echoing Williams own limited 
support for 'Black Power', Spencer argued that "Black Power 
can best be achieved by constructive planning, forceful 
persuasion and the transformation of ideas into activities 
which will create opportunities for the fulfilment of the 
aspirations of the Black Man." (ibid.) In the event, Clive 
Nunez of NJAC and the TIWU rejected Spencer's invitation on 
the grounds the Labour Congress still supported the ISA and 
that "Congress leaders are being used by the power structure 
- as they always have been -to attempt to infitrate the 
Black Power movement." (ibid.) 
What is more significant is the extent to which many workers 
in Labour Congress unions were implicitly challenging the 
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authority of their leaders by following the example of the 
'progressive unions' and going on strike. In mid-March 
workers walked off their jobs at George Wimpey, at Trinidad 
Cement and at a hotel construction project at Mount Irvine, 
Tobago. By mid April, industrial unrest had spread to postal 
workers, construction workers at the Hilton Hotel, pumping 
station workers at the Water and Sewage Authority (WASA), 
and factory workers at Bottlers Ltd .. The stoppages at the 
Hilton, WASA and Bottlers were important because they each 
involved members of the National Union of Government and 
Federated Workers. This union was formed in the late 1960s 
by a merger of the National Union of Government Employees 
and the Federated Workers Trade Union and so it became the 
largest union in the country and the backbone of the Labour 
congress. These stoppages therefore struck at the heart of 
the Congress leadership which continued to support the 
strict limitations on strike activity embodied in the ISA .. 
strikes had also taken place since March at the docks, at 
Charles McEnearney, at Textile, at Batoo Brothers Ltd. and 
among non-academic staff at the university (Express 
21.4.1970). The majority of these strikes were carried out 
independently of NJAC but, given their context, were not 
regarded as completely autonomous from the events in the 
capital and the ideas of Black Power. 
While some industrial action began to show signs of ending, 
most notably the strikes at the Hilton and Bottlers, the 
momentum of others increased. Members of the Trinidad and 
Tobago Postmen's Union demonstrated in Port of Spain and 
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then moved on to the 'People's Parliament' where the Union 
Vice President Albert Charles told Black Power supporters of 
their grievances. By the 20, the union was threatening to 
turn its work to rule into a full scale strike. Although, 
there were moves to settle the dispute at WASA, around three 
hundred workers decided to continue their stoppage. At an 
OWTU rally on April 15, President General Weekes expressed 
the hope that "when we look forward for action from you the 
oilworkers, whenever it is necessary and when we give the 
call ..• you will come out. 
" 
(Guardian 17.4.1970) Two days 
later the TIWU leadership called for a mass work stoppage on 
April 21, and for workers to join in a mass protest 
demonstration against the refusal of Public Transport 
service Corporation officials to reinstate workers who had 
lost their jobs in the 1969 bus strike (see above for 
details). Members of this union also picketed the Industrial 
Court, calling for the repeal of the ISA. 
Perhaps even more significant, at least from the point of 
view of unifying the two major racial groups, were the 
events in the sugar industry. On April 19 workers at the 
Brechin Castle sugar factory (owned by Caroni) stopped work 
in a protest against an Industrial Court decision which 
related to grievances dating back to January 1969. Although 
the Court awarded a wage increase, the workforce protested 
against the Court's rejection of union claims for pension 
and insurance plans, severance benefits, a guaranteed 
minimum wage and guaranteed employment throughout the year. 
ATSEFWTU leader Bhadase Maraj was called to the factory to 
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appeal to the workers to return to their jobs, but his pleas 
were in vain. The following day the stoppage spread and, 
according to Caroni's public relations manager, over two 
thousand sugar workers were on strike (Express 21.4.1970). 
The same day over a thousand strikers marched in Couva with 
NJAC leader Geddes Granger and OWTU Research Officer Winston 
Leonard. This march then linked up with other demonstrations 
at the 'People's Parliament' in Woodford Square. A 
delegation of workers at the Brechin Castle sugar factory 
also called on Weekes for help in their strike, and he 
promised to take up the matter at OWTU Executive level. 
So, by April 21 the country was in a state of industrial and 
social unrest, and there was the renewed threat (from the 
point of view of the government) of unity between sugar 
workers and the oil worker leadership. The situation was far 
more ominous for the government than in 1965, however, 
because, as the Express stated at the time, "these strikes 
are not isolated from the unrest which has swept this 
country since the February 26 invasion of the Cathedral of 
the Immaculate Conception." (Express 21.4.1970) It was 
therefore perceived that there was a danger that the 
'sectional' industrial unrest could be transformed into 
something far wider. 
It was at this point that Williams decided that action had 
to be taken and a state of Emergency was declared on the 
night of April 20. A curfew was imposed for 12 hours a day 
and the police were given wide powers of arrest and the 
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right to restrict a person's freedom of movement. Rioting 
followed and shops and banks were damaged. The Black Power 
leaders, including those in the OWTU, were arrested and sent 
to the remote Nelson Island prison. The strike in the sugar 
industry came to an end and a settlement at WASA was 
impending. 
The momentum of the rebellion therefore came to an abrupt 
halt. While I do not want to suggest that the mobilisation 
of organised labour was sufficiently politically conscious 
or widespread enough to carry out a social revolution (given 
the right leadership), the timing of the declaration of the 
state of Emergency is significant. Williams was certainly 
aware of the dangers of organised labour resistance and he 
justified the decision to introduce the state of Emergency 
by stating that n(i)t was only when the total breakdown of 
the trade union movement was imminent that I decided to 
act.n (Express 4.5.1970) 
This statement becomes of greater import when one examines 
correspondence (revealed a year later) between Williams and 
Labour Congress leader Clive Spencer. At the 1971 PNM Party 
Convention, Williams revealed that Spencer presented 
Williams with an ultimatum on April 20. According to 
Williams, Spencer's ultimatum was that n(i)f immediate 
action was not taken by the Government to bring the whole 
situation under control, then the Labour Congress .•• would 
bring the whole community to a standstill by calling out the 
workers in the Port, the Airport, external and internal 
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communications, the civil Service and the daily paid 
workers ... It was clear to the Ministers present and 
particularly the Prime Minister that the time had corne for 
decisive action; it was no longer a problem of aimless 
marches and wild public statements; the whole labour 
movement was threatened." (Guardian 25.9.1971) An Emergency 
Cabinet session was called which gave the Prime Minister the 
power to delare a state of Emergency when he saw fit. 
Spencer denied that he had actually told Williams to declare 
a State of Emergency but he accepted that he complained to 
the Prime Minister failing to take any action. He also 
disclosed that "members of the National Joint Action 
Committee had been engaged in activities at the Water and 
Sewerage Authority .. and .•. had caused the workers to go on 
strike" (Guardian 28.9.1971). It is clear from this 
statement that the leadership of the Congress, under 
challenge from sections of their membership, openly 
encouraged Williams to take 'decisive action'; and after the 
declaration of the State of Emergency, Spencer told Williams 
that the right course of action had been taken. 
In the absence of action by the government, Spencer was 
effectively calling for a mass strike by his members against 
Black Power and the progressive unions. Whether he would 
have got the desired response from them can only be a matter 
of conjecture. 'Responsible' trade unionism and the 'racial' 
disunity of the working class was under challenge, but this 
was confined to a minority of the labour movement. Moreover, 
the strikes that had arisen in March and April were quickly 
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settled during the state of Emergency. The strikers' 
'confrontation' with their leaders' philosophy of trade 
unionism was short-lived (but it did have beneficial long 
term effects, in that it paved the way for the emergence of 
younger leaders more willing to challenge sections of the 
bureaucratic leadership in the Labour Congress - see chapter 
six), and conflict with the government had hardly started. 
While sections of the proletariat had won higher wages and 
better working conditions, the momentum of these struggles 
had only just begun to be taken further, and it is unlikely 
that NJAC could have provided the coherent leadership 
necessary to continue this task. The political legitimacy of 
the PNM had been undermined, but it was far from broken, 
most crucially in the eyes of many workers in a politically 
divided labour movement. The movement was therefore likely 
to fail "as long as the trade union movement itself remained 
bitterly divided, with one faction largely supportive of 
government policy and the other, in its leadership, 
alienated from it." (Sutton 1983: 126) This is the second 
reason why the events of 1970 did not constitute a 
revolutionary or pre-revolutionary situation. 
section Three: Mutiny in the Army. 
An army mutiny may not appear to be of direct significance 
to a study of the politics of labour, but the mutiny from 
April 21 to May 1 is relevant for two reasons. Firstly, 
because it placed the question of state power on the agenda, 
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the mutiny constituted the most serious political challenge 
to the government in 1970. Secondly, there were some 
informal links between the rebels in the army and 
individuals active in the organised labour movement. For 
these reasons, I now briefly examine the army mutiny. 
The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force had been formed in 
1962 out of the West India Regiment that had collapsed along 
with Federation. The Officer Corps had been carefully 
selected by the former British commanders, largely on the 
basis of political reliability rather than military skill. 
After independence, political patronage continued and, in 
the words of the leading mutineer in 1970, Raffique Shah, 
"the senior officers had no military background whatever 
(sic.). They were what one might term political appointees 
who were appointed to such positions because they were loyal 
to the ruling party." (Caribbean Dialogue 1976: 22) 
The army was therefore left as an inefficient force whose 
sole purpose was to suppress internal dissent, rather than 
repel external aggression. However, opposition to patronage 
and inefficiency arose, most conspicuously among the junior 
officer corps. Links were established with some of the 
former members of the WFP, including CLR James (who had 
regularly lived in England, where many of the junior 
officers were trained) and activists involved in the 
production of the OWTU's newspaper, Vanguard. There were not 
however, any ties with NJAC (Shah 1990: 3). 
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Indeed, this newspaper appeared to know more about the 
problems of the military than the government. In an article 
published two weeks before the coup, an anonymous writer 
outlined the basic features of a 'crisis in the army': 
"Inefficiency, mental oppression, victimization and threats, 
deplorable conditions of work, racism and black rebellion .. " 
(Vanguard 4.4.1970) The writer described how the invasion of 
neighbouring Anguilla by British marines trained in the 
Caribbean had increased discontent among junior officers and 
the lower ranks and how the Black Power uprising had 
inspired them. 
When the state of Emergency was declared on April 21, the 
junior officers, led by Raffique Shah and Rex Lassalle, took 
control of the army. Shah later reasoned that "the one thing 
we could do was to prevent the government, which had 
obviously become unpopular at that point, from using the 
army against the people." (Caribbean Dialogue 1976: 23) Some 
of the mutineers wanted to go to Port of Spain to challenge 
the government and it was at this point that the question of 
state power was posed. This is why the mutiny was a more 
serious threat to the government than the NJAC-Ied revolt on 
the street. There were undoubtedly some who (rather 
adventurously) believed that the road to socialist 
revolution lay in an army coup backed by radical leaders in 
the trade unions. 
In the event, the young, inexperienced mutineers decided to 
settle their differences with the government by negotiation. 
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The government's position was strengthened by the presence 
of US and Venezuelan battleships in Trinidad's territorial 
waters, and by the fact that two British frigates were 
placed on alert (Shah 1990: 5; Express 23.4.1970). The 
rebels were tricked into a negotiated settlement, and were 
then arrested and charged with treason. The government had 
therefore survived the most serious challenge to its 
authority. 
section Four: The Consequences of 1970 and continued Unrest 
1970-73. 
The leaders of the Black Power rebellion were detained until 
November 1970, when the State of Emergency was lifted. (The 
leaders of the army mutiny were detained until they were 
tried for treason in 1971. Although they were found guilty, 
Shah and Lassalle were later freed on a technicality, and 
the former went on to play a very active role in labour 
politics in the 1970s - see chapter five for details.) 
Despite the government craCkdown, and its defeat of NJAC, 
industrial unrest continued and around 70 000 workdays were 
lost through strike activity in 1971 (Turner 1972: 175). 
The most serious of these strikes involved members of the 
OWTU. strikes took place at Dunlop and Federation Chemicals 
over delays in wage negotiations, the dismissal of six 
workers for insubordination (at Fedchem.), and the 
employment of expatriates in senior positions (at Dunlop). 
219 
The strikes, which involved around 600 people, rapidly 
spread as nearly 4 000 oil workers came out in sympathy with 
their fellow workers (Guardian 2 and 3.7.1971). They were 
eventually settled but there was still a police raid (one 
had already taken place in 1970) at the OWTU headquarters. 
Documents were seized and four OWTU officials were detained 
(vanguard 17.7.1971). This raid showed that the mutual 
distrust that had existed between the PNM and the OWTU 
leadership since independence had now developed into open 
hostility. 
Two further developments led to the government calling a 
second state of Emergency in the space of 18 months. The 
first involved the OWTU and three transnational companies: 
Texaco, Badger Pan-American and Wimpey. Texaco contracted 
Badger to construct a desulphurisation plant at its Pointe-
a-Pierre refinery, and over a thousand workers joined the 
OWTU. Wage agreements were made, but Wimpey, which was also 
carrying out construction work at the plant, refused to pay 
a similar wage rate. Wimpey workers went on strike, and 
Badger workers followed in sympathy. However, Badger then 
responded by pulling out of Trinidad altogether, which left 
its workers without a job. 
The second factor involved relations between the leadership 
of the OWTU and the Labour Congress. Workers at the Water 
and Sewerage Authority (active during the 1970 rebellion), 
the Telephone Company and in particular the docks, wanted to 
join the OWTU. The Labour Congress accused the OWTU, and in 
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particular George Weekes, of poaching: according to one of 
its leaders, Nathaniel Critchlow, the consequences of 
Weekes' alleged action would be lithe destruction of 
industrial peace in the country, the destruction of the 
investment climate, the creation of unemployment and 
discontent and the fomentation of political strife thereby 
making the country fertile ground for the propagation of an 
ideology of which he is a local protagonist." (Express 
11.10.1971) critchlow warned that if Weekes did not stop his 
'poaching activity' the Labour Congress would respond by: 
calling for the expulsion of the OWTU from the ICFTU and the 
International Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers; 
requesting to all maritime organisations to cease handling 
goods consigned to companies which give recognition to the 
OWTUi instructing the SWWTU and the Caribbean Air Transport 
Trade Union to do the same to any goods entering the country 
which involved companies that recognised the OWTUi 
instructing unions in the communications and the postal 
services to do the same with goods produced, installed or 
repaired within the country (ibid.). 
However, Critchlow's claim of poaching by Weekes was 
probably erroneous - Weekes was still in prison when the 
dock workers requested representation by the OWTU. The OWTU 
Executive argued that the reality was that some dock workers 
"have expressed dissatisfaction with the representation they 
got from the Seamen and Waterfont Workers' Trade Union and 
have individually applied to this union for membership. We 
have, of course, accepted them, as we believe that Trade 
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Unions are in duty bound to uphold the constitutional right 
of all workers to choose the union of their choice to 
represent them ... No organisers have been sent ... to solicit 
membership." (ibid.) 
Nevertheless, the government used the events at Badger and 
the claims of the Labour Congress to justify the declaration 
of another state of Emergency, in October 1971. Under this 
particular state of emergency, there was no curfew but 
public meetings were restricted and 10 activists were 
detained. Those detained included George Weekes, OWTU legal 
adviser Jack Kelshall, Geddes Granger and the President of 
the Badger branch of the OWTU, Alain Campbell (Guardian 
20.10.1971). 
Despite the efforts of the Labour Congress to uphold it, the 
events of 1970-71 had effectively destroyed the authority of 
the Industrial Stabilisation Act. The government, having 
decided that new legislation was necessary, introduced the 
Industrial Relations Bill shortly after the State of 
Emergency was declared. This bill became law in 1972, but it 
was less a replacement to the ISA than an amendment. The key 
limitations to the right to strike and the functions of the 
Industrial Court were retained. The provisions for price 
controls, which had never been implemented, were withdrawn 
and a new clause (aimed directly at the OWTU) stated that a 
trade union was not permitted to represent more than one 
group of workers in what were considered as essential 
industries. Public utilities, port operations, public 
transport, sugar and oil and related industries all came 
under this category. 
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Critchlow's statement (above), and the events which followed 
it, showed that the polical differences between 'responsible 
unions' and 'radical unions' still existed and that the 
former still adhered to their pre-ISA position that capital 
investment would be attracted if government and unions 
employed the correct policies. The radicals decided that an 
alternative trade union federation was necessary and in 1971 
the Council of Progressive Trade Unions was established. At 
this time the federation was not aligned to any of the 
international trade union federations (it later affiliated 
to the World Federation of Trade Unions in 1980). Although 
the federation attracted several unions, the OWTU and TIWU 
were initially the only two of real significance. 
Conclusion. 
In terms of the numbers involved, the Black Power rebellion 
of 1970 was the most serious challenge to the 30 years 
(1956-86) of PNM government. In a sense however, it did not 
challenge the government at all because the urban poor and 
its NJAC leadership never posed the question of state power. 
The rebellion of the black poor therefore represented a 
challenge to the power base of the PNM, but it did not 
challenge the government's right to rule. It was only when 
the organised labour movement became a significant actor 
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that Williams declared a state of Emergency. Therefore, the 
'danger' of an alliance between the organised working class 
(the proletariat), both Indian and African, and the urban 
poor, prompted Williams to act. 
The question of unity among the working classes in 1970 is a 
difficult one to assess for two reasons. Firstly, the 
'alliance', such as it was, had only just began to be formed 
when the government acted. Secondly, and related to this 
first point, there was no organisation that was likely to 
confront the right of the PNM to continue to rule. A few 
tentative conclusions and observations can be made, however. 
While race and ethnicity continued to divide the working 
classes, and the ideology of Black Power may have reinforced 
this, there were developments (the links between NJAC, and 
African and Indian workers on strike) which suggest that 
unity on a scale similar to 1937 was not out of the 
question. Writers that 'explain' the failure of the 
rebellion in terms of a timeless cultural divide between 
Indian and African (the plural society model), describe 
divisions of the greatest significance, but they do not 
explain either how these are rooted in history, or, related 
to this point, the dynamics of the 1970 events (see in 
particular La Guerre 1972; Gosine 1984). Racial and ethnic 
divsions were (along with politics) the most important 
reasons for the failures of 1970, but these divisions were 
constantly changing and never static. The changes that took 
place just before the crackdown indicate that relations 
between sections of the two ethnic groups were developing in 
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a positive way. Secondly, notwithstanding the developments 
among sections of the rank and file within the Labour 
Congress, the proletariat itself remained divided by 
politics. Many workers remained loyal to the Labour Congress 
and to the PNM. This factor cannot be dismissed as 'false 
consciousness' on the part of the working class, but can 
instead be attributed to the fact that the PNM had led the 
country to independence and had governed in a period when 
sUbstantial numbers of workers had won material gains. Those 
workers that were alienated from their 'responsible union 
leaders' and the PNM government were not necessarily in 
favour of their replacement by revolutionary means. And 
finally, the rank and file of the OWTU never followed the 
wishes of their leaders during 1970 and so never went on 
strike during the February-April period. So long as this 
remained the case the rebellion of 1970 was unlikely to 
develop into a revolution. 
The period from 1970-73 was one of intense unrest. By 1973 
it appeared that Williams had decided to resign, but the oil 
price rise (1973-4) led to a dramatic change in the 
country's economic fortunes, and the popularity of the 
government, and so he remained Prime Minister. The economic 
boom which followed also paved the way for a new period of 




The struggle for a Labour Party: The united Labour Front 
In chapter three, I described how trade unions 
unsuccessfully attempted to form labour and/or socialist 
parties that would win political office and lead the country 
to independence. It was, instead, the People's National 
Movement that undertook this task. However, there remained a 
conflict of interest between the PNM development strategy 
and the interests of the progressive trade unions, which 
culminated in restrictive labour legislation in 1965. There 
were renewed attempts to forge a new mass politics based on 
class rather than race in 1966 (namely, the WFP) , and to 
some extent in 1970 (see chapter four). These were defeated 
however and the PNM continued to govern the country and 
promote a capitalist development strategy. 
After 1974, the country entered a period of rapid economic 
growth which gave to the labour movement a new feeling of 
confidence that its demands could be met. An informal 
alliance of progressive trade unions was formed in 1975, 
which acquired the name of the united Labour Front (ULF). 
After government suppression the decision was taken to 
convert the ULF from a union based interest group into a 
political party. Unlike its predecessors, the ULF had 
considerable initial electoral success and it won 10 seats 
at the 1976 general election and control of the majority of 
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local councils the following year. However, within 12 months 
of the general election, the ULF had split into two 
factions, and so the most serious attempt yet to form a 
popular labour and socialist-oriented party in Trinidad and 
Tobago fell into disarray. 
In this chapter, I outline in four sections how the ULF 
emerged and rapidly disintegrated as a united political 
force. section one briefly examines the basis for the 
emergence of the ULF by referring to the economic boom which 
gave the labour movement an unprecedented degree of 
confidence. Secondly, I describe how this newly found vigour 
led to the formation of the ULF and explain why it then 
transformed itself into a political party. In section three 
I examine the divisions in the ULF and assess the reasons 
for its failure. In this section, I take issue with a number 
of 'Marxist-Leninist' analyses of the ULF which regard its 
failure as an inevitable manifestation of trade union 
'economism' and the lack of a political 'vanguard'. Instead, 
I argue that the real reasons for the split were partly 
organisational, but were above all based on crude 
factionalism, the 'politics of personality' and race. 
Finally, I examine the outcome and the aftermath of the 
split. 
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section One: The Economic Boom 
In 1973-4, the world price of oil sharply increased. The 
precise reasons for the increase are far more complex than 
the 'third world challenge' to western hegemony that is 
often alleged by both neo-classicists and 'third worldists'. 
In fact, although they may not have instigated them, western 
oil companies played a leading role in maintaining high 
prices through limiting production and allocating markets, 
and the Third World as a whole lost more than it gained 
(through the increase in the price for oil imports). For oil 
exporting Third World countries like Trinidad however, the 
oil price rise provided an opportunity to finance new 
development projects and overcome its subordinate position 
in the world market. 
In Trinidad the oil windfall between 1974 and 1978 was 
proportionately higher than other oil exporting countries 
like Ecuador, Venezuela and Nigeria; in this period it 
constituted the equivalent of 39 per cent of non-mining 
gross domestic product (Auty and Gelb 1986: 1163). 
Government revenue from oil rose from US $33 million in 1972 
to US $1.58 billion in 1980 (MacDonald 1986: 195). These 
changes laid the basis for a revised government economic 
strategy which aimed to create large scale resource 
intensive export industries. The state played a major role 
in government economic policy. An industrial estate was 
developed at Point Lisas which included a chemical 
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fertiliser industry and an iron and steel works. Government 
finance was used to improve roads, telecommunications, water 
and electricity supplies and other state services. 
In the long term, the strategy was largely a failure and the 
reasons for this - and government and union reponses to it -
will be discussed in chapter six. For the moment, the short 
term results and their effects on the working classes will 
be analysed. 
The social effects of the boom and the government's 
development strategy were contradictory. Per capita income 
increased from US $1 231 per annum in 1973 to US $3 168 in 
1978. Unemployment declined to 8.8 per cent by 1980 
(MacDOnald 1986: 191), and the amount of money in 
circulation ensured that many in the informal sector had a 
better standard of living than before 1973. Prime Minister 
Williams claimed that 'Money is no problem', a slogan which 
acquired some popularity. The low income sectors of society 
were given some degree of protection as the government 
intervened (directly and indirectly) in the economy in order 
to ensure a supply of cheap essentials. 
Nevertheless, poverty and inequality remained major 
problems. In a Household Budgetary Survey conducted in 1975-
6, it was found that the bottom 50 per cent of income 
earners earned 18.2 per cent of total income (Harewood and 
Henry 1985: 48). While there was some redistribution of 
income in this period, the main beneficiaries were the 
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middle class and the highest paid members of the working 
class (ibid.: 47-50). The survey also found that 32.2 per 
cent of the population lived below the poverty line, 32.7 
per cent did not have flush toilets, 41.4 per cent did not 
have pipe-borne water in their homes, 23 per cent did not 
have electricity, and 89.5 per cent were without a telephone 
(Cited in Ryan and Jacobs c.1979: xx). 
As the boom was sustained, the extent of poverty decreased 
and so it is very likely that there was a considerable 
improvement in these statistics. While uneven development 
continued and poverty remained a major social problem, 
improvements in living standards were still considerable. 
The economic climate helped to shape a renewed confidence in 
the PNM government and so any new political party, 
particularly a socialist one, was going to find it difficult 
to defeat the PNM in a general election. On the other hand, 
the boom provided the basis for a renewed vitality in the 
labour movement, as lower unemployment improved the 
bargaining position of the organised working class. The 
birth of the united Labour Front was based on this premise. 
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section Two: The Birth and Early Development of the united 
Labour Front 
(a) The united Labour Front as an Alliance of Unions 
The ULF was initially formed as an informal alliance of four 
trade unions: the OWTU, the ATSEFWTU, TIWU, and the Island-
wide Cane Farmers Trade Union (ICFU). The leaderships of 
both the OWTU and TIWU were still in the hands of 
'progressives' and in 1973-4 there were significant 
developments in the two sugar unions. Bhadase Maraj had died 
in 1971, but the ATSEFWTU, under the leadership of Maraj's 
deputy Rampartap Singh, remained undemocratic and corrupt. 
The other major sugar union was the pro-PNM Trinidad Island-
wide Canefarmers Association (TICA), led by Norman Girwar. 
By 1973, a significant rival to TICA had established itself 
- the ICFU, which was led by the former army mutineer, 
Raffique Shah. The ICFU executive also had strong 
representation from the explicitly Marxist united National 
Independence Party. Rampartap Singh (rightly) saw this 
challenge to the TICA as a challenge to his own union and so 
he recruited the charismatic Basdeo Panday as a bulwark 
against the ICFU. Panday had worked as a lawyer for the OWTU 
and had been a member of the WFP and so Singh was taking a 
gamble - one which he was soon to regret. 
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At the start of the sugar crop season, the increasingly 
popular ICFU inaugurated a no-cut campaign until employers 
recognised it as the sole bargaining agent for cane farmers. 
This campaign was supported by the ATSEFWTU as Panday staged 
an internal coup and established himself as its leader, and 
set about restoring democracy to the union. Panday then won 
a 100 per cent wage increase and guaranteed work for the 
whole year for sugar workers, and these victories won him a 
strong loyalty among sugar workers. 
In late 1974, Panday again called a strike at Caroni over 
the company's failure to negotiate a profit sharing scheme. 
Shah's union had still not won recognition from Caroni who 
argued that legislation passed in 1965 (the Cess Act) made 
the TICA the only legitimate representative of cane farmers. 
Meanwhile, negotiations between the OWTU and Texaco over 
wage increases had reached a standstill and a strike seemed 
likely. 
By early 1975 tension had increased and the government owned 
radio station banned interviews with Shah, Weekes and Panday 
and dismissed journalists who publicly disagreed with this 
decision. The OWTU regularly called out members from work to 
attend mass union meetings and the sugar workers' strike 
spread to the government owned Orange Grove Estate, and to 
Forres Park Estate and Caroni Distillers. Negotiations 
between TlWU and Neal and Massy were not progressing and a 
strike seemed likely. By March 1975 there were around 17 
thousand sugar workers on strike and 9 000 cane farmers 
boycotting the sugar harvest (Baptiste 1976: 18; Express 
11.3.1975) . 
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In an effort to reduce the industrial unrest, the Employers' 
Consultative Association met with the two union federations. 
The ECA President, Ralph Rostant, repeated the arguments of 
senators before the ISA was passed in 1965 (and the leaders 
of the Labour Congress in 1970), when he stated that "(i)t 
is almost naive to believe that we can attract foreign 
investors in this situation. And we believe that it is 
almost impossible to correct the unemployment situation in 
this country without these investors." He was most critical 
of the OWTU and claimed that "(w)e don't believe that 
industrial relations should be used as a tool for political 
ends." (Express 9.3.1975) 
The talks were not successful and the four unions of what 
came to be known as the united Labour Front made plans for a 
mass rally to be held on March 18. The government claimed 
that any march would be illegal as no permit had been 
granted by the Police Commissioner, but the ULF argued that 
the rally was not a political meeting. It would in fact be a 
religious occasion where there would be prayers 'for bread, 
justice and peace', and so a permit was not required. 
The rally went ahead at Skinner Park, San Fernando and the 
ULF leaders presented its six demands to the government in 
front of an unexpectedly large crowd of around 15 000 
people: 
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"I. To repeal Act no. 1 of 1965 - the Cane farmers Cess Act, 
and the immediate recognition of ICFTU. 
2. To repeal Act no. 23 of 1972 - the Industrial Relation 
(sic.) Act - IRA. 
3. To protest the delay of Texaco, Caroni Ltd., and Neal 
and Massy Ltd., in concluding negotiations with the OWTU, 
ATSEFWTU and TIWU respectively. 
4. To demand the withdrawal on Texaco's writ and Injunction 
preventing the Recognition Board from pursuing OWTU's claim 
for recognition of the monthly paid workers of Texaco. 
5. To demand withdrawal of the levy on sugar. 
6. To let those who labour hold the reins." (United Labour 
Front 1975: 1) 
In the short term these demands were overshadowed by the 
response of the legal authorities as the police broke up the 
rally and arrested thirty two ULF leaders (Express 
19.3.1975). The specific grievances of the ULF as a union 
alliance were settled over the next few months by 
compromises on both sides. More significantly, the 
suppression of the Skinner Park rally (which came to be 
known as 'Bloody Tuesday') convinced the ULF leaders that 
the interests of the working class could only be served in 
the long run by the formation of a new political party. The 
ULF as an informal union alliance had won considerable 
234 
industrial support from both African and Indian workers: its 
leaders hoped that this could be extended to politics. 
(b) The united Labour Front as a Political Party. 
After 'Bloody Tuesday', there was widespread discussion 
about the form that a labour party should take. Some members 
(such as Lennox Pierre, Allan Alexander and John Humphrey) 
argued that the ULF should remain a union alliance and that 
there should be a separate (but organically linked) 
political party. There were also fears that ultra-left wing 
organisations would use the ULF for their own ends (see 
below for details). Nevertheless, sufficient agreement was 
reached and "realising the limitations of Trade Union Action 
the ULF held a COSSABO (Conference of Shop Stewards and 
Branch Officers - R.K.) ... on January 3 and 4, 1976 at which 
a decision was taken to bring into being the Party of the 
Working Class." (Transport and Industrial Workers' Union 
1976: 1) At a further COSSABO a decision was taken to hold 
the Founding Congress of the ULF on March 21, 1976. 
The organisational structure that emerged out of this 
Congress was complex and never stringently implemented, and 
it formed the basis for a major division in the ULF. On the 
one hand was a tendency which wanted a highly centralised 
party structure in which a Central Committee would play the 
leading role in the running of the ULF. At the Founding 
Conference, this tendency (led by old UNIP members James 
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Millette and Richard Jacobs) argued that the existing 
leadership should elect the Central Committee. In other 
words, this tendency believed in an interpretation of the 
Leninist organisational principle of democratic centralism 
which placed the emphasis on centralism rather than 
democracy. On the other hand, another tendency argued that 
the party should be organised 'from below' through party 
blocks, which would be divided by region but could also be 
organised in workplaces and other communities. This group 
recognised that there would have to be some degree of 
centralisation, but they argued that the Central Committee 
should be elected by the total membership of the party. 
Lennox Pierre, the former leader of the West Indian 
Independence Party (see chapter three), was the main figure 
in this group. In practice, the Central Committee became the 
leading structure and the party blocks were never properly 
instituted, and this factor became a major point of 
contention in the 1977 split. At this stage, Basdeo Panday 
and Raffique Shah, the two major protagonists in the split, 
did not take clear sides. 
The organisational issue was complicated by the 
participation of a number of tiny ultra-left wing groups in 
the ULF. As well as UNIP these included the New Beginning 
Movement (NBM) , the National Liberation Movement (NLM) and 
the National Movement for the Total Independence of Trinidad 
and Tobago (NAMOTI). The NLM and NAMOTI were basically 
Maoist while the NBM was a basically Jamesian inspired 
organisation (and not Trotskyist as is usually asserted -
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see for instance Phillips 1984: 380). NAMOTI was by far the 
most significant of these organisations, and many 
'independents' in the ULF feared that it was being used as a 
battle-ground between Maoists (NAMOTI) and stalinists (UNIP) 
to promote their own interests at the expense of the ULF. 
These issues of contention were originally controlled as the 
new party set about drafting a constitution and political 
programme, and preparing for the general election which was 
due sometime in 1976. A draft constitution was eventually 
agreed which set out the aims and objectives of the ULF: 
"ea) To unite the working class as a class for political 
struggle and to struggle with the workers or any section of 
them for such political objectives as are immediately 
realisable and for the ultimate political objective of 
working class power; 
(b) To establish an economic system, a social order and a 
government consistent with the interests of the working 
classes and the people in general .. n (United Labour Front 
1976b: 1) 
The political programme of the ULF included proposals for 
national ownership and control of oil, natural gas, 
fertiliser plants, sugar, foreign trade, industrial 
monopolies such as motor vehicles, cement and rum, large 
distribution monopolies and financial systems. It also 
proposed a mixed economy of state and private capital for 
small and medium sized firms. Social legislation would 
include a minimum wage, the end of wage discrimination 
against women and a full social security system (United 
Labour Front 1976c: 14, 19). 
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There were some doubts expressed that the ULF should 
participate in 'bourgeois' elections (there had been a 
widespread boycott of the 1971 elections in protest at a 
government imposed state of emergency) on the grounds that 
it may become an electoralist party, solely concerned with 
winning general elections at the expense of extra-
parliamentary activity. ULF leaders eventually decided that 
it was necessary to participate in the election on the 
principle that this was a means to an end, rather than an 
end in itself; the General Secretary argued that "the ULF 
has to contest the forthcoming elections .•. not because the 
ULF is an election machine, but because that is the role 
which the ULF is called upon, at this stage, to play." 
(Millette 1976: 2) However, the party never adopted a clear 
political attitude towards parliament, as I argue below. 
The party went into the general election in September 1976 
without a clear leader and instead decided to uphold the 
principle of collective leadership. Allan Alexander, a 
radical lawyer of African descent, was nominated as the 
person who would become Prime Minister, possibly on the 
basis that the party did not believe that the country as a 
whole would accept an Indian leader. The electorate was 
however unconvinced by Alexander and regarded Panday as the 
real leader. The question of race quickly emerged as the 
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major factor in the election campaign. ULF Central Committee 
member, Richard Jacobs later claimed that "it would be fair 
to say that we were actually blind to race ... This mood, this 
tendency to ignore the racial factor, prevailed at all 
levels of the ULF." (Ryan and Jacobs c.1979: 271) Jacobs' 
claim has however, been strongly rejected by Panday at least 
(Interview 16.3.1990), and the decision to appoint Alexander 
as 'Prime Minister in waiting' suggests that 'race' was 
always an important consideration for the party. What is 
true is that the party over-estimated the extent to which 
the industrial action ('class struggle') of 1971-5 had 
eroded historical 'racial' divisions, and as a result, it 
failed to offer a challenge to the political hegemony of the 
black petty bourgeoisie. I will elaborate on this argument 
in section three. 
During the election campaign, members of the ('white') 
bourgeoisie presented the ULF as an Indian party and used 
racist arguments to appeal to the PNM's traditional African 
constituency. For instance, Jimmy Bain, director of numerous 
private companies and Chairperson of the state owned 
National Broadcasting Company, stated that n(s)hould this 
time come when the East Indian section owns most of the 
property, business and wealth of the country as well as 
control of the Government, an imbalance could develop in our 
society that would cause undesirable stresses and strains 
that would not be good for the nation. It is an urgent 
necessity therefore, that all of us give serious thought to 
these matters, and like sensible people make a conscious 
effort to counter any undesirable consequences that could 
develop from such a possible situation." (Guardian 
25.4.1976) 
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The ULF was not successful in uniting the working classes 
across racial lines. Black members of the OWTU and the 
Labour Congress unions largely remained faithful to the PNM. 
In the last two weeks of the campaign, the party attempted 
to increase its profile in the north, along the East-West 
corridor, and it organised motorcades through the area. The 
effect of this strategy was counter-productive, because the 
strong presence of Indians on these motorcades convinced 
black proletarians and petty commodity traders and producers 
that the ULF was simply a new Indian party, a replacement 
for the DLP. 
The result of the election demonstrated the problem for the 
party. The PNM won 24 seats, the Democratic Action Congress 
two seats (both in Tobago), while the ULF won the other 10. 
These seats were almost exclusively confined to the sugar 
producing areas, where the majority of the population was of 
Indian descent. Allan Alexander actually failed to win his 
seat, and so Panday became Leader of the Opposition. Lloyd 
Best rightly argued, .. (t)he ULF won the traditional DLP 
seats and the PNM won the traditional PNM seats with some 
slight changes." (Guardian 19.9.1976) The problem that the 
ULF faced was how to break out of this situation. 
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section Three: The Demise of the United Labour Front. 
(i). The Factions and the Split 
In August 1977, within one year of the general election, 
Panday was removed as Leader of the opposition and the party 
had effectively been divided in two. On the one side, 
supported by a majority of parliamentarians but only by a 
small section of supporters outside of the House of 
Representatives, was the 'Shah faction'. On the other side 
was Panday, who had the social base of ULF support but was 
strongly distrusted by his colleagues in Parliament and the 
leadership of the party. 
The split occurred against a background of increasing 
differences over organisation and politics. The Shah faction 
was led by Pierre, Education and Research Officer and NAMOTI 
supporter 'Teddy' Belgrave, Alexander, and Shah himself. 
This faction was opposed to the Soviet Marxism espoused by 
Millette and Jacobs, and the ULF became a breeding ground 
for left wing sectarianism. For instance, there was a lot of 
discussion about Cuba's role in Angola and the 'correct' 
response to the death of Mao (Millette Interview 2.3.1990). 
There were also differences over the most appropriate 
socialist strategy for Trinidad and Tobago. Millette accused 
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NAMOTI of having its own agenda and of advocating a Maoist 
'people's war' strategy, based on armed conflict, rather 
than the ULF policy of consolidating a mass base through 
electoral means (Millette n.d.: 16). 
Panday was aware of the divisions but was only interested in 
them insofar as they constituted a threat to his own 
perception of the ULF. This differed from both factions, 
because Panday was an essentially electoralist politician 
opposed to all ideologies, except his own. He basically 
advocated unity between the two races and some degree of 
workers' participation (Interview 16.3.1990), but his 
concrete proposals to achieve these were vague and he was a 
populist who had established a strong social base in the 
sugar areas during the industrial unrest of 1973-5. 
It was Panday's populism that was so objectionable to the 
Shah faction and, together with the ULF's commitment to 
working class unity across race lines, these factors above 
all others explain why the party split in two. The election 
result had reproduced the very pattern of race-based two 
party politics that the ULF had set out to destroy. After 
the election, Shah in particular came to believe that there 
should be a concerted strategy of campaigning in the north, 
and in particular in the all important East-West Corridor, 
even if this was at the expense of existing support in the 
sugar areas. The Shah faction quickly came to believe that 
Panday's politics reinforced the status quo at the expense 
of principled, class based, socialist politics. They 
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believed that Panday, like Bhadase Maraj before him, had 
come to represent a political demagogue who was basically 
happy to represent one section of the community. As the Shah 
faction's political organ Classline stated, "(w)as the ULF 
to practise the maximum in democracy or were we to sink into 
political opportunism and one-manism." (Classline 16.9.1977) 
The faction then went on to make some specific allegations: 
each of the unions that made up the ULF had more than one 
union leader on the Central Committee except for the sugar 
workers' union which had only Panday, who had instead 
insisted that his friend John Humphrey be a CC member; he 
had chosen former members of the PNM (Sonny Khayadat) and 
DLP (Mulchan Seuchan) and close political colleagues (Faizal 
Mohammed) for the 1977 local government elections instead of 
members of his union (such as radical shop steward, Omar 
Khan). For Shah and his colleagues, these men "represented 
the old - opportunism, racism and contempt for the poor 
people of our country." (Classline 16.9.1977) Panday was 
also accused of deviating from party policy on issues such 
as self-government for Tobago, and of introducing a motion 
of no confidence in the government without consulting any 
colleagues. Perhaps most seriously, Panday was accused of 
racism because he publicly condoned to his constituents in 
couva a statement that he was letting the Africans in the 
ULF ride his back and that he should get rid of them 
(ibid.). As a result of these divisions, on August 9 1977, 
the Party Central Committee removed Panday as parliamentary 
leader of the ULF (Express 11.8.1977). Shah had the support 
of six of the ten ULF MPs and, after some constitutional 
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questions were resolved, he replaced Panday as Leader of the 
opposition on August 19 (Express 15.8.1977 and 20.8.1977). 
Panday's reponse was to appeal to the social base that he 
had, and Shah did not have. Within three days of his 
expulsion, all four of the ULF controlled councils had given 
their support to Panday and "No Panday! No ULF!" banners 
were common in the sugar producing areas (Express 
13.9.1977). The cane farmers' union gave their support to 
Panday, despite the fact that it was led by Shah (Express 
16.8.1977). Panday held public meetings to put forward his 
own version of why he was removed as leader. Before his 
removal, he had talked of a "bunch of traitors and stooges" 
that were out to destroy the party (Express 1.8.1977). 
Panday's appeal to his social base became increasingly 
nationalist as well as populist: he complained that NAMOTI 
"wanted to destroy the foundations of the working class 
ideology (sic.) (and) to impose a foreign radical view which 
had no relevance to our situation." (Express 17.8.1977) He 
also claimed that he was not particularly interested in 
leadership but went on to say (in a classically populist 
manner) that "if the people calIon me to lead I will not 
flinch one hair's breadth from this sacred trust." (Express 
19.8.1977) 
In November Panday called a 'Party Congress' of the ULF 
which demonstrated that there was by now effectively two 
parties claiming the party banner. On the one side was Shah 
and his supporters which was the official Opposition but had 
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little support outside of Parliament, and on the other was 
Panday and his supporters in the sugar belt. By the end of 
March 1978, Shah resigned as opposition Leader because he 
was disillusioned with the processes of parliamentary 
politics and after a quite blatant piece of (PNM sponsored) 
state-judicial victimisation of the ULF (Shah faction) MP 
Boodram Jattan (See Ryan and Jacobs c.1979: 312). In his 
Farewell Address as opposition Leader, Shah spoke of a "plot 
to plunge the country back into racial politics." (Guardian 
1.4.1978) 
Panday's initial removal was followed by the resignation of 
James Millette as General Secretary. He blamed the ultra-
left (NAMOTI and the Shah faction) for splitting the party, 
and using it as "a battleground on which rival factions and 
jejune ideas could joust for the triumph of their own 
version of purity in the working class movement." He argued 
that the task of the ULF was to "consolidate the Party as a 
united national movement of working people and to equip it 
with the resources necessary for the accomplishment of the 
task of taking power and using it in the interests of all 
the people •. " (ULF Crisis Bulletin no.19) 
So, by September 1977 the party had divided into two 
factions led by Panday and Shah, plus a 'semi-faction' led 
by Millette. Shah's faction saw Panday as a threat to the 
'new politics' proposed by the ULF, while Panday and his 
supporters argued that Shah was simply a figurehead for a 
NAMOTI 'coup' within the party. Millette was critical of 
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aspects of Panday's behaviour but basically took the view 
that Panday was removed because "the others wanted to take 
the leadership." (Millette Interview 2.3.1990) While the two 
main factions regarded the split as in many ways a good 
thing, Millette saw it as a disaster. 
(ii). Economism, Vanguard ism and the Split in the ULF 
Most of the assessments of the ULF, particularly those 
written by socialists, argue that the split was a 
consequence of two related factors: the party's trade union 
roots, and the resultant failure to organise the party as a 
vanguard of the working class. Phillips has written that the 
factors that led to the formation of the party were "based 
in 'mere economism'" and that the "ideological monolithic 
direction which is characteristic of a vanguard did not 
exist in the ULF." (Phillips 1984: 367, 409) She goes on to 
argue that the ULF "may have been useful in the context of 
the subjective social circumstances within Trinidad •.. (b)ut 
(it) was not a mass party that was properly constructed." 
(Ibid.: 410) History has shown that "(m)ass organisations of 
a pro-socialist nature have existed as a forerunner to a 
vanguard Party, but always with a core vanguard among the 
leadership of the mass organisation." (ibid.: 409-10) She 
argues that a specific analysis of Trinidad and Tobago 
(rather than an inflexible line) was needed, but also that 
"Ca) vanguard party would be selective and monolithic, (if 
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only at the leadership core of the mass party), and would 
guide the working class struggle to the realisation of 
change in its interests. The ULF was not this kind of 
party." (ibid.: 411) For Phillips then, the basic problem of 
the party was organisational - the ULF was not a vanguard of 
the working class, and it instead represented a conflict 
between two strands of Marxism (reactionary Maoism and the 
far more preferable 'Marxist-Leninism) (ibid.: 392). 
The supporters of Millette's 'semi-faction' (which became 
known as the February 18 Movement) took a more flexible 
approach but similarly rejected trade union 'economism' and 
advocated vanguardism. Millette's journal, 'Workers 
Tribune', established after the split, was very hostile to 
NAMOTI and its influence in the progressive trade union 
movement. It argued that "even within the ranks of the 
'progressive' trade union movement economism is rampant. It 
is disguised only in the fact that the 'progressive' trade 
unionists talk all the time of working class politics and 
the need for working class parties." (Workers Tribune 2(2): 
1) Instead of trade union economism, "(w)hat the Revolution 
needs are (sic.) revolutionaries. What the Revolution needs 
is a truly revolutionary party. What the Revolution does not 
need is another trade union party." (Workers Tribune 1(1) 
In other words, according to Millette, NAMOTI's 'Maoism' (in 
actual fact this part of NAMOTI's politics was closer to the 
thought of CLR James rather than Mao Zedong) led it to 
advocate loose organisational principles based around 
communities and workplaces rather than the centralised 
vanguard that was required. 
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The problem with this approach is two-fold: firstly, it is 
based on a one-sided approach to both the limitations of 
trade unionism and the virtues of vanguardism (and in fact 
has more in common with Clark Kerr than Lenin); and 
secondly, it ignores the very real obstacles that the ULF 
faced in winning support among a highly divided labour 
force, problems which would not have 'magically disappeared' 
had the party's organisational structure been different. 
These problems were never adequately dealt with by Shah and 
NAMOTI, as well, and I discuss them (and the 'problem' of 
Panday) below. First I will discuss the question of trade 
unions and political vanguardism. 
The 'Marxist' view that trade unions are economistic is 
derived from a (mis}reading of Lenin, as I discussed in 
chapter one. Trade unions are not an obstacle to socialist 
revolution; rather, they should be seen as "a limited form 
of class consciousness representing the very social forces 
and interest upon which a revolution can be built." (Wood 
1986: 192) Ultra-left views that trade unions are purely 
economic actually converge with right wing 'labourist' 
theories of trade unionism. For instance, Phillips is very 
supportive of the approach of the Bank and General Workers' 
Union, whose leader (Michael Als) formed the Stalinist 
people's popular Movement, which consciously separated 
'bread and butter' union issues from 'politics' (and has 
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consistently failed, as a supposed 'vanguard' party, to win 
any support among the working class). Phillips writes that 
"(i)t is evident that Mr. Als and other members of the union 
executive engage their union in strictly 'trade union 
issues' and not overtly in political issues. They have been 
able to separate the two." She later states that "(t)he 
mature realisation by the leadership of BGWU of the 
dichotomy between the role of a trade union and the role of 
a political party in a capitalist dominated social formation 
is instructive, and is in fact reflective of a level of 
consciousness not found among the leaders of any other 
union." (Phillips 1984: 281, 497) This approach is 
contrasted with the leaders of TIWU where "some of its 
promising leaders have reverted to handling issues which are 
mainly of an outright 'trade union' nature." (ibid.: 497) 
But, according to the logic of Phillips' argument, this is 
precisely what the Bank and General Workers' Union does (at 
the trade union level at least). What Phillips appears to be 
saying is that TIWU (and by implication, the Shah faction in 
the ULF) concentrated too much on 'strictly union' issues, 
at the expense of political party organisation; she 
therefore sets up a false dichotomy between trade unions and 
politics. It may be true that TIWU and the ULF neglected the 
limitations of trade unions as agencies for social change, 
but the dichotomy is her's and not the union's. A trade 
union can never simply be 'economistic' in a capitalist 
social formation for the simple reason that the power of 
capital is by its nature political. Ownership of private 
property is a relationship of power and trade unions, for 
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all their weaknesses, represent a restraint (and therefore a 
partial challenge) to this power. All attempts to 
depoliticise trade unions are therefore political 'projects' 
which have more in common with F.W. Dalley (see chapter 
three) and Clark Kerr (chapter one), than they do with 
socialist politics. 
It is true that the ULF failed to win the widespread support 
of trade unionists in the Labour Congress or the OWTU, but 
this has more to do with the wider problems that the party 
faced, rather than the limitations of trade unionism per see 
These problems would include the question of the divisions 
of the working classes, and the problem of attracting the 
support of higher paid workers (especially oil workers) who 
benefited most from the economic boom. Again it should be 
stressed that this had nothing to do with the OWTU 
leadership's commitment to 'purely trade union issues' (a 
ludricous claim) and everything to do with the state of 
class consciousness of the oil workers at this time. 
The false dichotomy of trade unions and politics is carried 
over into the belief that a vanguard was necessary for the 
ULF to become a party of the working class. Phillips' claim 
that mass organisations of the working class have always had 
a monolithic vanguard at their core is simply untrue. The 
Bolsheviks were divided over the 'small matter' of whether 
to seize the winter Palace in 'October' 1917. And, despite 
Phillips' claims to the contrary (1984: 410), the Sandinista 
National Liberation Front in Nicaragua (which won power in 
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the 1979 revolution) was not a monolithic organisation but 
in fact was made up of three factions, each with its own 
'line' on revolutionary strategy (see among others Weber 
1981: 38-60; Black 1981: 75-178). 
The commitment to vanguardism and 'Marxist purity' was 
shared by both the Stalinists (Millette) and the Maoists 
(Shah, Belgrave et.al.) in the ULF. NAMOTI may not have 
advocated 'democratic centralism' (with the emphasis on the 
latter) as an organising principle but it still placed as 
much emphasis on 'the right line' as its Stalinist 
adversaries. For instance, while the Stalinists accused the 
Maoists of 'left economism' (Sebastien 1981: 59), the 
Maoists argued that .. (t)he problem of the mass movement has 
been the problem of leadership. Just when it seems that the 
mass movement is poised to fulfil its mission, some leader 
sells it out or causes it to split. The most recent example 
was the ULF experience with people like Panday and 
Millette." (NAMOTI special Labour Day Bulletin) In other 
words, the problem of the ULF was simply a question of 
leadership; once the 'correct line' (often on obscure 
international issues over which any Trinidad government 
would have no say) was obtained, the issue of 'the masses' 
would take care of itself. 
The vanguardist approach was also carried over to the 
party's attitude to Parliament. Shah and Panday's 
differences were often characterised as an irreconcilable 
conflict between revolutionary and electoral politics, but 
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this perspective is based on too rigid a contrast between 
the two types of politics. As Millette recognised, 
parliamentary politics could be used as a means to an end, 
rather than an end in itself. However, ULF MPs quickly 
became frustrated with parliamentary procedure, and this 
came to a head in November 1976 during the debate on the 
1977 budget, when they walked out of Parliament and later 
staged a motion of no confidence in the Speaker. While there 
was undoubtedly collaboration between the PNM and the media, 
which led to discrimination against the ULF, but the 
response of the party was often counter-productive. At one 
point, Shah summoned a meeting of the Central Executive to 
determine whether MPs should continue attending Parliament 
(Ryan 1989: 169). This attitude was indicative of the 
party's black and white, vanguardist approach to politics. 
The issue of factions in the ULF is therefore an important 
one, but not for the reasons given by Phillips. What was 
needed in the ULF was not a monolithic ideological direction 
but an organisational structure that allowed for divergence 
of views and 'lines'. It was precisely the commitment to 
dogmatic, vanguardist politics (something Phillips 
advocates) which provided the organisational basis for the 
split which occurred. The split should therefore be seen as 
a response by competing factions to break out of the party's 
narrow social base. contrary to Phillips' claims, 
factionalism and vanguardism compounded rather than 
alleviated this problem. 
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The consequence of this elite vanguardism was that the 
Marxists were tied up in their own sectarian debates and so 
they never seriously tackled the problem of winning 
widespread support among the working classes. The historical 
divisions of the labour force in terms of class fractions 
(proletariat, peasantry, informal sector and so on), race, 
gender and politics were never properly addressed. The Shah 
faction's attitude to Panday is particularly instructive. 
Panday may have been an opportunist politician who used race 
to guarantee his own political base, but the implication of 
this (and indeed the same applies to the PNM's appeal to the 
African population) is that the question of race cannot be 
ignored. Panday at least addressed the race factor, even if 
his motives in doing so were at best confused, and at worst 
dishonourable. (This question continues to be at the 
forefront of Trinidadian politics and I will address it 
again in the context of the 1980s recession in chapter six.) 
This faction also failed to tackle the question of PNM and 
liberal democratic hegemony. Liberal democracy may have been 
limited by the wider economic system and PNM corruption and 
repression, but Shah and his comrades failed to see that the 
political system still guaranteed certain rights (won by 
working class struggle) which made 'adventurist' politics 
inappropriate. 
What was therefore needed was a greater awareness by the 
party of the concrete conditions in Trinidad and Tobago. Of 
all the socialists in the ULF, James Millette showed the 
greatest sensitivity to the immediate task of consolidation 
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in the party, but this awareness was hindered by his own 
(Stalinist) vanguardism and his ultra-left view of trade 
unions (see above). Furthermore, he underestimated the race 
problem and may have therefore been too charitable towards 
Panday's opportunism. A long term 'counter hegemonic' 
strategy was necessary to challenge the domination of the 
PNM and racially based politics, rather than sterile debates 
(which were often full of half truths and inaccuracies) 
about Maoism and Stalinism. Of all the people who have 
written about the ULF, it is the non-Marxist Selwyn Ryan who 
has most accurately described what the ULF did not do and 
should have done - "What was missing was a willingness on 
the part of the actors involved to learn from the history of 
working class politics in Trinidad and Tobago. What was 
clearly needed was for Indian and African workers to get 
used to the idea of working together politically to help 
overcome the suspicions and prejudices inherited from the 
past." (Ryan 1989: 176-7) This may be an unremarkable 
conclusion, but it is a far more realistic one than those 
proposed by the socialists in the ULF. 
section Four: The Factions after the Split. 
After the split in the party, Panday's faction, after 
successfully winning the right to the party's name, 
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continued its shift to the right and supported the 
government over the constitutional question of parliamentary 
representation in cases where MPs had left their original 
party and 'crossed the floor' (See Classline 2/1). In a 
local government by-election within Shah's constituency, the 
pro-Panday candidate easily beat the Shah supporter. 
Panday's party did badly in the 1980 local government 
elections and so the decision was taken to enter into an 
alliance with the Democratic Action Congress and the Tapia 
House Movement for the 1981 elections. Panday's opportunism 
extended to an alliance with the Organisation for National 
Reconstruction (a party with politics considerably to the 
right of the PNM) in the 1986 general election. This 
alliance will be examined in more detail in chapter six. 
Shah's faction refused Panday's offer of a renewed alliance 
and did not participate in the 1981 election (Panday 
Interview 16.3.1990; Shah Interview 20.4.1990). Although 
Shah advocated armed struggle as late as 1981, the faction 
began to take a far more realistic approach from this 
period. NAMOTI was dissolved and the faction's doctrinaire 
Maoism was gradually abandoned. The Committee for Labour 
Solidarity was formed in 1981 and its leaders described it 
as a 'preparatory political party'. It began to concentrate 
on building support at the grassroots level, especially 
through the trade union movement. In other words, as well as 
rejecting Panday's opportunism, it also consciously tried to 
avoid the excessive vanguardism of the Marxist factions in 
the ULF. By the late 1980s, the CLS had converted itself 
into a political party called the Movement for Social 
Transformation (see chapter six for more details). 
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Finally, Millette's 'faction' became the February 18 
Movement. This tiny organisation regretted the split in the 
ULF and argued that Panday's faction had degenerated into a 
new DLP, and that the CLS repeated the old economism of 
NAMOTI (see for instance Millette 1981: 11; Workers Tribune 
2[2]). This movement has had little impact on working class 
politics and, given its dogmatic allegiance to Stalinist 
politics and organisational principles, this situation is 
unlikely to change. 
Conclusion: A Lost opportunity. 
Electoral contests in Third World societies are relatively 
infrequent events, but the Caribbean region provides some 
examples of changes in the ruling party through 
parliamentary contests (for instance in Jamaica). In the 
case of Trinidad it was always going to be difficult to 
challenge the hegemony of the PNM because of its success in 
leading the country to independence, the racial nature of 
politics and voting behaviour, and its control of patronage. 
Given that the ULF was largely a race-based party and was 
divided by ideology, it was unlikely to form a government. 
The ULF split because it was divided on the questions of 
race and factionalism. Race became a major issue as soon as 
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one Marxist faction (around Raffique Shah) attempted to 
break out of the party's existing social base. The disputes 
over political strategy were not successfully contained, not 
because the ULF lacked a vanguard approach to politics, but 
because the factions themselves were 'over-committed' to 
vanguardism. As a result, important questions such as 
winning the support of trade unionists in Labour Congress 
unions, the support of the 'informal sector', and the 
question of race itself, were all trivialised. Therefore, 
while the attempt by Shah's faction to extend the ULF's 
social base was itself correct, the manner in which it was 
done was problematic. The left in the Caribbean saw the 
disastrous consequences of vanguardism six years later in 
Grenada when one faction murdered the leaders of a rival 
faction (see Marable 1987: 265-7). 
Despite its undeveloped politics, factional infighting and 
short political life, the united Labour Front represented 
the most serious attempt to form a popular working class, 
socialist political party. It can be said with hindsight 
that its disintegration was disastrous for the working 
classes (of both ethnic groups), because it left them i11-
prepared for the recession in the 1980s. The recession, and 
the response of the labour movement to it, will be the 
subject of chapter six. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Uneven Development Revisited: Labour and the Recession of 
the 1980s 
The contradictions of Trinidad's peripheral capitalist 
development discussed in chapter one have been readily 
visible since the country entered an economic downturn in 
1982. The responses to the recession have sharpened the 
tensions between capital and organised labour as the former 
has called for cutbacks in the state sector and a return to 
a leading role in the economy for the private sector. George 
Chambers' PNM government initiated a move in this direction, 
but it was with the election of the 'multi racial' National 
Alliance for Reconstruction government (in December 1986) 
that the twin processes of state sector cutbacks and 
privatisation really accelerated. As a result the labour 
movement has been forced to face the worst crisis in its 
history. Unemployment and union membership have sharply 
declined and workers in the public sector have faced wage 
cuts and freezes. Other sections of the working classes have 
similarly suffered as unemployment, poverty and serious 
crime have all dramatically increased. The social crisis has 
also become a political one as divisions in the NAR 
government led to a racial split in 1988 and an increase in 
ethnic tensions at the end of the decade, and in 1990 there 
was a vain attempt to overthrow the liberal democratic 
system itself by means of an Islamic coup. 
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In this chapter, I examine the impact of the recession on 
the working classes and how they have resisted the demands 
of employers and government. I try to show that the factors 
that have traditionally divided labour (race, gender, uneven 
class formation and politics/trade union disunity) are still 
pervasive, and in some repects more acute, but that there is 
some tentative movement towards a recognition (at leadership 
level) that labour unity is vital to repesent the interests 
of the working classes. This can be seen most clearly by the 
increased awareness that there is a need for one trade union 
federation and a move away (by at least some Labour Congress 
unions) from purely collective bargaining mechanisms to 
'social movement unionism'. I examine these questions by 
dividing the chapter into two sections. Firstly I look at 
the causes of the recession and its impact on the working 
classes. section two explores the changing nature of 
politics and trade unionism in this period and in particular 
looks at renewed attempts to introduce trade union unity, 
the development of a conception of social movement unionism, 
and the renewed quest for a mass labour party. 
section One: The Recession and its Impact on the working 
Classes. 
(a) The Crisis in the Economy 
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The economic crisis of the 1980s had its origins in 
Trinidad's continued dependence on oil and the state 
revenues that are derived from taxation in this industry. By 
1980, oil production and refining constituted 42 per cent of 
Gross Domestic Product, directly provided 65 per cent of 
government revenues, and accounted for TT $9.17 billion of 
the country's total export earnings of TT $9.72 billion 
(Yelvington 1987: 12). After the oil 'shocks' of 1973-4 and 
1979-80, the price of oil on the world market began to 
decline and in December 1985, the organisation for Petroleum 
Exporting Countries announced that it would abandon efforts 
to maintain a high price for oil. OPEC instead embarked on a 
new strategy which would concentrate on recapturing its 
dominance of world oil production. 
This changing strategy had its roots in the competition 
between OPEC and non-OPEC oil producing countries (Farrell 
1985a: 390-2), a conflict which had a particular impact on 
Trinidad's 'open petroleum economy' (Seers 1964). Although 
Trinidad had benefited greatly from the rise in world oil 
prices, the foundations of the recession could be found in 
the boom period. From 1978 onwards, national oil production 
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steadily declined and the refineries were operating at well 
below full capacity. After the first oil shock, the united 
states - Trinidad's major oil market - reduced its 
dependence on imported oil, and in particular residual fuel 
oil, which is Trinidad's main oil export. us refineries also 
began to refine more residual fuel oil than they had done 
before 1973, and the Trinidad refineries began to outlive 
their usefulness to North American transnational 
corporations (Farrell 1985b). 
By the early 1980s the Trinidad economy had to face a 
decline in the market, and a decline in the price per barrel 
for its principal export. Nevertheless, the boom had 
provided the government and the private sector with an 
opportunity to diversify so that the country was no longer 
so dependent on the fluctuations of the world oil market. 
The 1973 oil price rise had, for instance, led to a windfall 
oil revenue of TT $24 billion (Farrell 1986: 8). However, 
this opportunity was wasted for at least three reasons: the 
government undertook over-ambitious and expensive 
development projects; the private sector continued to show 
little interest in sUbstantial domestic investment (see 
chapter one, which refers to the export of capital in this 
period); and money was wasted on corruption. 
The result of this particular conjuncture of international 
and domestic forces has been devastating for the economy. 
From 1982-89, the country experienced negative growth rates 
in every single year, and by 1987 real Gross Domestic 
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Product was about 28 per cent lower than it had been in 1982 
(Republic of Trinidad and Tobago 1984; 1985; 1986; 1989; 
Yelvington forthcoming: 16). Gross domestic product fell 
from US $6 229 million in 1984 to US $5 610 million in 1987, 
and the external debt stood at US $1.41 billion in 1987 
(Latin American Regional Report 8.12.1988). The external 
debt service ratio rose from two per cent in 1982, to 24.3 
per cent in 1987 (Republic of Trinidad and Tobago 1986: 46; 
Farrell 1989: 9). 
Both the PNM and the NAR governments introduced strong 
measures in trying to halt the decline. In December 1985, 
the Chambers government announced a 50 per cent devaluation 
in the Trinidad and Tobago dollar and a new 10 per cent tax 
on some consumer goods (Express 18.12.1985). In August 1988, 
a further devaluation was announced by ANR Robinson's NAR 
government (Latin American Regional Report 29.9.1988). 
Further measures have also been carried out which have had a 
direct impact on industrial relations, and these are 
examined below. 
perhaps the most visible feature of the crisis has been the 
rise in unemployment and the consequent increase in poverty, 
vagrancy and the size of the informal sector. Unemployment 
increased from 10 per cent in 1981 to 18 per cent by 1986, 
and an estimated 23 per cent by the late 1980s (Hunte 1988: 
10, 13). The problem was most serious among young people: in 
the first quarter of 1987, the unemployment rate was 42 per 
cent for males and 54 per cent for females in the 15-19 year 
age group; among 20-24 year olds, the figures were 39 per 
cent for males and 38 per cent for females (ibid.: 11). 
(b) The Impact on the Labour Movement and the Working 
Classes. 
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Cecil Paul, the General Secretary of the Council of 
progressive Trade Unions, has claimed that the economic 
situation, and the response of successive governments to it, 
have laid the framework for 'the collapse of collective 
bargaining' in the country (Paul c.1986: 1; Cecil Paul 
Interview 28.3.1990). He identifies a number of symptoms: 
employers no longer honouring terms of collective agreements 
and introducing conditions without consulting trade unions; 
the continued (one is tempted to say, after 25 years, 
eternal) backlog of cases at the Industrial Court; employers 
failing to honour Industrial Court agreements; employers' 
use of lockouts to subvert collective agreements and their 
subsequent offering of individual contracts (or strike-
breaking labour) to workers. Paul argues that "(a)t present 
in Trinidad and Tobago, we are witnessing .. a development of 
weak and immobilized Trade Unions, the underselling of 
labour, the subversion of the trade unions, the surplus of 
labour (unemployment) and as a result, the pauperization of 
large sections of .. society." (Paul c.1986: 1) 
The trade union movement has suffered accordingly. The last 
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survey of the whole trade union movement conducted at 
national level (in 1985) suggested that between 1982 and 
1985, over 70 000 workers (16 per cent of the total labour 
force) had been retrenched. In the period from 1981 to 1985, 
trade union membership had declined from approximately 142 
000 workers to 100 000 (Council of Progressive Trade Unions 
1985). From 1985 to 1990, there are no published figures on 
the size of the national trade union movement, but estimates 
(below) by leaders of the two federations, and individual 
unions, suggest that the size of the trade union movement 
continues to contract. 
Trade Union/Federation Membership (1990) Peak Membership 
council of Progressive 
Trade Unions (Federation) 30 000 38 000 (1980-2) 
Labour Congress 
(Federation) 80 000 120 000 (1982) 
National Union of 
Government and 
Federated Workers 44 000 76 000 (1983-4) 
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All Trinidad Sugar and 
General Workers Trade 
union 10 000 18 000 (1980-2) 
oilfield Workers Trade 
union 11 000 16 000 (1980-2) 
(Sources: Interviews with Cecil Paul 28.3.1990; Carl Tull 
1.5.1990; Selwyn John 30.4.1990; Sam Maharaj 12.4.1990; 
Errol McLeod 30.3.1990) 
The precise accuracy of these figures is questionable, not 
least because the claims made for the size of the two 
federations conflict with the more precise survey carried 
out by the CPTU in 1985. However, while these figures may be 
over-estimates made by hopeful, rather than accurate, trade 
union leaders, they are useful because they show an almost 
universal trend towards declining trade union membership 
since the end of the boom in the early 1980s. Each 
interviewee also stated that a major reason for the decline 
in union membership was retrenchment of the workforce. There 
are two exceptions to this trend - the Trinidad and Tobago 
Unified Teachers' Association and the Public Services' 
Association - but in both cases the increase in membership 
is explained by changes in the internal structure of the 
union rather than a favourable bargaining position with 
employers (which in both cases is the state) (Frank Ramnanan 
265 
Interview 10.5.1990; Kenrick Rennie Interview 7.5.1990). 
Since the election of the NAR government in late 1986, it 
has been the public sector unions that have suffered most. 
The new government has been committed to a leading role for 
the private sector and 'rolling back' the economic functions 
of the state. In its 1987 budget, the government suspended 
the Cost of Living Allowance, which had effectively acted 
(since the Second World War) as an automatic wage increase 
tied to inflation. The following year a five per cent 
'mobilisation for economic independence' tax was introduced, 
the top rate of income tax was reduced from 70 per cent to 
50 per cent, and there were price increases for basic goods. 
Prime Minister Robinson also announced his intention to ask 
the International Monetary Fund for finance to compensate 
for falling export earnings. After ignoring an Industrial 
Court decision of July 1988 to increase wages and restore 
COLA, the government introduced its most austere budget in 
1989, which included a 10 per cent cut in public sector 
wages, which was ratified by the Public Sector Emolument Act 
(Latin American Regional Report 30.3.1989; Express 
17.2.1989). Finally in 1990, the indirect and therefore 
regressive Value Added Tax was introduced for many basic but 
'non essential' goods at the standard rate of 15 per cent. 
The situation in the publicly owned sugar industry (Caroni) 
is equally desperate for the workforce. In early 1987, the 
Caroni board of directors, which included five workers' and 
farmers' representatives, submitted a Directional Plan for 
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the industry to the Minister of Planning, Winston Dookeran, 
who had close ties with the sugar union. The plan made 
provisions for those affected by rationalisation of the 
industry and it was envisaged that all workers laid off 
would be offered land and/or cash as compensation. All 
workers who opted for land would be assisted in forming 
agricultural co-operatives and would supply cane to the main 
company, but they would also be free to grow other crops 
(and thereby help to reduce the nation's food import bill). 
However, the government rejected the Directional Plan and 
introduced its own which would reduce sugar production, 
close the sugar factory at Brechin Castle, and, according to 
the union, retrench 7 000 workers without any compensation 
in land or cash (All Trinidad Sugar and General Workers 
Trade Union n.d.: 4; Sam Maharaj Interview 12.4.1990). 
The public sector (and so - significantly - the Labour 
Congress unions) has therefore suffered most amongst the 
organised working class since 1986. There has been 
widespread retrenchment, particularly among daily rated and 
public work scheme workers (the public works system, DEWD, 
was closed in 1987, leaving 8 000 jobless), attrition (non-
replacement of workers that have emigrated or retired), and 
wage cuts and loss of benefits (Selwyn John Interview 
30.4.1990; Kenrick Rennie Interview 7.5.1990). However, 
there have also been many job losses in the private sector 
(which itself challenges the economic philosophy of the NAR 
government) and from 1982 to 1986, total employment in this 
sector contracted by 20 per cent (Hunte 1988: 9). The 
collapse of Kirpalani's in 1986, one of the 'Big Four' 
national conglomerates, was the most dramatic of all the 
bankruptcies of private enterprise (Express 6.8.1986). 
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The most visible result of retrenchment has been an increase 
in unemployment and in the size of the petty commodity 
sector. The number of vendors in the towns, and in 
particular in Port of Spain and San Fernando, has soared, 
and this has in turn led to new conflicts with the 
government - for instance, over the area that street vendors 
are allowed to sell their goods (Express 10.4.90). It is 
likely that poor women have suffered most from the recession 
due to a sharp fall in real wages, a reduction in public 
spending for services on which women rely (Safa forthcoming: 
3), and an intensification of their dual role as wage 
earners and unpaid domestic workers. Moreover, the 
government's economic strategy also includes the promotion 
of export processing zones, which often rely on the 
employment of low paid female labourers working in very poor 
conditions. 
section Two: Labour unity in the 19808? 
The unfavourable situation facing the organised working 
class has led to major changes in the labour movement. On 
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the one hand, fear of unemployment has led to low morale and 
a general unwillingness on the part of the workforce to 
strike. Between 1984 and 1987, there were very few 
officially recorded major strikes (these involve strikes 
which result in the loss of at least 2 000 workdays): in 
1984, there were 10; in 1985, there were five; in 1986, 
there were four; and in 1987, only two (Republic of Trinidad 
and Tobago 1989: 89). There have been a number of stoppages 
since then (see below for details), but these have rarely 
been long term and in this respect conform with the pattern 
of labour resistance from 1984 to 1987. On the other hand, 
the economic and social difficulties faced by the trade 
union movement (and the working classes more generally) have 
led to significant changes among the attitudes of the 
leaders of organised labour. In this section, I look firstly 
at the gradual (but still limited) movement towards trade 
union unity. Secondly, I examine new moves to unify the 
working classes as a whole through a community and trade 
union based organisation (the Summit of People's 
organisations) and through labour-based political parties 
(the United National Congress and the Movement for Social 
Transformation). Thirdly, I show how this has been linked to 
an explicitly political critique of government (and 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank) policy. 
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(a) Trade Union Unity 
The movement toward trade union unity has been tentative, 
and the creation of one, united trade union federation 
remains a long term prospect. The two federations continue 
to be divided over ideological issues which are reflected in 
their respective international affiliations; the Labour 
Congress is aligned to the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions, while (since 1980) the Council of 
progressive Trade Unions is aligned to the World Federation 
of Trade unions (Carl Tull Interview 1.5.1990; Cecil Paul 
Interview 28.3.1990). The extent to which these ideological 
issues (and other 'local problems' - not least, the question 
of personality differences among trade union leaders) have 
been overcome is discussed below. 
Political differences notwithstanding, the majority of trade 
unions recognise that the crisis in the trade union movement 
can only be challenged by closer ties between both the 
federations, and the non-aligned (the teachers' and sugar 
workers') unions. Before the 1986 general election, trade 
union unity was of a basically informal nature but met with 
little success. Since the NAR entered office, most trade 
unions have moved closer to each other, albeit on specific 
issues rather than on the question of one trade union 
centre. 
At the formal level, the first joint Labour Day celebrations 
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were held in 1982 and some labour unity resolutions were 
held. On this basis, the CPTU in particular tried to 
initiate talks about one trade union centre, but these 
actions were not welcomed by a Labour Congress leadership 
suspicious of the CPTU's 'communist' sympathies (Oil fields 
Workers' Trade Union 1986b: 20). A Labour Congress team 
prepared a draft discussion document on labour unity in 
1986, but this went no further in either of the two 
federations (Trinidad and Tobago Labour Congress 1986). 
More informally, the Joint Trade Union Grouping was set up 
in December 1983 by unions from both federations and the 
non-aligned (Oil fields Workers' Trade Union 1986b: 21). 
Conferences of shop stewards were held and the Grouping 
mobilised a picket outside Parliament on the day that the 
1984 budget was presented to the House of Representatives. 
An alternative economic programme was presented which 
demanded an immediate moratorium on retrenchment and a small 
wage increase "that recognises that workers, no less than 
management, have the right to maintain their standard of 
living." (Guardian 24.5.1984) This argument - that the 
working classes were being forced to pay a disproportionate 
share of the economic pain in the recession - became a 
common conviction of the trade union movement, especially 
after the NAR was elected (see below). 
The Joint Trade Union Grouping (later re-named the Concerned 
Group of Trade Unions) remained a purely informal grouping 
which united on concrete issues, which in practice meant 
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that it organised annually around the time of the Budget. 
Its 1986 programme outlined as its main objective the 
development of "unity in action of all Trade Unions around 
concrete issues ... through activities that are acceptable to 
Unions and agreed upon in an 'informal' body that can best 
achieve consensus, thereby laying the foundation for Formal 
unity." (Concerned Trade Unions 1986b: 1) The problem 
however, was that the Group failed to deal with the long 
standing divisions in the trade union movement and never 
enjoyed the full support of those Labour Congress union 
leaders that had close ties with the PNM. The result was 
that in practice the trade union movement often remained as 
divided as ever (at leadership level, at least) on concrete 
issues. The Transport and Industrial Workers' Union dispute 
with Neal and Massy in 1986 is a case in point. This 
particular conglomerate, the largest in Trinidad, had led 
the offensive against organised labour since 1983. The 
parent company had unilaterally declared a wage freeze, 
withdrawn COLA, reduced the working week and contracted out 
work at some of its subsidiary companies (Socialist Worker 
April/May 1986). When these actions were followed by lock 
outs at further subsidiaries (Polymer Caribbean, Neal and 
Massy Motors, Edgar Borde, Electrical Industries and 
Automotive Components), TIWU called for a boycott of two 
food and drink subsidiaries (Cannings food and drink and Hi-
Lo supermarkets) in April 1986. This call was supported by 
thirteen trade unions, but it was strongly criticised by the 
most important Labour Congress union, the National Union of 
Government and Federated Workers (Express 7.8.1986). 
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The election victory of the NAR paved the way for a new 
period of attempts to unify the trade union movement. The 
momentum of the struggle for trade union unity has increased 
for two reasons. Firstly, the defeat of the PNM meant that 
there were no longer the close ties of patronage between 
government and conservative trade union leaders that had 
existed since the early 1960s. Secondly, there was the 
question of government policy itself. The government's 
commitment to cutting back the economic role of the state 
and promoting private enterprise meant that Labour Congress 
unions (especially the NUGFW and the Public Services' 
Association) suffered most from government policy. 
The new government created institutional structures in which 
(so it was claimed) the trade union movement would enjoy 
genuine representation and a chance to promote its own 
particular demands as representatives of labour. The most 
important of these was the Joint Consultative council. Both 
the trade union centres and the non-aligned unions were 
dismayed when COLA was withdrawn from public sector workers 
in the 1987 budget. The Council of Progressive Trade Unions 
responded by presenting a paper to the Joint Consultative 
council which criticised the government's policies of 
promoting 'free enterprise'. The paper argues that lithe 
Private sector was only called upon to make minimal 
sacrifices through the national recovery impost ••• And in 
spite of this, their contribution to the national 
reconstruction effort so far has been minimal." (Council of 
progressive Trade Unions 1987: 2) The CPTU called for a 
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reduction in the salaries of company directors, a price 
freeze, increased taxation on capital exports and the 
establishment of funds for the provision of social services 
(ibid.: 3-4). This paper was subsequently adopted by the 
Labour Congress, which also proposed a similar revenue 
raising alternative budget (Trinidad and Tobago Labour 
Congress 1987). The Congress also argued that labour had 
taken more than its share of the required sacrifice, 
claiming that while, between 1983 to 1986 real income for 
the country as a whole had fallen by almost 30 per cent, 
labour income in the public sector had fallen by 44 per cent 
(Guardian 29.11.1987). In 1965 and 1970, conservative trade 
union leaders had blamed the 'political' trade unions for 
the country's economic problems. By 1987, the Congress was 
arguing that the "fundamental structural problem •.• lies with 
the business community, and with the manner in which our 
businessmen have elected to provision the economy. The 
determination of the business community to earn their 
livelihood through imports, the reluctance of these citizens 
to reinvest their profits in this country, and the 
reluctance of these entrepreneurs to take any major 
investment initiative except (if) it is in some way 
underwritten by the government, have all added up to what 
exists today; an economy that remains heavily dependent upon 
foreign investment, an economy whose fortunes remain very 
sensitive to the conditions of the government's budget." 
(ibid.) 
Despite the Labour Congress' (implicit) 'conversion' to the 
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notion of uneven capitalist development, there were still 
some differences between the two centres on the question of 
the economy. The major issue was whether the government 
should ask the International Monetary Fund for a loan and 
accept conditionalities in order to retain the confidence of 
external creditors (it had become obvious that the 
government would). The CPTU was against any such policy, 
while (in 1987) the Labour Congress was concerned about the 
social effects of IMF conditionalities, but not yet 
completely opposed to the government's expected course of 
action (Trinidad and Tobago Labour Congress 1987: 6-7). 
However, this potential area of disagreement rapidly 
disappeared, as by early 1988 the Congress was describing 
the government's courting of the IMF as "dangerous and 
extremely serious" and it stated that it was "vehemently 
opposed to the outdated conditions of the Fund." (Express 
23.1.1988) 
The government's decision to approach the IMF was first 
officially announced at the presentation of the budget in 
early 1988, and this was followed by the submission of a 
Letter of Intent to the IMF the following November (Farrell 
1989: 15), despite accusations by a former IMF official that 
the organisation had been deliberately inaccurate in its 
assessment of the Trinidad economy (see Ryan 1990: 321). In 
late 1988 and early 1989, two IMF loans (plus one from the 
World Bank) were secured, and, more importantly, the IMF 
'seal of approval' was given to bankers to continue to lend 
money to the country. The usual conditionalities applied, 
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especially to the second loan: these included a reduction in 
the budget deficit, a periodic review of the exchange rate, 
and a reduction in import and price controls. 
It was against this background that the first IMF-influenced 
budget was introduced in early 1989, in which the 
aforementioned salary cuts were made. In anticipation of a 
harsh budget, the trade union movement planned a national 
day of resistance for March. By this time the informal 
alliance of trade unions had evolved into the Joint Trade 
Union Movement, which, given the context in which it 
operated, was far more unified than its predecessors. Before 
the Day of Resistance, the Labour Congress demanded the 
recall of the 1989 budget, arguing that its fiscal measures 
"will have the effect of damaging the economic system of the 
country, while at the same time instituting a level of 
poverty and suffering such as the society will not be able 
to bear. This is a Budget which has attacked workers by 
cutting their pay, by reducing their jobs (sic.) security ... 
In our view the Government of this country has every reason 
to reopen negotiations with the IMF and to seek to get 
better terms for the people of this country." (Express 
15.1.1989) 
The Day of Resistance was held on March 6, 1989. The 
intention was that the whole of the country's workforce 
would stay away from work for one day. The response to this 
call by the Joint Trade Union Movement was strong in the 
public sector, especially among teachers, public transport 
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workers and public servants, but workers employed by private 
enterprise were far less supportive (Guardian 6.3.1989; 
7.3.1989) . 
The immediate response of the government to the protest 
action was negative. NAR General Secretary Bhoe Tewarie, 
criticised the trade union movement that "is now being led 
astray by a callous clique whose actions are prompted by 
political ambitions. Indeed, the trade union movement itself 
may well be in jeapordy because of the callous and 
irresponsible attitude of these political players in the 
trade union movement." (Express 4.3.1989) This attack, 
reminiscent of Eric Williams in his prime, was ill-advised 
because the trade union leadership of the late 1980s was 
very different from what it had been in the mid-1960s. Prime 
Minister Robinson therefore took a more conciliatory line 
and set up a technical team which would make proposals for a 
medium term economic programme. 
This technical team met in May 1989 and had representation 
from both union federations. Through the Joint Trade Union 
Movement, demands were made for a moratorium on some of the 
1989 budget measures, on retrenchment and on the Cabinet 
plan for the sugar industry (see above) (Express 2.5.1989). 
However, a split developed between the two federations over 
the talks. According to Labour Congress representative 
Selwyn John, progress was made on the issues of 
retrenchment, but not on the issue of a 10 per cent cut in 
public salaries. However, CPTU leaders claimed that "we 
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accomplished nothing." (Express 3.5.1989) This division 
became serious as the CPTU withdrew from the technical team, 
which effectively destroyed the unity of the Joint Trade 
Union Movement. In a media announcement, the Congress stated 
that it regrets "the move by its sister Federation, the 
CPTU, to resist all attempts to arrive at a united position 
in relation to further talks with the Government." (Express 
15.6.1989) Although it encouraged the CPTU to re-enter 
dialogue with Congress and the government, the old political 
divisions were resurrected. Congress stated that it was not 
a political football "to be used and misused when it suits 
the interests of those who are bent on carving out some 
space in an increasingly difficult political environment. We 
therefore have no intention of letting our guard down." 
(ibid.) The CPTU was also accused of having an agenda and 
finance organised by 'foreign forces' (Cecil Paul Interview 
28.3.1990; Selwyn John Interview 30.4.1990). 
The technical team continued without CPTU representation and 
so unity was once again undermined. However, by the end of 
1989, two factors helped to restore a limited degree of 
unity. Firstly, there was industrial action at the oil 
refineries, the Water and Sewerage Authority and the Public 
Service Transport Corporation. The strike involving the 
oilworkers was successful in winning a (realistically small) 
wage increase along with better pension schemes and medical 
benefits for workers (Express 17.10.1989). In a public 
statement, the OWTU argued that the strike was of wider 
significance because it "re-established without a doubt the 
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respect and regard by employers (private and state) managers 
and Government for the Trade Union Movement in general and 
the OWTU in particular." (Express 22.10.1989) There were 
also sit-ins and work stoppages at WASA and the PTSC in 
response to retrenchment orders (later partially withdrawn) 
(Express 30.12.1989; Guardian 5.1.1990). The WASA stoppage 
was particularly important because it involved workers in 
the largest Labour Congress affiliated union (the NUGFW) . 
Secondly, and related to the WASA stoppage, the Labour 
Congress became disorientated with the government's attitude 
to the technical team and in particular to the role of the 
trade union movement in it. The leadership claimed that in 
meetings with the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, the government had ignored the Labour Congress 
(Guardian 9.12.1989). 
This breakdown of negotiations was reflected in the 1990 
budget. The introduction of 15 per cent Value Added Tax was 
strongly criticised by both federations and it provided the 
basis for renewed impetus in the Joint Trade Union Movement 
and the creation of a wider, community based organisation, 
the summit of Peoples Organisations (SOPO) (Kenrick Rennie 
Interview 7.5.1990; Cecil Paul Interview 28.3.1990). 
Demonstrations were organised against the budget and the 
June 1990 labour day celebrations were re-united under one 
banner at Fyzabad (Express 22.6.1990). 
The prospects for trade union unity in the 1990s are greater 
than they have been since the last major split in 1965. At 
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the same time however, the scale of the problems facing the 
movement have never been greater and the moves towards unity 
have not kept pace with these difficulties. While some 
Labour congress unions regularly attend JTUM meetings, the 
federation itself is not affiliated to it (Carl Tull 
Interview 1.5.1990). Moreover, those unions affiliated to 
Congress that do attend are not as fully committed to the 
JTUM as the CPTU unions. There are basically two levels of 
criticism made by Labour Congress affiliated unions against 
the Joint Trade Union Movement. On the one hand is the well-
worn criticism (see chapters one and three) made by older 
leaders that the progressive trade unions are too political. 
AcCording to NUGFW President Selwyn John, "(the) difficulty 
that has come up in the trade unions within the last year, 
maybe two years, is that the left wing forces have attempted 
to take most, if not all the trade unions, and in doing so 
they undermine these bodies •.. lt is our view that this was 
an international left wing cause - that in order to gain 
power they must have not only trade union power but 
political power." (Selwyn John Interview 30.4.1990) On the 
other hand, some younger leaders, who are far less critical 
of the CPTU and not so closely associated with the Labour 
congress' 'old guard', reject this false separation of trade 
unions and politics, but criticise the JTUM on the more 
realistic basis that there has been a long term separation 
of leaders from workers. According to the Bank Employees' 
Union General Secretary (and Labour Congress Deputy General 
Secretary) Patrick Rabathly, while the JTUM is a worthwhile 
endeavour (in that it at least recognises the need for trade 
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union unity), "we have not been communicating well with 
workers" and so the JTUM "will only really get the 
credibility it deserves if people can see that the labour 
movement is united." He regards the JTUM as too much of a 
'top down', leadership-oriented initiative (Interview 
3.5.1990). The two non-aligned unions are active in the 
JTUM, but are sceptical about the prospects for unity, 
especially the sugar workers' union leadership, which 
regards the major obstacle to be one of personality 
conflicts (Frank Ramnanan Interview 10.5.1990; Sam Maharaj 
Interview 12.4.1990). 
So, while the JTUM is "the most developed form of unity that 
we have had in the labour movement ... since 1965" (Cecil Paul 
Interview 28.3.1990), there are still a number of problems 
to be resolved. Firstly, there is the resistance of some old 
but highly influential trade union leaders (Carl Tull and 
Selwyn John) opposed to one trade union centre and 
'political unionism'. Secondly, there is the related problem 
of ideology and international trade union affiliation. 
Thirdly, and in the long term most importantly, the wide gap 
that exists between trade union leaders and rank and file 
members must be narrowed. This is all the more important in 
the current period because the recession has lowered the 
morale and the confidence of organised labour. Perhaps the 
most promising development in this regard has taken place in 
some of the Labour Congress unions (the PSA and the Bank 
Employees Union, among others) where old, often corrupt, 
leaders have been replaced by a younger leadership which 
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rejects so-called 'responsible unionism' and is broadly 
sympathetic to the aims (if not the methods) of the CPTU. I 
examine this in more detail below, in the context of 'social 
movement unionism', the Summit of People's organisations and 
new labour parties. 
(b) Labour Parties and Social Movement Unionism 
There are currently two political parties claiming to 
represent the cause of labour, and these essentially reflect 
the split in the ULF in 1977. On the one hand is Basdeo 
Panday's United National Congress, which established itself 
as the official opposition after the attempted Islamic coup 
in July 1990 (Latin American Regional Report 4.10.1990), 
while on the other is the Movement for Social 
Transformation, which has its origins in the old Shah fat ion 
of the ULF. 
After the split in the ULF, Panday's party entered various 
alliances (see chapter five), culminating in the National 
Alliance for Reconstruction. The problem with this coalition 
was that it contained such a diversity of political views 
that it never really constituted a positive alliance - its 
only unifying feature was a desire to end twenty five years 
of PNM government. Once the party entered office, divisions 
quickly arose. Panday and some of his followers felt that 
the government was not sufficiently challenging the 
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entrenched state bureaucracy, especially on the issue of 
public works schemes (Ryan 1988: 69-76). They felt that this 
was indicative of a wider government failure to challenge 
anti-Indian racism in society. within a year of the NAR's 
election victory, the party was in open conflict. By 
February 1988, Prime Minister Robinson was talking of forces 
"bent on destruction within the party - some of them 
functioning at the highest levels." (Express 7.2.1988) He 
argued that the 'splitters' were using race, and in 
particular the government's refusal to allow the Indian 
government to build an Indian cutural centre, to divide the 
party (Ryan 1990: 160-2). Panday, who was by now holding 
open meetings of NAR dissidents, argued that the divisive 
factors were a combination of class and race: "Sugar workers 
are owed $125 million in backpay and they cannot get a word 
on that, and they are now saying that the centre is the 
issue? The fact that the centre was mentioned as an issue 
demonstrates the road which they wish to travel and that is 
to divide us again ... They are trying to do exactly what the 
PNM used to ..• (T)hose who seek to divide the country will 
feel the wrath of the people. Only our people will never go 
back to the racial syndrome. That is a mistake they making 
(sic.)." (Express 8.2.1988) On February 8, Robinson 
dismissed Panday, Kelvin Ramnath and Trevor Sudama from the 
Cabinet (Express 9.2.1988), and in April 1989, the united 
National congress was founded (Express 1.5.1989). 
The new party has probably attracted a social base similar 
to the old ULF (although some old ULF members stayed loyal 
283 
to the government). To become a mass party it faces the 
basic problem of attracting black working class support. The 
party has placed much emphasis on the persistence of racial 
discrimination in society, which has led to renewed 
accusations that Panday is a racist (see for instance 
Express 15.11.1988 and Guardian 25.3.1990). However, raising 
the question of race where racism exists is not itself 
racist, and the political left in Trinidad have continued to 
ignore race as a mere epiphenomenon of capitalism. What is 
questionable about Panday and his followers is the zeal with 
which he condemns anti-Indian racism but the comparative 
reluctance to condemn racist comments made by some Indian 
leaders (see Guardian 18.3.1990). So, while Panday quite 
rightly emphasises the continued significance of the race 
factor, the manner in which he raises it is questionable and 
not dis-similar to the old Democratic Labour Party. 
The second party claiming to represent the working classes 
is MOTION, which was formed in September 1989 out of the 
committee for Labour Solidarity. It is an independent 
socialist party committed to a mixed economy (Movement for 
social Transformation 1989b: 8) and is critical of the 
record of the 'socialist' countries (David Abdulah Interview 
25.4.1990). The decision was taken in 1988 to transform the 
CLS into a full political party because of the changing 
political climate - in particular, the rise of the NAR and 
the associated demise of racially based voting. After the 
subsequent problems of the government, CLS activists 
believed that there was a sufficient change in the political 
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atmosphere to justify the formation of a new labour based 
party. In the words of its interim political leader, David 
Abdulah, "the mood had changed .•. The people were ready for a 
new kind of politics, not just a new kind of party." 
(Interview 25.4.1990) 
The problem with this perspective is that it underestimates 
the resilience of ideologies like racism. The divisions that 
existed between African and Indian workers were not created 
by the PNM and are therefore unlikely to simply disappear 
now that a different party is in office. Moreover, 
recessions are a fertile breeding ground for scapegoating, 
and there has been a marked increase in racial tensions in 
the last two years. For instance, government plans for a 
national service have led to a moral panic that the races 
will become 'mixed' (Guardian 18.3.1990). While MOTION 
undoubtedly recognises the persistence of racism (David 
Abdulah Interview 25.4.1990), the party still tends to 
regard as an epiphenomenon of capitalism or a capitalist 
conspiracy. For instance, its political programme contains 
relatively progressive sections on women's rights, 
education, and young and old people but there is no section 
on race or ethnicity. A section on sport and culture does 
not mention the historical divide between Indian and African 
(Movement for Social Transformation 1989b: 30-7). 
The second major problem that MOTION faces is that it may 
come to be regarded as yet another isolated socialist party 
whih involves a few CPTU leaders but few rank and file trade 
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unionists or unorganised workers. A more credible 
alternative may have been the creation of a progressive 
labour party out of those unions in both federations, which 
would have shown to workers (organised and unorganised) that 
the trade union movement is capable of achieving some unity. 
In the long term, the creation of such a party would lead to 
a conflict in the Labour Congress between the new, younger 
leaders and the 'old guard', but this would eventually aid 
unity as the latter group remains the biggest obstacle to 
one trade union centre. 
The final important organisational development among the 
working classes is the creation of the Summit of People's 
organisations (SOPO). This was formed in February 1990 in 
response to the burden of IMF and World Bank-influenced 
government policy. The organisation was set up on the 
initiative of trade unions from both federations (but again, 
with less support from some Labour Congress affiliated 
unions) but is a wider body than a 'pure' (or 'responsible') 
trade union. It includes religious and cultural 
organisations (among these, before July 1990, was the 
Jamaat-AI-Muslimeen, the organisation behind the coup 
attempt), feminist groups (the Caribbean Association for 
Feminist Research and Action) and various political parties 
(including the PNM and MOTION) (Summit of People's 
organisations 1990: 1). 
The basic inspiration for SOPO is the success of 'social 
movement unionism' in countries like Brazil and South 
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Africa. This phenemenon is based on an alliance of organised 
labour with other social movements, and its motivation is 
the belief that "there is a growing confluence of interests 
and a gradual overcoming of previous social and political 
barriers." (Munck 1988: 117) This conception rejects the 
distinction between economic and political unionism, and the 
crude Marxist notion (discussed in the opening chapter) that 
the class struggle is the major (or only) source of conflict 
in society. As waterman states, in this conception "worker 
struggles are neither condemned as 'economic/reformist', nor 
glorified as 'political/revolutionary', but recognised as 
representing one front or site of political struggle that 
must be articulated intimately with others if the 'present 
state of things' is to be abolished ..• In our increasingly 
diverse, complex but interdependent economies, polities and 
cultures ... it is not unity but diversity that is strength. 
It is, in other words, not so much a matter of trying to 
reduce all the increasing variety to one 'primary', 
'fundamental' contradiction (class, nationality or - for 
that matter - gender). It is rather one of recognising 
within the many movements (which thus include the labour 
one) the common democratic thread." (Waterman 1990: 8, 11) 
The immediate demands of SOPO included a halt to 
retrenchment at Caroni and PTSC, the reinstatement of COLA 
and the 10 per cent of salaries that were cut from teachers 
and public servants, a halt to cutbacks in social services, 
the withdrawal of VAT and an immediate programme of job 
creation (Summit of People's Organisations 1990: 1-2). While 
some of these demands are of more immediate concern to the 
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trade union movement, others (such as stopping the cuts in 
social services and abolishing VAT) are of relevance to all 
sections of the working classes and therefore represent a 
move towards social movement unionism. However, this move 
remains tentative and at the time of writing is largely 
confined to trade union leaders and activists. 
summary and Conclusion: Uneven Development Revisited and the 
Rise of Social Movement Unionism. 
The nature of government economic policy, especially since 
1986, has forced the trade union movement, and in particular 
the Labour Congress unions, to rethink the relationship 
between trade unionism and politics. This in turn has led to 
a protracted debate over economic policy, which echoes my 
discussion of uneven development presented in the opening 
chapter. 
The trade union movement's criticisms of the government have 
addressed economic policy per se, and the social 
consequences of these policies on the organised working 
class and the poorest sections of the population. The basic 
philosophy behind government, International Monetary Fund 
and World Bank policy is the neo-classical theory which I 
challenged in chapter one. In order to revive the economy, 
the IMF typically proposes cutbacks in the state sector, 
privatisation and the liberalisation of imports. This 
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equilibrium model also expounds the view that foreign 
investment will be attracted to a country if the government 
provides the right incentives. These views are undoubtedly 
shared by the NAR government's Minister of Finance, Selby 
Wilson (see Express 18.3.1990), and in 1990, the country's 
first export processing zone was established at Point Lisas 
(Guardian 19.3.1990). However, as I argued in chapter one, 
this equilibrium model is seriouslY flawed, as it fails to 
examine the agglomeration tendencies of international 
capitalism, and the weakness of the private sector in 
developing countries (and its related tendency to export 
capital). Furthermore, Export processing Zones do not 
provide a great deal of employment or linkages with the rest 
of the economy, and they generally rely on the super-
exploitation of cheap, usually female labour (Jenkins 1987: 
123-43: Elson and Pearson 1979). The union movement has 
therefore correctly predicted that government policy (at 
least in the absence of a massive oil price rise) will lead 
to a worsening of the recession and a redistribution of 
wealth away from the poor towards the rich. Such a process 
is common in many Third World countries, in which austerity 
protests occur where debt and IMF pressure are most 
pronounced (Walton and Ragin 1990: 883). 
Government economic policy has laid the framework for a 
substantial revision of trade union practice and most of the 
movement's leaders have recognised the necessity for greater 
unity. Moreover, there is now a widespread belief that trade 
unions should link up with other organisations, so that non-
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unionised sectors of the working classes can be represented. 
The success of social movement unionism and mass labour 
party politics will depend on the extent to which the trade 
union movement can bridge the gap between leaders and 
members (or non-members), and the divisions of race, gender 




The history of Trinidad and Tobago is incomprehensible 
without an examination of the history of labour. The 
inhabitants of the country are the descendants of people who 
were brought to the islands as labourers. The economic 
development of the islands' over the last five centuries 
must be understood as the simultaneous evolution of 
different modes of labour control. Existing mainstream 
theories of development and underdevelopment lack such a 
labour-based approach. 
In the 20 century, the working classes have played a crucial 
role in the history of the twin-island state - for example, 
the rebellion of 1937 paved the way for organised trade 
unionism and gradual decolonisation; independence in 1962 
was led by a black petty bourgeois organisation, but it was 
with the active involvement of the trade union movement; and 
in 1970, unorganised fractions of the working classes 
rebelled against the government. 
Nevertheless, my case study showed that there is no 
homogenous working class and little commitment to socialist 
politics. Crude Marxist two-class models, based on notions 
of 'true' and 'false' consciousness are therefore 
inappropriate. Instead, I explored the divisions among the 
working classes and examined the extent to which these were 
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overcome during certain periods of struggle (such as in 
1970), or by socialist political parties (such as the ULF). 
The four major divisions that I examined were gender, race 
and ethnicity, class, and politics. 
The sexual division of labour confines women to domestic 
duties and certain low paid occupations in the 'formal 
sector'. Although there is no discernible discrimination 
against women in the informal sector per se, they are still 
disadvantaged because they are expected to bear the burden 
of unpaid domestic labour. The origins of the sexual divsion 
of labour are complex (and under-researched), but it appears 
that both male and female slaves and indentured labourers 
worked equally (at least, vis-a-vis each other) on the 
plantations. with the intensification of proletarianisation 
in the late 19 century, there was a process of 
'housewifeisation' which forced many women out of the labour 
market and into the domestic sphere. The precise mechanisms 
of this process are ambiguous however, and in particular, in 
the absence of a pre-existing sexual division of labour, the 
precise reasons why men became proletarians and women 
housewives is not clear. Capitalists may benefit from the 
unpaid domestic labour performed by women because it 
reproduces an exploitable labour force, but this does not 
explain why it was women who were generally assigned this 
task. One tentative (and, on its own, inadequate) 
explanation used in chapter two referred to male violence 
(and the threat of violence) against women. 
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Nevertheless, the twin processes of proletarianisation and 
housewifeisation did undoubtedly occur, and this has left 
women oppressed both in society and vis-a-vis working class 
men. Despite their subordinate role, women have been 
actively involved in the labour movement (their role in the 
1937 rebellion was especially pronounced), but the 
patriarchal nature of society has ensured that they remain 
under-represented in the trade union movement (both at 
leadership and membership level) and in labour-oriented 
political parties. The promotion of export processing zones 
in the 1990s may increase the number of proletarian women 
(although the experience of other Third World countries 
suggests that this will only be confined to a small minority 
of the labour force), but it will be at the cost of their 
'super-exploitation'. 
The racial division of the labour force was established in 
the period of indentured labour. A basic rural-urban divide 
was established in which Indians lived in the countryside 
and Africans in the towns. Mutual distrust was fuelled as 
the importation of Indian labour undermined the bargaining 
position of the former African slaves, and racial 
stereotyping on both sides developed. Economic development -
in particular in the oil industry, in manufacturing, and in 
the state bureaucracy - has undermined this demographic 
segregation but there are still SUbstantial political and 
cultural divisions. Party politics, at least until 1986, has 
been based on one party largely representing the Africans, 
and another largely representing the Indian population, 
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which has in turn militated against efforts to create a 
popular socialist party. The Workers and Farmers Party and 
the united Labour Front both failed to constructively come 
to terms with the question of race (see below for a 
discussion of this point) and, in the case of the latter, 
this was a major reason for its split in 1977. The election 
of the multi-racial NAR government in 1986 undermined two 
party, racially based politics, but the split in the 
government and wider racial tensions suggests that the two 
latest parties that aspire to represent labour (the UNC and 
MOTION) face a great obstacle if they are to achieve 
political unity among the Indian and African working 
classes. 
The class structure is too complex and diffuse for there to 
be a single 'working class', and so the plural 'working 
classes' has been employed throughout this study. There are 
at least three fractions of the working classes - the 
working class, the peasantry and the informal sector - and 
each of these can be further subdivided. Firstly, the 
working class are those workers (proletarians) who sell 
their labour power in order to live. This group can be 
further sub-divided into casual, temporary workers at one 
extreme (this would include, for instance, sugar workers up 
to the 1970s, low paid female domestic employees, and many 
workers at the present time in the public sector), and those 
that are comparatively well-paid, in relatively secure jobs, 
and politically 'integrated' at the other. This latter group 
includes oil workers and some public sector workers during 
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the boom period of the 1970s. Some writers have referred to 
such a group as a 'labour aristocracy' who, because of their 
relative privileges (such as job security and high wages) , 
are unlikely to have radical politics (for a summary of the 
general debate see Munck 1988: 53-5). The OWTU has had a 
radical leadership since 1962 but its members have been 
relatively conservative - for instance, while they supported 
George Weekes as their trade union leader, they never 
supported the labour parties (WFP and ULF) in which he was a 
leading figure. However, the problem with the concept of the 
labour aristocracy is that it is too static - it over-
estimates 'privileges' such as job security and high wages 
and under-estimates the dynamics of political change. oil 
workers and public sector workers were highly paid and 
enjoyed job security during the economic boom, but this is 
no longer the case and there has been widespread 
retrenchment and erosion of real wages in the 1980s. 
Moreover, oil workers have always been better paid than the 
rest of the organised working class, but have not always 
been conservative - in the 1930s and 40s, it was this sector 
that led anti-colonial unrest. The subsequent conservatism 
of this group of workers is better explained by the rise of 
a racially based, two party political system. 
The peasantry has been a declining fraction of the working 
classes this century, but there are still substantial 
numbers of small farmers in central Trinidad and in Tobago. 
Some of these, especially around the sugar estates, are 
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semi-proletarianised in that they work for an employer for a 
wage, and supplement their income by growing their own food. 
The informal sector comprises those people that have been 
'marginalised' by peripheral capitalism (though not in an 
absolute sense - see chapter one), and so have to sell goods 
on the streets of the main towns in order to survive. Some 
of the more successful petty traders enjoy high incomes, but 
most have modest or low 'life chances'. 
The relatively isolated and individualised work experience 
of these two groups (with the exception of the 'semi-
proletariat') makes it harder for them to organise amongst 
themselves. Nevertheless, the black urban poor was at the 
forefront of the protests in 1970, and the increasing 
numerical significance of the informal sector has made it 
imperative that the organised labour movement begins to take 
account of this sector (see below) . 
The organised labour movement has historically been divided 
by politics, and this is reflected in the large number of 
labour parties that have attempted to represent the working 
classes, and the long term division of the trade union 
movement into 'responsible' and 'political' trade unions. 
Furthermore, there is a wide gulf between the trade union 
leadership on the one hand, and the membership on the other. 
'Responsible' trade unions have often been undemocratic, and 
some of their leaders have enjoyed the patronage of 
successive PNM governments. However, this situation began to 
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alter in the 1970s and 1980s and new, younger (and 
politically minded), trade union leaders were democratically 
elected to Labour Congress unions. 'Political' trade union 
leaders have often enjoyed widespread support from their 
members as trade union leaders, but the latter have 
generally not shared the former's wider political 
aspirations. 
Left wing parties have often concerned themselves with 
'Marxist purity', rather than setting about the long term 
task of winning popular support. For example, the united 
Labour Front of the 1970s failed to confront the problem of 
racial politics and simply tried to replace it with a class-
based political agenda. It did not have a conception of 
transitional demands which attempted to bridge the gap in 
the existing political consciousness of the working classes 
on the one hand, and the socialism to which the ULF aspired, 
on the other. 
The rise of social movement unionism in the 1980s may 
prepare the way for a new stage in the history of labour 
politics in Trinidad. However, one should recognise the 
context in which this has taken place - the biggest crisis 
in the labour movement's history - and the fact that the 
initiatives to start a popular labour-social movement 
alliance are very tentative. Nevertheless, the summit of 
peoples' organisations is a potentially significant 
organisation for three reasons. Firstly, because it is an 
alliance-based organisation it can more easily come to terms 
297 
with the diversity of the working classes and recognise 
(unlike the ULF or WFP) that political unity can only be 
achieved through a recognition of social and cultural 
diversity. In this way, social movement unionism attempts to 
come to terms with, rather than ignore, the divisions within 
the working classes. The autonomy of the different social 
movements must therefore be recognised, as well as the 
common democratic interests that they share. Secondly, and 
related to this first point, social movements tend to be 
'bottom up' initiatives and so should represent, and be part 
of, the working classes in a way that 'vanguard' 
organisations never did or could. Whilst the labour movement 
remains too much of a 'top down' organisation, there is at 
least now a recognition amongst its leaders that this is a 
major problem that must be faced, and most unions now have 
structures that are more democratic than they were thirty 
years ago. Thirdly, because social movement unionism is 
based on initiatives from below, it can represent (albeit in 
a limited way and through a long term process) alternative 
sources of power and co-operation in society. In this way, 
it is part of a 'counter hegemonic strategy' for change that 
represents a challenge to a liberal democracy in a 
peripheral capitalist society. This point is important 
because, although there is widespread cynicism about 
parliamentary rule (in that it is weak and corrupt), it has 
not been challenged by alternative systems of popular power. 
The 1970 rebellion never confronted the issue of power 
(except for - briefly - the military), and the power base of 
socialist parties has rested with central committees rather 
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than popular organisations. This was the case with the ULF, 
despite the intentions of the Shah faction. 
Labour in Trinidad and Tobago is therefore beginning (again 
I would stress, slowly and tentatively) to recognise the 
realities of its history. The working classes have been, and 
will continue to be, a major force in the twin island 
state's history. 
On the other hand, the working classes, and their various 
fractions, have played different political roles at 
different times and situations. Capitalist development is 
especially uneven in peripheral capitalist societies, and so 
too is the development of class consciousness. This is the 
case in all societies, but it is especially true where the 
class structure is particularly fluid and diffuse. 
vanguardism has been ineffective because it is based on a 
productionist Marxism which assumes the existence of a 
homogenous working class and is therefore an inappropriate 
model for Third World (and other) societies. 
In this thesis, I have challenged existing theories of 
development and underdevelopment and in doing so, have 
attempted to show that there is a close link between labour 
and development. The 'underdevelopment' of Trinidad and 
Tobago should be explained by referring to the 'archaic' 
methods of labour control in the 18 and 19 centuries, and 
the unevenness of class formation in the 20 century. 
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I have then further used the concept of uneven development 
to move beyond traditional conceptions of production and the 
working class, to explain the real divisions within the 
labour force, and how the labour movement has constructively 
engaged with these problems. While I have outlined these 
issues in relation to a small Caribbean twin island state, 
my approach is also more generally significant. Both labour 
movements, and intellectuals in many countries have begun to 
recognise the limitations of productionist Marxism and 
traditional Marxist-Leninism, and have looked instead at 
issues like the relationship between different fractions of 
the working classes, non-class divisions such as those based 
on gender and ethnicity, and the emergence, given this 
context, of social movement unionism (for commentaries see 
Cohen 1983; Munck 1988). It is hoped that my thesis is a 
modest contribution to this 'new' approach to labour 
studies. 
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APPENDIX: THB RESEARCH PROCESS 
The purpose of this appendix is to provide some detail about 
my experience of the research process. It outlines my 
primary research strategies, and how these changed (and were 
forced to change) over time. I also conclude by describing 
my experience of the process of writing up a thesis. 
As I said in my introduction, documentary materials were 
always going to be my major source of data because they 
provide the researcher with the opportunity to utilise a 
long term perspective. Surveys or interviews usually cover a 
small period of time and apply to subjects which are far 
more specific than a history of labour which covers a period 
of 200 years. My concern was to explore the general 
tendencies of labour politics, and so documentary research 
was considered the most appropriate strategy. 
Nevertheless, I initially thought that I could supplement my 
documentary sources with a large number of interviews in 
Trinidad. Before visiting the country, my research time-
table was broadly divided into two sections. Firstly, I 
would concentrate on the period up to 1970 and use documents 
and newspapers from the colonial and immediate post-colonial 
period. Secondly, in Trinidad, I planned to examine 
documentary sources for the period from 1970-90, but I also 
intended to undertake case studies of two trade unions {the 
333 
OWTU and the NUGFW) in the contemporary period. I hoped to 
interview rank and file trade unionists in order to get a 
'view from below'. While the first half of my research plan 
ran relatively smoothly, my plans concerning the second part 
in Trinidad were continually altered. 
My first problem was that I had serious doubts about my 
intention to 'target' two trade unions at branch level. In 
my planned interviews I hoped to examine what rank and file 
members saw as the relationships between trade unionism and 
politics, and between organised and unorganised labour. The 
two unions were chosen because each was in one of the two 
federations, the OWTU had a long history of organisation, 
and the NUGFW was the largest union in the country. While 
these interviews would undoubtedly provide me with a wealth 
of primary and highly specific data, I thought that there 
was a danger of the material becoming too specific. For 
instance, there was no guarantee that my discoveries in the 
two case stUdies could be generalised to those unions at a 
national level, or to the labour movement as a whole. I 
therefore felt that I was in danger of losing a macro-
perspective. 
I arrived in Trinidad in January 1990, and almost 
immediately these doubts were increased. Two research 
students at the University of west Indies had carried out 
interviews with workers in the oil and sugar industries (see 
D. Ramsaran 1989). They told me that they had aroused great 
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suspicion from interviewees, and that it was widely believed 
that they were spies from the World Bank or International 
Monetary Fund, who were planning to 'rationalise' the 
workforce. At times they had been verbally abused and 
threatened with physical violence. Both researchers were 
from Trinidad, and they warned me that a British researcher 
might fare worse than they had done. 
My doubts were obviously increased by these stories, but I 
still decided at this point to make contact with trade union 
leaders at national level as a first step to getting access 
to trade union branches (and documentary materials). After 
the General Secretary of the Council of Progressive Trade 
Unions confirmed that I would face suspicion or even open 
hostility from rank and file trade unionists, I decided to 
formulate a different strategy for interviews. My interviews 
would now focus on trade union leaders and concentrate on 
the question of how the economic recession had led to new 
strategies within the leadership of the trade union 
movement, based around social movement unionism, and whether 
this would provide the renewed basis for one united trade 
union federation. The findings of these interviews would 
therefore not constitute a whole chapter, but would instead 
form the section of chapter six which looks at trade union 
unity. In order to maintain a wider analysis, such as data 
on the economy, government-labour relations and strikes, I 
was drawn back to a reliance on documentary materials (see 
below for more details). 
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The choice of which trade union leaders to interview changed 
over time, and was strongly influenced by informal 
consultations with leaders. For instance, I initially 
intended to interview two leaders from each of the 
federations, but the Labour Congress General Secretary Carl 
Tull recommended that I talk with his deputy, Patrick 
Rabathly, who was also General Secretary of the Bank 
Employees' Union. Rabathly was a major source of 
information, particularly concerning the division in the 
Labour congress unions between the 'old guard' and the 
younger leaders. I therefore decided to formalise at least 
some of what he told me in an interview. 
All of the interviews with labour leaders (except one - see 
below) were taped and then transcribed, and each (again with 
one - the same - exception) lasted between 45 minutes and 
one hour. The interviews were semi-structured, and were 
divided into three broad sections: the first section looked 
at each particular union and how it had been affected in the 
1980s; section two examined the relationship between the 
trade union and wider social struggles, and section three 
looked at the progress towards trade union unity. The 
interviewees gave information on certain details on the 
condition that I would not quote them directly. Much of this 
sensitive information was concerned with dominant, yet 
publicly low-key figures in the trade union movement, and 
dealt with the issues of corruption and government 
patronage, and political affiliations and finance. Although 
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I quote various leaders in chapter six, much of the data 
presented is based on the 'feelings' conveyed to me by 
interviewees, and this again led me back to a search for 
more public data, where for example the differences between 
the two federations were openly expressed in newspaper 
advertisements. 
The disadvantage of this approach was that I lost some of my 
focus on the 'rank and file' and there was a danger that I 
would concentrate too much on the trade union leadership. 
However, I recovered my macro-based approach, and decided 
that in my return to documentary sources I would bear in 
mind the historical division between trade union leaders and 
rank and file members. In addition I specifically asked 
trade union leaders questions about this division and all of 
them were prepared to admit that there was a wide 
discrepancy between the attitudes of leaders and members. 
For the period of the 1980s, I was given accesss to a wide 
variety of documents. The General Secretary of the Council 
of progressive Trade Unions allowed me to search through his 
files, and agreed to photocopy (free of charge) any material 
that I found useful. I spent three separate days sorting 
through the files, and a secretary photocopied hundreds of 
pages of documents. The documents included material on 
correspondence between the two trade union federations, on 
alternatives to government economic policy, and minutes of 
meetings of the Joint Trade Union Movement and the Summit of 
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Peoples' Organisations. After the photocopying was 
completed, the General Secretary checked through to see 
which documents I had taken. He agreed to release all of the 
material I requested, but did so on the condition that I 
would not quote directly any of the minutes of meetings. I 
agreed to this request. 
After taking the documents home, I divided them both 
chronologically and into four subject categories, and, as a 
result, I read them twice. The first time, I read them as 
historical documents, and tried to trace important shifts of 
emphasis in union policy over time. The subject categories 
emerged out of my historical reading, and they formed the 
basis for the structure of chapter six. The four categories 
were economic policy, industrial relations, trade union 
unity and labour parties. Once these categories were 
established they were again sub-divided chronologically. 
Reading and re-reading the documents was at times a tedious 
affair, and much of my time was spent discarding material 
which was repetitive (in that certain points were constantly 
made in documents). The documents were important because 
they told me how the CPTU federations perceived the crisis 
in the economy and the labour movement, and how the leaders 
hoped to deal with these problems. The most serious weakness 
in this approach was again that it relied too much on the 
views of the leadership and not enough on those of the rank 
and file. This common problem is more serious in Trinidad 
338 
because the progressive trade unions have a history of 
exaggerating the radicalism of workers. I kept this in mind 
when reading through the documents, and looked at strike 
statistics and newspapers in order to get a clearer picture 
of rank and file feeling in the 1980s. Moreover, documentary 
confirmation of a leader-member divide became a source of 
data in itself, and as I have already said, this is 
something I explored further in my interviews with trade 
union leaders. To my surprise, most of them (including those 
in the CPTU) accepted that there was a wide gap between the 
views of leaders and members, and discussions in interviews 
often centred around how this gap could be narrowed, and how 
this question related to trade union unity. 
The other major problem I faced in researching documentary 
material was getting access to the files of the Labour 
Congress. Its General Secretary did not provide me with any 
material and was very evasive in granting an interview. In 
the end, he allowed me to ask him a number of questions, but 
he made sure that the interview was not taped and that it 
only lasted for a short period of time (approximately 15 
minutes). Most of my information on the Labour Congress was 
obtained from public statements and paid advertisements in 
newspapers, and the CPTU provided me with some of the 
Labour Congress internal documents. The problem with this 
approach was that I was too reliant on the CPTU for 
information and there was a consequent danger of my 
favouring its contentions at the expense of the Labour 
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Congress. I therefore attempted to redress the balance 
through informal (and formal) consultations with one 
prominent figure in the Labour Congress. I also attempted to 
constructively utilise my problems of gaining access to 
Labour Congress, and questioned the secretive approach of 
some of its leaders. My key informant provided me with 
information (not all of which I could confirm) about the 
history of the Congress, and some of its more questionable 
activities, and told me about the personality conflicts 
within the leadership of the trade union movement as a 
whole. Once again, the 'flavour' of some of this information 
is contained in chapter six, but direct quotations have not 
been used. I agreed to my informant's request that, for the 
sake of peace in the Labour Congress, he should remain 
anonymous. 
On my return to England in July 1990 I started writing up 
the thesis. I had already began writing drafts of the early 
chapters, but these were amended in the light of further 
investigation of documentary material in Trinidad. 
Nevertheless, these early drafts were very important because 
they substantially reduced the time spent on writing the 
thesis. This was all the more important because I found that 
writing was by far the most tedious part of the research 
project. In my final year I went through a couple of periods 
where I simply found it impossible to write, and I wondered 
if I would ever complete the thesis. Given the isolated 
nature of research, these feelings are to some degree 
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inevitable. However, in my experience (and I would not be so 
bold as to generalise) these feelings are also controllable, 
so long as one keeps a sense of perspective. I have heard 
former Ph.D. students give talks about how their project 
became their 'life', and how they spent countless nights 
interpreting their data and writing and re-writing draft 
chapters. In my case the Ph.D. was never my life, and in the 
last year I do not recall working on it after 7 o'clock in 
the evening, or at any time over weekends. I basically 
treated it as a 9 to 5 job, and then completely switched off 
from it. Finally, I managed to retain a sense of proportion 
by remembering that no matter how bad things got, they were 
infinitely better for me than they were for those who were 
the subjects of my research. 
